What are the West’s Russia sanctions missing?

Some conspicuous absences exist in the West’s sanctions regime against Russia, allowing it to contine raking in a fortune.

After Russian troops poured across Ukraine’s border in February last year, the West unleashed an unprecedented raft of sanctions on Russia – on a scale not seen since the dark days of the Cold War.

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A Yale University study from July 2022 claimed the sanctions, which targeted a sweep of industries and trades, were “catastrophically crippling” the Russian economy, citing the ruble’s collapse and mass exodus of Western firms.

The Russian economy has since shown resilience, however.

Its GDP – an indicator of economic health measuring the total value of goods and services a country produces – is predicted in a Reuters poll to rise 0.7% this year, all the while other European economies splutter and stagnate.

There are many reasons for Russia’s economic robustness. But some suggest one explanation is that sanctions have too many blindspots, loopholes and cracks, limiting their ability to hit Russia where it hurts – in the pocket. 

“There are plenty of gaps in the existing sanctions regime,” Tom Keatinge, Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at Royal United Services Insitute, tells Euronews.

First up he highlights the “financial system” where “banking channels to deal with Russia” remain open in the West.

While these are ostensibly to pay for energy imports that are still allowed in some cases, Keatinge says transactions are “very hard to police”, suggesting payments for oil and gas could mask purchases of other items, such as high-tech military goods.

“If you are a bank, it can be hard to really know what the underlying trade a payment is connected to,” he explained. “Frankly, these remaining channels are overdue being closed down.”

The same goes for companies involved in other sectors with more of a humanitarian bent, such as food and pharmaceuticals, Keatinge continues. 

“There’s always a risk that a batch of medicines or similar being exported could act as a cover for something less benign.”

“I am not against leaving humanitarian loopholes if they are acknowledged and policed properly,” he adds.

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‘Bankrolling Russia’s war machine’

Another gap says the analyst is that many specific industries remain sanctions-free.

Diamonds are one such example. Though the United States and United Kingdom have applied restrictions, the European Union (EU) continually leaves the precious stones off its Russia sanctions list, now in their 11th incarnation. 

This allows the world’s biggest diamond producer continued access to one of its key markets.

“Governments are struggling to figure out how to close those loopholes in a way that isn’t too hard on their own pockets,” Keatinge tells Euronews, suggesting Belgium’s desire to protect its diamond industry helps explain the slow application of sanctions to the diamond industry.

Still, he cautions sanctions are a complex issue.

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Despite much “distasteful” trade carrying on, Keatinge notes some “is very challenging to cut, like the ongoing trade in nuclear fuel.”

The AP news agency reported in August Moscow was raking in hundreds of millions of euros selling nuclear fuel to the US and Europe, which are entirely dependent on Russian products.

Not slapping sanctions on some other goods, such as medicines for Russian civilians, also “makes perfect sense” as it could pose a “huge propaganda own goal” for the West, Keatinge adds.  

Fundamental to this issue are arguments about how sanctions work and their ultimate purpose – irrespective of what they target or not. 

“It is wrong to suggest sanctions are an all-or-nothing thing,” Keatinge emphasises.

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“It’s clearly not true that you have to sanction everything everywhere in order for them to have any effect,” he explains. “Lots of restrictions have been put in place. But the system does, nonetheless, have cracks, where money and trade, like water, will find its way through.”

“We need to limit the number of cracks to the greatest extent possible – and recognise that if they do exist they leave material gaps in our defences – but that doesn’t completely undermine the sanctions regime, they are clearly having an impact.”

‘It’s economic war’

While welcoming scrutiny of what was missing from the West’s sanctions regime, Mark Harrison, Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Warwick, says the “important thing” was that there was one in the first place. 

“The real purpose of economic warfare is to ramp up costs for an adversary by forcing them to make adaptations,” he tells Euronews. “It is not possible to seal off the Russian economy.” 

“But what we can do is continually make it more expensive for Russia to maintain its ties with the rest of the world.”

“Modern economies are very tough targets. That doesn’t mean it’s not worth attacking them. It means countries need realism and patience,” he added. 

Russia’s prized fossil fuel revenues – upon which its economy depends –  dropped by more than a quarter in January 2023 compared to the previous year, according to the International Energy Agency.  

A final issue with the West’s sanctions regime the experts raise is that third countries aren’t covered. 

This means other states with more of an ambivalent position on the Ukraine war, such as Turkey, Kazakhstan and India, can act as intermediaries where sanctioned goods pass through their territory to or from Russia – circumventing the sanctions. 

“Many in Europe have overlooked the fact that the target of sanctions, Russia, doesn’t sit there and say okay,” says Keatinge. “They restructure and reorganise.” 

India has ramped up purchases of Russian crude oil, which some allege is sold as a refined product to help Moscow evade sanctions, according to a Euronews report in May.

New Delhi has defended itself, claiming it cannot pay for more expensive energy imports from countries beyond Russia with millions living in poverty.

“If you block off trade by one route, it just finds another way,” details Harrison, citing a historical example of World War One where exports were “simply rerouted” through neutral European countries after Britain imposed a naval blockade on Germany.

‘Some countries have a bad rep when it comes to sanctions’

Even amongst Western allies of Ukraine, Keatinge suggests sanctions lack “consistency”, with some countries buying petroleum products more actively than others, plus a few Russian banks can still use the SWIFT payment system.

“It doesn’t make a mockery of the sanctions, but it certainly makes it far more difficult to have any certainty the restrictions are being properly imposed,” he told Euronews.

Led by ultra-nationalist Viktor Orban, Hungary has gained notoriety for continuing to purchase Russian energy, while some worry sanctions fatigue is gripping Austria, with one political party saying last October restrictions should be put to a referendum.

“Sanctions are a political tool,” Keatinge tells Euronews. “If the leadership in your country is not putting out strong messaging on sanctions, then why would industry feel the need to comply.”

The EU signalled in July that its sanctions against Russia will build over time, with the bloc seeking to patch holes and curb new loopholes as and when they arise. 

These could extend to penalising countries that aid Russia, though this is not certain. 

“It’s a war of attrition,” says Harrison. “By subjecting Russia to costly workarounds and stretching its resources, we weaken the country both at home and on the battlefield.” 

“That’s the point. That’s the purpose here.”



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What would actually happen if Ukraine joined the EU?

By any stretch of the imagination, Ukraine probably isn’t joining the EU any time soon.

Plagued by deep structural issues – not to mention Russia’s grinding invasion – it could take many years for the country to get ready – no matter where its heart lies.

Still, Ukrainian accession is a hot topic, with debates raging among analysts and policymakers about what it would mean in practice if the embattled nation entered the fold.

‘The centre of gravity would shift to the east’

Home to some 40 million people, Ukraine would become the union’s fifth-biggest member and largest by land mass, if it joined.

This would raise significant geopolitical implications, paving the way for a new Warsaw-Kyiv axis that could rival the traditional Paris-Berlin one, according to Professor Michael Keating at Aberdeen University in Scotland.

With the “old Franco-German motor not what it used to be… we could certainly see a large shift in the balance of power within the EU,” he told Euronews, though Ukraine itself would not be “very powerful”.

Enlargement could further strain the unity and cohesion of the 27-member state club. 

“The bigger the European Union gets, the more difficult it becomes to make decisions and engage in collective action,” said Keating. 

Already there are major tussles within the EU between western and southern states, eastern and northern, over the nature of the bloc and its objectives.

Relatively new members Hungary and Poland – who both joined in 2004 – have been a particular thorn in the side of Brussels, which has sanctioned them for undermining the rule of law and democracy. 

Money also matters. 

Even before the war ground its economy to dust, Ukraine was one of the poorest countries in Europe.

It had a GDP per capita of $4,800 (€4451) in 2021 – more than ten times less than advanced European economies such as the UK, France and Germany.

According to Jolyon Howorth, a professor of European politics, integrating such a battered and bruised country would cost a “horrendous amount”.

It could invariably strain EU finances, possibly diverting funds away from poorer member states, such as Poland, Greece, Hungary and Romania, all net beneficiaries in 2022.

Yet this has happened before. 

Despite “a bit of grumbling” from those who lost out, Keating says EU funding has historically changed, shifting east and southwards as the EU enlarged in 2004 and 2007.

“That’s part of the normal process of adjustment,” he told Euronews. “They’re losing funding because they’re developing. That’s not much of a problem.”

“It’s a bit difficult to complain about getting richer.” 

‘Polish plumber tropes’

In the long run, Ukraine could stand to reap economic gains, especially through attracting foreign investment, if admitted into the EU – the richest trading bloc on the planet.

Plus the need to meet EU eligibility criteria may incentivise the country to tackle deep-seated structural issues, such as corruption, an endemic evil in Ukraine. 

But Keating issued a warning.

Across many states, EU membership has increased regional disparities, he suggested. 

Those living in the area around the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, for example, have a GDP per capita nearly three times higher than in the country’s poorest region. 

This is possible in Ukraine, according to Keating. With investment concentrated around Kyiv, he said regions in the east – where “political tensions are the highest” – could grow even more “economically marginalised”.

“That could be a problem,” he said. “Policies [would need to be] in place to make sure there wasn’t too much division in the country when it came to economics and wealth.”

In the more immediate term, Holyworth says it is “almost inevitable” there would be migratory flows out of Ukraine.

Any mass influx of Ukrainian workers runs the risk of creating a possible political backlash in existing member states – irrespective of their economic contribution.

Experiencing a boom at the time, the UK was one of the only major economies not to limit the number of eastern European workers, with immigration later becoming a hugely contentious issue within the Brexit vote.

This is despite the positive economic impact of European immigrants on the country. 

But Keating claimed: “That’s already happened. Poland was filled with Ukrainians, even before the war.”

“Labour markets in western countries need these workers,” he continued, though recognised “economics and politics don’t always align”.

‘What are the limits of Europe?’

Writing in the New Statesman, a British political magazine, essayist Jeremy Cliffe claimed leaving Ukraine out in the cold would be a dangerous thing, possibly inviting new conflicts.

“Imagine a Ukraine worn down structurally and industrially by years of war; it’s economy sclerotic and investment sparse; a slow-motion failed state; its voters and leaders resentful of an EU that failed to stand by its promises.”

“Compared with this scenario, the challenges of rapid EU enlargement do not look quite so insurmountable,” he added.

Russia’s invasion has turbo-charged support for EU membership amongst Ukrainians. 

Ninety-two per cent want to join the club by 2030, according to a poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Before the conflict, only 67% said they would vote yes in a membership referendum. 

Debates around Ukraine’s EU membership ultimately raise profound existential questions about the bloc itself.

“Enlargements constantly call into question the reason why we’re doing it,” said Holywoth. “What is the purpose of further expansion? Are we doing it for its own sake? Can you keep on enlarging more or less indefinitely?”

“If you take that logic that the European Union can just keep extending itself, ever further forward, then it rapidly gets out of hand.”

Again he pointed to “ unresolved divisions” among member states about what the union really is, saying it was journeying to the unknown, without a clear purpose.

“We’ve never defined our destination. We’ve simply said that’s where we’re heading. And I think with the potential membership of Ukraine, we need to have a much clearer answer to that question: What’s the point of all this?”

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