What are the West’s Russia sanctions missing?

Some conspicuous absences exist in the West’s sanctions regime against Russia, allowing it to contine raking in a fortune.

After Russian troops poured across Ukraine’s border in February last year, the West unleashed an unprecedented raft of sanctions on Russia – on a scale not seen since the dark days of the Cold War.

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A Yale University study from July 2022 claimed the sanctions, which targeted a sweep of industries and trades, were “catastrophically crippling” the Russian economy, citing the ruble’s collapse and mass exodus of Western firms.

The Russian economy has since shown resilience, however.

Its GDP – an indicator of economic health measuring the total value of goods and services a country produces – is predicted in a Reuters poll to rise 0.7% this year, all the while other European economies splutter and stagnate.

There are many reasons for Russia’s economic robustness. But some suggest one explanation is that sanctions have too many blindspots, loopholes and cracks, limiting their ability to hit Russia where it hurts – in the pocket. 

“There are plenty of gaps in the existing sanctions regime,” Tom Keatinge, Director of the Centre for Financial Crime and Security Studies at Royal United Services Insitute, tells Euronews.

First up he highlights the “financial system” where “banking channels to deal with Russia” remain open in the West.

While these are ostensibly to pay for energy imports that are still allowed in some cases, Keatinge says transactions are “very hard to police”, suggesting payments for oil and gas could mask purchases of other items, such as high-tech military goods.

“If you are a bank, it can be hard to really know what the underlying trade a payment is connected to,” he explained. “Frankly, these remaining channels are overdue being closed down.”

The same goes for companies involved in other sectors with more of a humanitarian bent, such as food and pharmaceuticals, Keatinge continues. 

“There’s always a risk that a batch of medicines or similar being exported could act as a cover for something less benign.”

“I am not against leaving humanitarian loopholes if they are acknowledged and policed properly,” he adds.

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‘Bankrolling Russia’s war machine’

Another gap says the analyst is that many specific industries remain sanctions-free.

Diamonds are one such example. Though the United States and United Kingdom have applied restrictions, the European Union (EU) continually leaves the precious stones off its Russia sanctions list, now in their 11th incarnation. 

This allows the world’s biggest diamond producer continued access to one of its key markets.

“Governments are struggling to figure out how to close those loopholes in a way that isn’t too hard on their own pockets,” Keatinge tells Euronews, suggesting Belgium’s desire to protect its diamond industry helps explain the slow application of sanctions to the diamond industry.

Still, he cautions sanctions are a complex issue.

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Despite much “distasteful” trade carrying on, Keatinge notes some “is very challenging to cut, like the ongoing trade in nuclear fuel.”

The AP news agency reported in August Moscow was raking in hundreds of millions of euros selling nuclear fuel to the US and Europe, which are entirely dependent on Russian products.

Not slapping sanctions on some other goods, such as medicines for Russian civilians, also “makes perfect sense” as it could pose a “huge propaganda own goal” for the West, Keatinge adds.  

Fundamental to this issue are arguments about how sanctions work and their ultimate purpose – irrespective of what they target or not. 

“It is wrong to suggest sanctions are an all-or-nothing thing,” Keatinge emphasises.

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“It’s clearly not true that you have to sanction everything everywhere in order for them to have any effect,” he explains. “Lots of restrictions have been put in place. But the system does, nonetheless, have cracks, where money and trade, like water, will find its way through.”

“We need to limit the number of cracks to the greatest extent possible – and recognise that if they do exist they leave material gaps in our defences – but that doesn’t completely undermine the sanctions regime, they are clearly having an impact.”

‘It’s economic war’

While welcoming scrutiny of what was missing from the West’s sanctions regime, Mark Harrison, Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Warwick, says the “important thing” was that there was one in the first place. 

“The real purpose of economic warfare is to ramp up costs for an adversary by forcing them to make adaptations,” he tells Euronews. “It is not possible to seal off the Russian economy.” 

“But what we can do is continually make it more expensive for Russia to maintain its ties with the rest of the world.”

“Modern economies are very tough targets. That doesn’t mean it’s not worth attacking them. It means countries need realism and patience,” he added. 

Russia’s prized fossil fuel revenues – upon which its economy depends –  dropped by more than a quarter in January 2023 compared to the previous year, according to the International Energy Agency.  

A final issue with the West’s sanctions regime the experts raise is that third countries aren’t covered. 

This means other states with more of an ambivalent position on the Ukraine war, such as Turkey, Kazakhstan and India, can act as intermediaries where sanctioned goods pass through their territory to or from Russia – circumventing the sanctions. 

“Many in Europe have overlooked the fact that the target of sanctions, Russia, doesn’t sit there and say okay,” says Keatinge. “They restructure and reorganise.” 

India has ramped up purchases of Russian crude oil, which some allege is sold as a refined product to help Moscow evade sanctions, according to a Euronews report in May.

New Delhi has defended itself, claiming it cannot pay for more expensive energy imports from countries beyond Russia with millions living in poverty.

“If you block off trade by one route, it just finds another way,” details Harrison, citing a historical example of World War One where exports were “simply rerouted” through neutral European countries after Britain imposed a naval blockade on Germany.

‘Some countries have a bad rep when it comes to sanctions’

Even amongst Western allies of Ukraine, Keatinge suggests sanctions lack “consistency”, with some countries buying petroleum products more actively than others, plus a few Russian banks can still use the SWIFT payment system.

“It doesn’t make a mockery of the sanctions, but it certainly makes it far more difficult to have any certainty the restrictions are being properly imposed,” he told Euronews.

Led by ultra-nationalist Viktor Orban, Hungary has gained notoriety for continuing to purchase Russian energy, while some worry sanctions fatigue is gripping Austria, with one political party saying last October restrictions should be put to a referendum.

“Sanctions are a political tool,” Keatinge tells Euronews. “If the leadership in your country is not putting out strong messaging on sanctions, then why would industry feel the need to comply.”

The EU signalled in July that its sanctions against Russia will build over time, with the bloc seeking to patch holes and curb new loopholes as and when they arise. 

These could extend to penalising countries that aid Russia, though this is not certain. 

“It’s a war of attrition,” says Harrison. “By subjecting Russia to costly workarounds and stretching its resources, we weaken the country both at home and on the battlefield.” 

“That’s the point. That’s the purpose here.”



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If Bulgaria’s anti-corruption fight fails, Moscow stands to gain

By Nicolas Tenzer, Non-resident senior fellow, CEPA

Bulgaria’s fight against corruption is the best way to combat the Kremlin’s operations in the country, which risks becoming one of Europe’s weak links alongside Hungary, Nicolas Tenzer writes.

Former Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov recently presented an ambitious seven-point plan to his new coalition partner GERB, whose leader, Boyko Borissov, was in power for more than a decade.

The plan notably includes a roadmap for judicial reform and a warning that the country must urgently flush out Russian influence in its security services if Sofia hopes to succeed in cracking down on corruption.

Yet despite the bold plans, after less than a month, their ostensibly pro-Western coalition is already flirting with collapse — underscoring a perpetual instability which is hampering the long-awaited fight against graft.

Sixteen years after Bulgaria joined the European Union, it remains the bloc’s most corruption-ridden country, according to Transparency International. 

Despite Brussels’ repeated exhortations, Sofia has made little progress in establishing a fully independent judiciary and limiting the particularly extensive powers of the Bulgarian public prosecutor and his unparalleled near-total immunity.

While concerns about overreach by the Bulgarian prosecutor have percolated for years, they have reached a fever pitch in recent weeks as allegations of misconduct by the now-former prosecutor general have mounted. 

Ivan Geshev was finally dismissed by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) in mid-June, but amidst controversy over his successor Borislav Sarafov and reports that Geshev is embarking on a political career, it’s clear that more needs to be done to address the situation, especially given that failure to do so risks increasing Moscow’s influence in Bulgaria.

The prosecution finally went too far

The dismissal of Prosecutor General Geshev came as encouraging news after the long list of allegations against him, as accusations of protecting oligarchs and political allies had significantly increased in recent months. 

In January, Geshev ordered raids on the offices of the FinTech company Nexo, alleging financial improprieties. 

The reality, however, is likely far murkier, given that Nexo’s team were known to support the political opposition — expected to get a mandate to form a government just days after the raids took place.

On top of these suspicions of protecting corrupt officials and targeting private companies for political purposes, there have also been suggestions, denied by the prosecutor, that Geshev’s office has slowed down investigations into the explosions of ammunition depots in Bulgaria reportedly carried out by Russian military intelligence.

In early May, Geshev even allegedly escaped an assassination attempt against him after a bomb exploded near his car.

However, the inconsistencies in the official report of the highway blast kicked up significant speculation that Geshev had invented the supposed attack as a tactic to attract sympathy and hamper any attempt to reform the Judicial Prosecutor’s Office, a method straight out of the Kremlin’s playbook. He allegedly even let a series of false reports about the case run unchallenged.

To make matters worse, the alleged bomb attack prompted a smear campaign against investigative journalists in the country, with several OCCRP journalists targeted in particular–perhaps unsurprising given that Geshev and fellow prosecutors have launched abusive legal proceedings against investigative journalists (SLAPPs) for years. 

Notably, Geshev has repeatedly publicly accused journalists of conspiring with criminals and politicians of plotting against him.

Even after Geshev’s ouster, serious problems remain

The fact that Geshev is now preparing for a political career — he announced he had founded his own party, Justice for Bulgaria, this Wednesday, that is meant to target GERB’s and Borissov’s voters — suggests that he is unlikely to tone down his aggressive tactics and accusatory rhetoric. 

What’s more, the conditions under which he was dismissed as prosecutor general —essentially a political compromise decided by the SJC, a commission whose composition and independence are disputed — hardly suggest a serious commitment to genuine judicial reform.

Controversy immediately arose over the appointment of his successor, Borislav Sarafov, to the point where judges protested vigorously, with the Union of Judges questioning some of Sarafov’s decisions and his professional competence and calling for an open and transparent procedure.

Sarafov’s name also made waves amidst the investigation surrounding the Anti-Corruption Fund, notoriously dubbed the “Eight Dwarves” case. 

The saga saw a prominent Bulgarian businessman flee the country after exposing a scheme in which the prosecutor’s office apparently conspired to seize control of the flourishing elevator business Izamet. 

Astonishingly, no penalties or charges have been brought forth thus far, and Sarafov’s involvement remains unexplained.

Despite opposition from the Minister of Justice, Sarafov’s appointment was confirmed on 22 June, casting doubt on the Bulgarian judiciary’s competence to impartially crack down on corruption anytime soon.

The Kremlin stands to gain

A perpetuation of the status quo in Bulgaria — a flawed judiciary and endemic graft —leaves fertile ground for foreign interference, particularly from Russia. 

As Petkov recently noted, “Moscow uses corruption to maneuver their foreign policy.” 

Russian influence is already a major pain point in Sofia; Defense Minister Todor Tagarev recently expressed his extreme concern at Moscow’s increasing malign operations in his country.

These Russian actions are nothing new: as Bellingcat investigative journalist Christo Grozev revealed, Moscow operatives were already behind an attempted coup in Bulgaria in 2016.

The Kremlin may well have had a hand in certain policy decisions in Sofia, too — seen, for example, in the fact that the Bulgarian government was the only one in the EU not to condemn the attempted poisoning of the Skripals in the UK in 2018, or the government’s failure to implement any of the EU’s sanctions against Russian citizens or companies. 

Russian influence also appears to have been decisive in toppling Petkov, a fervent supporter of Ukraine and the fight against corruption, after just six months in office last year.

Bulgarian political life itself is ridden with Russian influence — whether in the form of openly pro-Kremlin parties or officially pro-EU parties nevertheless willing to form alliances with pro-Russian factions or Bulgarian President Rumen Radev’s relatively complacent line towards Putin’s regime. 

Many of these elements have seen their own power grow amidst Bulgaria’s instability — it’s hardly surprising, then, that the authorities show little eagerness to combat the manipulation of information on social networks and in parts of the press.

Moscow’s malign influence is not without results

These factors have concrete and worrying results: according to a December 2022 survey, only 46% of Bulgarians (sharply below an EU average of 88%) believe that the war against Ukraine is Russia’s responsibility. 

As Bulgaria’s liberal defence minister pushes for increased arms deliveries to Ukraine, it is feared that Russian disinformation and interference operations will multiply, playing on conciliatory views within the ruling coalition.

Bulgaria’s fight against corruption is not only an indispensable battle in and of itself but is the best way to combat the Kremlin’s operations in the country, which risks becoming one of Europe’s weak links alongside Hungary. 

The long-awaited reform of the judiciary, in particular a reassessment of the chief prosecutor’s role, will be a decisive signal in whether Sofia can genuinely combat graft. 

Both the EU and NATO should take a firmer, more determined stance in urging the motley coalition in power to move in this direction.

Nicolas Tenzer is a guest professor at Sciences Po Paris and a non-resident senior fellow at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

At Euronews, we believe all views matter. Contact us at [email protected] to send pitches or submissions and be part of the conversation.

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