Normalising al-Assad’s regime is against Europe’s interests

Normalising al-Assad’s regime is against Europe’s interests

Post By World bashar al-assad, European Union, euroviews, Syrian refugees, War in Syria

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

As someone who witnessed the tragic consequences of conflict, genocide and forced displacement in the Balkans, every time an attempt is made to normalise relations with a dictator fuelling a decade-long war marked by repression, ethnic cleansing and major war crimes, it leaves me questioning who thought that would be anything but the worst possible idea.

Yet, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani and his Austrian counterpart Alexander Schallenberg have just called for a change in Europe’s strategy toward Syria — specifically suggesting the normalisation of relations with the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Their words, published in the Italian press, echo a call joined by six other countries —Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia — facing increasing domestic political pressures to act against the increasing refugee flows toward Europe.

Their demands will be discussed in a meeting of all 27 EU member states on 13 September.

Informed by Bosnia’s painful history and years of work studying the Syrian crisis, I must warn that normalising relations with al-Assad would have disastrous consequences, especially in terms of refugee return and stability of Europe.

Legitimising a regime that has systematically destroyed its own population and which continues to pose a threat to both the Syrian people and European security will result in more refugees reaching European borders, not less.

It’s not about the economy

The position articulated by the eight European governments seems to suggest that normalising relations with al-Assad could facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, thus easing the pressure on Europe.

This argument is fundamentally flawed. Syrian refugees are not simply economic migrants who can be coaxed back with promises of aid and reconstruction. They are people who fled unspeakable violence, torture, and repression at the hands of the al-Assad regime.

Any proposal to return refugees to Syria under al-Assad’s rule ignores the reality that many of these people are viewed as enemies by the very government that Europe seeks to normalise relations with.

Al-Assad’s regime has made it clear that it has no interest in welcoming back refugees, especially those who were part of the opposition or fled regime-controlled areas. The regime has enacted numerous laws that allow it to seize the properties of displaced Syrians, labelling them as “terrorists” or “traitors”.

Moreover, recent decrees, like the one issued in November 2023, allow the regime to confiscate the assets of those who oppose it, further disincentivising any potential return.

A UNHCR report from 2023 showed that less than 1.1% of Syrian refugees expressed a willingness to return to Syria under current conditions. They demand security, freedom from arbitrary detention, access to livelihoods, and the resolution of issues surrounding detainees—all things that the al-Assad regime has shown no interest in providing.

Any attempts to force or even encourage refugees to return to al-Assad-controlled areas will only lead to renewed cycles of displacement.

According to repeated surveys by the Syrian Association for Citizens Dignity, more than 70 % of displaced Syrians would rather risk their lives trying to reach Europe than accept a return to al-Assad-held Syria.

There can’t be any ‘safe zones’ if violence never stopped

As a Bosnian, it makes me shudder to hear well-informed insiders warn that one of the central proposals championed by a number of European and some non-European states and international organisations is the creation of “safe zones” within al-Assad-held Syria where Syrian refugees would be returned to.

On paper, this may seem like a practical solution to Europe’s concerns over migration. However, in reality, the concept of safe zones in al-Assad-controlled areas is a dangerous illusion.

In Bosnia, we experienced first-hand how the concept of safe zones can fail catastrophically. The international community declared Srebrenica a safe zone, only to watch in horror as 8,000 men and boys were massacred by Bosnian Serb forces.

The failure of the international community to protect those who sought refuge there should serve as a permanent lesson in the limitations of such zones, especially when they are established in areas where the very forces responsible for war crimes are in control.

In Syria, the situation is even more complex. Al-Assad’s regime may nominally control large parts of the country, but key areas are actually under the influence of Iranian-backed militias and Hezbollah, as well as Russian forces. These are not regions of stability or safety; they are militarised zones where civilians continue to live in fear.

Violence, arbitrary arrests, and detentions remain widespread in al-Assad-controlled areas, making the idea of establishing safe zones within these territories not only unrealistic but also unethical. Any attempt to push refugees into these zones would place them directly into the hands of a regime that considers them traitors and enemies.

Furthermore, in areas like Daraa, which have nominally “reconciled” with the regime, the violence has never stopped, in fact it is on the rise. Residents continue to face threats, repression, and new waves of displacement.

Refugees who return to these areas are not returning to safety—they are returning to insecurity, intimidation, and the potential for renewed violence. This rise in violence is these days spreading to other areas, including Homs and Sweyda.

The experience of Daraa, where the head of the Military Security Branch of the regime’s forces only last week threatened to turn the town into a “Gaza like situation,” should serve as a stark warning to Europe about the dangers of relying on al-Assad to ensure security for returning refugees.

Forcing refugees back into al-Assad-controlled areas under the guise of “safe zones” would not only violate their basic human rights but would also lead to new waves of displacement. Many Syrians would choose to flee again rather than live under al-Assad’s brutal rule.

As a result, Europe could face renewed refugee flows, this time from Syrians who have been pushed back into an unsafe homeland. This scenario would only exacerbate the refugee crisis that European leaders are so eager to solve.

The dangers of normalising al-Assad

Normalising relations with al-Assad would have far-reaching consequences, not just for Syria but for Europe itself. Al-Assad has shown no interest in meaningful political reform, accountability for war crimes, or human rights. Instead, he has relied on the support of Iran and Russia to maintain his grip on power while continuing to oppress his people.

The push to normalise relations with al-Assad is not just misguided—it is dangerous. Proponents argue that normalisation would bring stability to Syria and allow for economic recovery. But this argument ignores the fundamental nature of al-Assad’s regime.

Al-Assad has not survived because he is a capable leader committed to the welfare of his people. He has survived because he has ruthlessly crushed any opposition, starved his people into submission, based his economy on the manufacturing and smuggling Captagon, and relied on external actors — namely Russia and Iran — to prop up his regime.

Normalising relations with al-Assad would not bring stability; it would entrench a corrupt, brutal dictatorship. The al-Assad regime has systematically weaponised humanitarian aid, diverting it to loyalists and using it to further its military objectives. The regime has no interest in political reform or national reconciliation.

Some 13 years of international engagement, from the “Four Baskets” to the Constitutional Committee to “Step for Step” to Arab normalisation, have all yielded the same result: al-Assad has refused to make any concessions. He has no reason to change course now.

For Europe, normalising al-Assad would be a political and moral disaster. It would send a clear message that dictators can commit war crimes, displace half their population, and still be welcomed back into the international community. This would not only embolden al-Assad but also set a dangerous precedent for other authoritarian regimes.

What should Europe do?

So, what should Europe’s strategy toward Syria look like? First, Europe must maintain its commitment to sanctions and diplomatic isolation of the al-Assad regime until there are real, verifiable changes on the ground.

These changes should include the release of political prisoners, an end to arbitrary arrests and torture, and the establishment of conditions for the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of refugees. Any discussions of reconstruction aid should be tied to progress on human rights and accountability for war crimes.

Second, Europe must continue to support the work of international organisations that are documenting war crimes and building cases for future prosecutions. Just as the ICTY was essential in holding perpetrators accountable in the Balkans, future justice mechanisms will be crucial for Syria. The issues of detainees and accountability for crimes continue to be the most important return conditions for the vast majority of displaced Syrians.

Finally, Europe must reject the idea of creating “safe zones” in al-Assad-controlled areas and focus instead on supporting refugees where they are. This means increasing support for host countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan while at the same time using its political weight to elevate the creation of a genuinely safe environment for all Syrians to the top of the political process in Geneva.

There is one point Tajani, Schallenberg and I agree on: Europe indeed faces a critical choice in its approach to Syria.

It can either opt for the normalization of the Syrian regime and the creation of “safe zones” in al-Assad’s Syria and start preparing for new waves of Syrian refugees that are bound to seek safety in Europe as a result, or it can stand firm in its commitment to human rights, justice, and accountability, and start the hard work of convening a genuine political process which will move Syria towards the establishment of a genuinely safe environment for all Syrians.

Only one of these two paths is not only a moral obligation to the millions of displaced Syrians but also in Europe’s interest.

Refik Hodžić is a transitional justice expert, former ICTY spokesperson and former Communications Director of the International Center for Transitional Justice.

At Euronews, we believe all views matter. Contact us at [email protected] to send pitches or submissions and be part of the conversation.

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Is Western myopia in Libya creating a far worse version of Gaddafi?

Post By World European Union, euroviews, Italy, Libya, Libyan war, United States

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

If we do not prevent Libya from becoming a mafia state, the trend will not stop at Libya’s borders but become a norm in the region, and especially the Sahel, Hafed Al-Ghwell writes.

Today, a gridlocked Libya ambles along in an unsettling calm as Russia increases its presence in the region.

Libya continues to unravel quietly, with indications mounting that rival governments are regrouping for something big.

Recently, Italian authorities intercepted a cargo ship suspected of bringing Russian weapons to General Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya.

The reason being that Russia is arming Haftar in return for allowing Moscow to build a port on the Mediterranean coast, which would give it a base with Italy directly in its sites.

The country remains compromised, not least by its self-assured ruling elites, but also by the unhelpful policy decisions and changing rules of engagement in Western capitals. I fear the consequences will likely birth the country’s next and likely Muammar Gaddafi.

Flip-flopping Western policies

Briefly looking back, we can see that Western approaches toward Libya have undergone noteworthy changes, shifting from narrow security-oriented strategies to facilitating inclusive political settlements.

And, when that failed to secure meaningful progress in restoring the Libyan state, the West subsequently devolved toward a messy strategy of pursuing agreements among Libya’s differing factions.

This new strategy erroneously viewed bargains between the fractious and unelected Libyan elites as a makeshift bridge toward the ultimate goal—peace and stability.

This is a grave miscalculation and a deliberate misreading of fairly obvious dynamics at play in Libya.

By prioritising exclusive bargains, the West inadvertently sponsored the entrenchment of Libya’s kleptocratic governance model that has successfully sidelined the building of key institutions and security sector reform.

At the core of this ill-informed shift in strategy was a severe underestimation of the underlying causes of Libya’s endemic instability and scapegoating of its political deadlock for a stalled state-building process. It also enabled the meteoric rise of “Clan Haftar”.

Small-time CIA asset turned Libya’s biggest strongman

Khalifa Haftar rose to prominence in Libya as a result of his military background and fortuitous alliances.

An ex-officer in Gaddafi’s army and commander of Gaddafi’s armies who tried and failed miserably to invade Chad, Haftar later turned into an opponent, participating in a failed coup before spending years in exile in the United States as a small-time CIA asset.

His return in 2011, followed by a series of events and foreign sponsorships, eventually catapulted Haftar into the larger-than-life figure he has become in Eastern Libya today.

After a failed and humiliating attempt to capture Tripoli with direct support from the UAE, Haftar’s stronghold remained in the east, where he established control through his Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), a network of alliances with tribal leaders, radical Islamists and other local armed factions with foreign backing, consolidating influence through both military and political manoeuvring.

A combination of strong anti-Islamist rhetoric, pure brutality, control over significant oil resources, and portraying himself as a bulwark of stability in a chaotic region further solidified his dominance in the eastern part of Libya — much to the delight of an international community exasperated by mounting policy failures in the country.

Despite a controversial background, problematic records of human rights violations, and deepening kleptocracy, Haftar continues to receive clandestine and overt support from various Western countries, including a recent visit with US officials.

France, for instance, valued Haftar’s promise of combating terrorism, stemming migrant flows, and possibly, being an insurance for Paris’ waning control over the Sahel.

Additionally, countries like Italy have been keen on gaining uninterrupted access to Libyan oil by trying to position Rome favourably in a post-conflict scenario and bolster its ambitions to become a Mediterranean energy hub, and Libya plays a prominent role in UAE’s ongoing agenda of gaining influence across North Africa and the Sahel.

Meanwhile, in Brussels, lavish economic incentives for Libya’s strongmen to control migration have altered the balance of power within the country.

By offering financial incentives to curb migrant flows, the EU is inadvertently subsidising the higher operational costs associated with keeping trafficking routes open, bankrolling Clan Hafar’s management of detention facilities and security operations essential for trafficking, and increasing its control over these illicit markets.

‘Haftar & Sons, Inc’

Beyond Libya’s borders, Clan Haftar turns a hefty profit from more lucrative criminal activities like fuel and drug smuggling, while maintaining a facade of cooperation with Europe to ensure uninterrupted financial flows.

To date, there is no credible accountability mechanism or other means for tracking where profits from illicit activities go, as well as who or what they end up funding.

Meanwhile, the more resources Haftar and his sons accumulate from its capture of Libya’s state expenditures, the greater its accumulation of power and influence, fostering a deepening personality cult around Clan Haftar.

In a sense, Europe’s and the US’ strategy of reinforcing the very instability and criminality it claims to mitigate is not just an own goal for its policy objectives.

It also perfectly encapsulates the paradox of supposed defenders of democracy, human rights and the rule of law openly crowding behind the antithesis of protection of human rights, political pluralism and consensus government at the expense of Libya’s democratisation prospects.

This trend readily reinforces Clan Haftar’s authoritarian rule. Before its downfall in 2011, the Gaddafi regime was characterised by unrestrained power concentrated in the hands of one individual, with the systematic suppression of dissent and political pluralism while at least maintaining a level of a normal state with public services and security for its people.

Clan Haftar has already replicated this model in its control of the East. Unchecked, Libya faces the real possibility of becoming a far worse form of an earlier era of personalistic rule, suppressed civil liberties, disappearing political opposition, and a monolithic and mafia-like power structure with no regard to anything else other than the Haftar & Sons Inc while pretending it’s a national army.

The implications are grave

Politically, while some level of order might be achieved in territories under Haftar’s control, the undermining of an inclusive and legitimate central government could perpetuate instability and unrestrained violence, particularly in contested areas.

Socioeconomically, while resource control might bring short-term gains for certain factions, the lack of a unified national vision could hamper long-term development and equitable economic growth.

Citizens, especially in contested or “forgotten” regions, may continue to face issues related to access to basic services, employment opportunities, and investment in infrastructure.

Beyond Libya, the empowerment of figures like Haftar, with documented ties to criminal networks and a history of human rights abuses, is very concerning. It signals a worrisome precedence for short-termism.

In sum, Western policy towards Libya, characterised by a preference for deal-making with controversial actors like the Haftar clan, is a myopic approach fraught with peril.

A recalibration of this strategy is imperative, one that prioritises the establishment of legitimate political institutions and respect for human rights.

If we do not prevent Libya from becoming a mafia state, the trend will not stop at Libya’s borders but become a norm in its region, and especially the Sahel.

Hafed Al-Ghwell is the Executive Director of the North Africa Initiative (NAI) and Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute (FPI), Johns Hopkins University.

Contact us at [email protected] to send pitches or submissions and be part of the conversation.

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Ex French diplomat says world order at risk amid global conflicts

Post By World European politics, European Union, French politics

Around the world conflicts are multiplying and democracies seem increasingly in crisis. Has the world become ungovernable? Sergio Cantone put this question to Hubert Védrine, ex advisor to French President François Mitterrand and former Minister of Foreign Affairs for The Global Conversation.

In the 1980s and 90s when Hubert Védrine served as a foreign policy advisor to France’s President François Mitterrand, and later as Foreign Affairs minister from 1997 to 2002, the world was going through tumultuous times. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent end of the Cold War upended the post-WWII geopolitical order and caused a fundamental reset in global relations. As a leading diplomat Védrine was part of international efforts to chart a course through the chaos and gained a profound insight into the challenges entailed in the quest for peace and stability around the world; insight which he agreed to share with Euronews.

An end to world order?

Decades on and the question of global governability persists. Sergio Cantone began by asking Védrine if, in the turmoil of 2024, we are witnessing the end of a global political and economic order.

“Overall, there has never really been world order,” Védrine says. “In fact, there has always been world disorder. But there have been times when there have been powers that have managed to dominate the system. After the Second World War, it was the Americans who organised the aftermath, very well indeed. It was one of the rare moments when a dominant power managed to combine national interests, which are the case for all powers, with a kind of more general vision.

“Then there was the Cold War, which was quite stable, by the way, and we understood. There was the East, the West and the South, the famous Third World. And then, when the Soviet Union disappeared, there was a surge of enthusiasm, of triumphalism in the West, with a slightly nationalistic form in the United States: “We’ve won, we’re the masters!” Now we’re back to classic geopolitics: the strength of the United States, the strength of China, what’s happening to Russia, etc, etc, all that.

“So, I wouldn’t say that all regimes are in crisis, that’s different. In China or Russia, it’s different. On the other hand, all democracies are in crisis, in my opinion, they’re under threat. Look at the United States, they’re in a frightening situation. It’s like two countries fighting each other. So, there’s a crisis in democracies and representative democracies. The old ideas of electing people, presidents, members of parliament and so on, and letting them do their work, then judging the results, and taking them back or not, that’s dead.”

Relations with Russia

On the issue of the West’s relations with Moscow, Russia remains a dilemma for both Europeans and Americans. Some European countries take a hard confrontational approach, seeing Russia is an existential threat, while argue for more engagement with the superpower. How does Védrine see it?

“I’m of the same opinion, to be frank with you, as the old American realists: Kissinger, Brzezinski who are for once in agreement and who thought that we completely missed the 90s,” he says. “So, I also think that in this period: Yeltsin, Putin the second time, Medvedev, we should have done what Kissinger proposed, i.e., a major security agreement, including Russia. And Brzezinski, himself a Pole, he was with Carter, and even afterwards he had enormous influence, he said: ‘Ukraine must be cut off from Russia.’

“So, reinvent Ukraine, cut it off from Russia, so that Russia is no longer an empire. But don’t put it [Ukraine] in NATO. We need to create a neutrality status, like the Austria of the Cold War era. That’s not what’s been done at all. But not at all with a strategic duplicity approach. I use the term of Olympian offhandedness for the United States: “We’ve won. Our values are going to be imposed everywhere, with sermons, sanctions, bombings and so on. We’ve won”.

“Realism has not failed. Realpolitik hasn’t failed, it hasn’t been tried. So, it was a kind of confused realpolitik that dominated. And here, I do share Biden’s approach, and not the one of all the Europeans. Biden, from the start, said: “We’ve got to stop Putin from winning in Ukraine. We absolutely must. But we’re not going to let ourselves be dragged into a war with Russia.” And there’s a divide here, because there’s a group of Europeans who don’t dare to say it outspokenly, but they think we should remove the Russian regime. That’s the truth.

Ending the Ukraine war

In concrete terms what does the is mean for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine? Where does Védrine see the path to a resolution to the conflict lying?

“I expect some sort of freeze,” he says. “Either this is the famous Trump plan we know the beginning of. He tells Zelensky that it’s time to stop, so Zelensky anticipates, saying ‘I’ll get along with Trump, I’ll invite the Russians to negotiations,’ he’s already figured it out, and even if it’s the Democrats, they’re not going to promise perpetual support.

“So, a sort of freeze. After that, I can’t imagine negotiations, at least not direct ones. Ukraine has suffered too much, it’s too disgusting the Russian war in Ukraine, it’s monstrous in human terms, the targets, etc. It’s frightening. It’s frightening. So, they can’t negotiate with any president, even if it’s not Zelensky, even if it’s someone else, he can’t negotiate with Russia.

“Different countries were proposing plans, plans for coexistence, for neighbourliness, for an organized ceasefire, and so on. The Turks, who pointed out that they had allowed negotiations to take place in the first year. You remember. Eventually the Indians, the Chinese, Lula, everyone, but not the Europeans, who are in one camp now. I think that the Europeans, without giving anything up, continuing to help Ukraine, should position themselves to be able to play a role in the follow-up to this. And that means being able to accept that at some point we’ll have to talk to the Russians again.”

Whether Ukraine’s future lies in the European Union is less clear for Védrine, and he is even more sceptical about further eastward expansion of the bloc:

“Enlargement in general, one day, must stop somewhere. So, the idea that we’re going to enlarge all the way to Mongolia… Well, it’s a joke now, but we’re not there yet. Ukraine, I can understand that at some point, for reasons of human solidarity, given the atrocities suffered by the Ukrainians, we make this gesture, but it’s very complicated. They don’t meet the conditions. So, there must be a realistic timetable. On the other hand, we can’t let down countries like those in the Western Balkans, which have been in the waiting room for years.

“I was in the contact group, including the Russian minister at the time, Igor Ivanov. But I would point out that Spain has not recognized Kosovo. There are several European countries that haven’t recognized it because it’s too dangerous a precedent. So, I don’t see how the European machinery, which is rigid in its thinking, with much, much, much arrogance, perhaps a little less now, I don’t understand how it’s made a condition [for Serbia’s accession to the EU].

To see the interview in full, including Védrine’s thoughts on European defence and the rise of the far right in Europe, click on the video above.

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What’s at stake for Europe in Ukraine’s EU membership talks?

Post By World EU Budget, EU enlargement, European Commission, European Union, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine

A new budget, rule of law, defence, and security are the top priorities for opening the European Union’s gates to Kyiv. Will Ukraine and the EU be up to the challenge?

By opening the membership negotiations with Ukraine, the EU has decided to face its biggest moment of truth in decades.

The eastern European country of some 44 million is by far the biggest potential member state — by surface area, it is larger than the bloc’s current number one, France — and integrating it could prove to be a major existential matter.

During the “Big Bang” enlargement talks in the early 2000s — the first round of integration of the former socialist countries, some of which had been under Soviet influence for decades — the EU negotiators had a mantra: “Big countries, big problems.”

That enlargement process, the EU’s largest to date, opened in 1998 at the Conference of London, under a British EU presidency. It was completed in 2004 with the accession of Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Also included were Cyprus and Malta, the only new members that did not share the experience of an full-on socialist or communist regime.

The entire process took place in a relatively favourable environment, with predictions of general economic growth and a non-openly assertive Russia. But 20 years on, the situation has become quite the opposite.

Another world, another story

Most EU member states have been struggling with financial crises, including burdensome public debts and deficits, as well as massive inflows of migrants and refugees. Ukraine, meanwhile, is defending itself from Russian forces in the biggest war Europe has seen since 1945.

In terms of finances and human lives, peer-to-peer conflicts come with costs far higher than so-called “ethnic conflicts” or remote and ill-defined “wars on terror”.

Facing a huge demographic loss thanks to the war, Ukraine is now searching for peace, political stability, clear and safe borders and functional infrastructure.

Its closest supporters in the EU understand this.

“From the beginning of the war in Ukraine, we talk about recovery and not simply reconstruction,” said Krzystof Kubon, the foreign and European policy adviser of Civic Platform, the party of the Polish PM Donald Tusk.

“Because recovery creates opportunity for the European state economies to grow and to expand and to get Ukraine closer to the European Union,” Kubon explained.

EU diplomats and officials estimate that the new enlargement will cost €186 billion over seven years, the duration of the multiannual financial framework. The entire EU budget in 2022 totalled €170bn.

Having said that, the EU’s entire long-term budget — the seven-year multiannual financial framework from 2021 to 2027 — amounts to slightly over €1.13 trillion.

This budgetary provision was set before the Ukrainian war and the reboot of the enlargement process.

However, while integrating an economically devastated Ukraine into the EU would be extremely demanding, especially fiscally, it wouldn’t be impossible.

Mission possible

For one, budgetary lines always depend on the political will of the member states — a delicate matter of balancing political circumstances, geopolitical priorities, and domestic interests.

The entire process of integrating Ukraine will require a deep redesign of the EU budget, demanding concerted financial efforts from the current member states.

Current net beneficiaries like Poland, Spain, Portugal, Hungary and others are to become net contributors, while the old net contributors could be called to spend more money on the common budget. That, in turn, will require a complex redefinition of the EU cohesion policy.

Kubon argued that if one day the advantages of the cohesion policy for a “Big Bang” member like Poland were to become history, the country would enjoy new opportunities for growth — but only if Ukraine joined the EU at a moderate pace.

“From the Polish perspective, if we look at Germany, the biggest net contributor when Poland joined the EU, we see our future as bright,” he said.

“When you look at the economic relations between Poland and Germany, you can find a profitable synergy of the two economies.”

According to Tusk’s centre-right Polish liberal conservatism, Germany’s net contribution to the EU budget, particularly for the cohesion policies, became a fruitful investment as Central European countries entered the mighty German manufacturing area of interest.

Seen through Polish eyes, there is a chance for Ukraine and Poland to replicate the same scheme.

Black soil worth its weight in gold

Ukraine has formidable farming opportunities: 71% of its land mass features the most fertile soil in the world, and the humus-rich “chernozem” (an old Russian word for “black soil”) covers about 51%.

As an indicator of the potential that it offers, the Ukrainian land market was drastically expanded to private investors on 1 January 2022, just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion.

While most of the big investors are either Luxembourg-based agribusinesses like Kernel, owned by local oligarchs, or transnational companies from the US, China and the Gulf states, Ukrainian land could, in theory, become eligible for the EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP) funding, especially after the war.

However, the prospect of Ukraine’s entry into the EU agricultural sector has not made existing member states too happy. Polish farmers, for example, stood up massively against the favourable import regime of Ukrainian grain set up by the EU to support Kyiv’s war effort.

But this is just one problem that has arisen. Integrating Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkan countries and, perhaps one day, Georgia would require drastic changes to the EU’s decision-making processes.

Forcing the issue

After the European Commission’s troubled experiences with Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, the question about the EU institutions’ ability to enforce the rule of law has become unavoidable.

Every EU member state, even the smallest or the worst off, is a sovereign state with the right to vote, abstain, or veto if it is so inclined.

Any domestic shift that would see a member state less inclined to respect — or even block — the decisions made in Brussels would jeopardise the union’s long-term viability.

Some argue that revising the EU cohesion policies, the CAP, and the rule of law principles would require a deep and comprehensive reform of the EU’s core institutions and their decision-making mechanisms before the enlargement.

Since the 2004 “Big Bang”, the union’s leadership has been focused on reforming the European Council’s decision-making process, which grants every member state the power of veto, and expanding the list of policy areas covered by qualified majority voting to ensure the EU can function properly.

According to Lukas Macek from the Paris-based Jaques Delors Institute, the issues of decision-making and the rule of law are tricky enough as it is.

“The enlargement to an EU of more than 30 member states can be as much part of the solution as a worsening of the problem,” Macek told Euronews. “Enlargement can move the lines where the 27 member states are stuck.

“Unfortunately, the current political dynamics do not seem to be moving in this direction.”

In the end, with mounting Euroscepticism across the EU and anti-enlargement positions increasingly entrenched in public opinion, the member states might opt for stability over change.

“I see that there is no political will in the majority of the member states to reform and to change the European Union,” Kubon said. “Among the main EU political forces, like my own political party in Poland… as well as the party of (Greek) Prime Minister Mitsotakis and other EPP members, there no such a big will to undertake changes.”

The solution, Macek argued, could come from a smaller-step approach.

“The most important issue to tackle is that of reforming the enlargement process itself to make it more progressive, more nuanced, more motivating for applicants, more reassuring for members and also more reversible.”

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The far-right swing in European Parliament elections | Explained

Post By World European Parliament, european parliament 2024, European Parliament elections, European Parliament elections news, European parliament president, European Union, European Union elections

The story so far:

As 51.1% of nearly 400 million Europeans voted in marathon polls held across 27 member states of the European Union (EU) from June 6 to 9, the conservative centre-right bloc of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen managed to retain its status as the biggest political group in the European Parliament (EP). However, right-wing and far-right parties clocked their best performance in the legislative body’s history with liberals and Greens being delivered humbling blows. The result caused French President Emanuel Macron to call for snap elections in his country on June 30, with the move being seen as a political gamble to stop in its tracks the rise of the far-right firebrand Marine Le Pen’s party, with the latter eying a Presidential term in the 2027 elections.

Which countries led the far-right gains?

While the far-right wave predicted by exit polls did not materialise, far-right parties managed to make significant and historic gains in key member states — France, Germany, and Italy. In France, Ms. Le Pen’s nationalist, anti-immigration Rassemblement National (RN) became the biggest party nationally winning 31.5% of the vote and 30 of France’s 81 seats in the EP, more than double the vote captured by Mr. Macron’s centrist Renaissance party, which finished a distant second.

In Germany, the results directly brought the ruling coalition’s legitimacy into question with just 30% of German voters still supporting it. Chancellor Olaf Schulz, whose own disapproval ratings are as high as 70%, however, ruled out early national elections. The extreme right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party, despite being marred by a string of scandals involving espionage and bribery allegations and facing nationwide protests, came in second with a record 16% of the vote, winning more seats than Mr. Schulz’s Social Democrats (SPD), part of the ruling coalition with the Greens and the Free Democratic Party, who were also left behind by the AfD in terms of vote share numbers. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister party Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), finished first securing 30% of the vote.

Italy also saw Prime Minister Georgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy Party with neo-fascist roots consolidating its grip by capturing a quarter of the vote, while far-right parties also made gains in Austria, Hungary, and Spain.

While national political parties contest elections to the 720-seat EU body every five years, they join the transnational political groups of the EP after the polls. As of 9:00 pm, June 12, provisional results indicate a fairly strong showing of centre-right parties across Europe, with the European People’s Party group, including the CDU/CSU, emerging as the leading bloc with 189 seats. While the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), having Germany’s SPD among others, managed a narrow consolidation with 135 seats, the Renew Europe (RE) group with Mr. Macron’s Rennaissance, suffered huge losses finishing at 79 seats compared to last time’s 102. The pro-climate action Greens saw their seats reduced to 53 down from 71, becoming the sixth largest block instead of fourth. The hard and far-right European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) and the Identity and Democracy Group (ID), including Ms. Meloni and Ms. Le Pen’s parties, respectively, now collectively hold 131 seats in the chamber, up from 118. The other far-right lawmakers are in the non-attached (NI) group including AfD (which was expelled from the ID in May) with 15 seats and Hungarian PM Viktor Orban’s Fidesz with 10 seats.

What can the right’s gains be attributed to?

In 2019, with youth protests across Europe calling for climate action, the EP elections delivered a Green wave, which shaped Brussels’ five-year agenda and brought about the ambitious ‘Green Deal’, laying a roadmap for the EU’s 2040 and 2050 net-zero targets. But that was before the COVID-19 pandemic; before pan-continent farmers protests; and the Russian attack on Ukraine sending energy prices skyrocketing, leading to the worst cost-of-living crisis Europe has faced in years. Besides, the steady rise of Eurosceptic, populist, and anti-immigrant parties, some of whom deny climate change, across Europe also contributed to this year’s rightward shift.

In Germany, for instance, which sends 96 seats to the EP, national surveys saw voter priorities shift significantly with peace, social security, and immigration issues bagging the top spots and climate change dropping from first to fourth place. The far-right AfD capitalised on voter anxieties related to a spike in migration numbers in 2023, as migrants and asylum seekers from war-hit Ukraine, Africa, and West Asia were at Germany’s doorsteps. While West Germany saw anti-extremist protests against the AfD, East Germany emerged as its natural voter base where many voters have felt left behind by the establishment after the 1990 reunification. Another area where the party seems to have tapped into the voter discontent was the ruling coalition’s 2023 clean energy law asking homeowners to replace fossil fuel boilers with expensive heat pumps, with Afd promising to stop the transition.

The EU’s climate policy became another bone of contention for a section of voters: European farmers, who have held a record 4,000 different protests so far this year. The EU’s Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), which provides subsidies and protects farmers from foreign competition, is a decisive voting issue with large farmer lobby groups. But farming emissions, which haven’t gone down since 2005, account for 10% of the EU’s total emissions with its farm sector accounting for a quarter of global pesticide use. Farming only contributes 1.3% to Europe’s GDP.

Protesting farmers have balked at the policies in the Green Deal which call for redesigning the EU’s emission-heavy food systems and carving out land for biodiversity restoration. Right-wing parties like RN, have termed such measures as ‘punitive ecology’.

Has the balance of power in the European Parliament shifted?

In the outgoing Parliament, Ms. von der Leyen’s EPP, the Socialists and Democrats, and Mr. Macron’s Renew Europe groups often termed the ‘Grand Coalition’, which together held 417 seats, managed to make and push deals amongst themselves often with support from the Greens. While the EPP and S&D will still largely maintain their old numbers, weakened RE and Greens blocs mean the European Commission President may collaborate with the right-wing ECR and possibly even the ID on issues like migration, restrictions on climate policy and defence issues.

However, nationalist right-wing parties who have made gains this election hold different positions on a spectrum of issues and are unlikely to become a strong and collective decisive force.

The immediate playout of the election results could be seen in the deals Ms. von der Leyen strikes with the blocs to get re-elected as the European Commission President in a secret ballot vote in July. While she could gather enough number of votes from the Grand Coalition, there has historically been a 10% defection margin, which means she could be courting the right’s MPs for votes.

How will the results affect EU policy?

While political analysts don’t anticipate an immediate drastic shift in EU policy, an overtime rightward pivot of the EU agenda, which was already manifesting before the election, remains of concern. Centre-right parties in some member states have been turning to a strategy of integrating the right’s agenda into their own to counter the far-right’s popularity. Ms. von der Leyen had already declared that she would be open to working with Italy’s Ms. Meloni in the EP.

The strengthened centre-right, as reiterated by EPP President Manfred Weber, is already aiming to overturn the 2035 EU ban on the sale of combustion engine cars.

Earlier this year, the EU parliament also voted to remodel its immigration and asylum policy, which has clauses for expedited deportations and the contentious issue of relocation of asylum seekers. In fact, the European Commission President last year, along with Ms. Meloni signed a pact with Tunisia to receive financial aid for stopping asylum seekers at its borders from entering Europe.

The author is a former staff writer with The Hindu and is interested in geopolitics, global inequality, and history.

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EU Elections: Voter turnout was just 50% last time – will it rise?

Post By World EU Parliament, European elections 2024, European Union

According to the Euronews Polls Centre young voters could raise the turnout in France and Germany.

Over 350 million voters are eligible, but how many will actually vote this time?

In 2019 the majority of them voted, but only just. The official figure was 50.66 percent across all the 27 states, which was the highest since the 1994 elections.

The abstention rate is closely followed as, to some extent, it can indicate what the level of apathy and disenchantment with EU politics might be.

And if it falls below the all-important 50 percent figure this year it would be a blow to the EU and those who support it.

“We can’t forget that we’re not talking about one European election, but 27 national ones,” Tomasz Kanievcky, a Euronews Polling Center analyst, told Euronews.

“Therefore, the approach to abstentionism will certainly differ according to the countries in which these elections occur, and according to the current issues at stake.”

According to the Euronews Polls Centre, young voters could raise the turnout in France and Germany. But these young voters could be tempted to vote for the far right. Another example is Italy, where abstentionism could be significant.

Voters in six European Union countries were casting their ballots on Saturday: Italy, Slovakia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Malta the EU’s smallest member.

Voting has now finished in the Netherlands, and Ireland but the first results will only begin to come in from Sunday evening.

The Netherlands’ public broadcaster NOS’s poll of 20,000 voters has already predicted that the centre-left alliance would secure eight out of 31 European Parliament seats in the country.

Observers say approach to abstentionism will ‘certainly differ’

In Cyprus, concern is growing over people who are not voting as well as an increase in blank and invalid ballots from those who do vote.

The issues are linked to a local government reform that requires voters to cast between six to ten ballots, a complexity that has frustrated both voters and election participants.

In response, Cypriot President Nicos Christodoulides encouraged voters to turn out. “The European elections concern us all. A massive turnout will send a strong message about the importance we attach to a stronger, more resilient, more strategically autonomous, more united, and of course more efficient Europe,” he stated.

In the last European elections in 2019, the highest abstention rate was recorded in Slovakia. It remains to be seen whether, following the assassination attempt on anti-European left-wing populist Prime Minister Robert Fico, the trend will be reversed.

Far-right, populist parties set to see significant gains?

The elections are set to be one of the most controversial and contested in its history by Eurosceptic, populist, and far-right parties.

“It will be an existential fight,” said Guy Verhofstadt, a former Belgian prime minister and outgoing free-market liberal member of parliament who has been in the thick of EU politics for over a quarter century.

It will pit “those who want less Europe and, then, those political forces who understand that in the world of tomorrow, you need a far more integrated European Union to defend the interests of the Europeans” Verhofstadt added.

Since the last EU election in 2019, populist, far-right, and extremist parties have taken over governments in three EU nations and are part of governing coalitions in several others.

Far-right parties in France, Belgium, Austria, and Italy are seen as frontrunners in the EU elections.

The vote is the second-biggest exercise in democracy behind the elections in India, as the 27-nation bloc will be picking 720 parliamentarians to serve them over the next five years with decisive votes.

Germany

A shift in German law has granted voting rights to Germans as young as 16 which is a two year drop in the age requirement.

This expands the pool of potential voters by roughly 1.5 million. Traditionally, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party performed best with younger voters.

However, a shift has been underway of late in Germany, as in much of Europe, which has seen young voters move towards right-wing parties.

The shift and trove of new voters could give AfD a boost after scandals have dropped them in recent polling.

Many speculate that EU and domestic issues will increase voter turnout in Germany. The polarized political situation, if it drives turnout, will likely negatively affect the government-leading SPD, as well as the Greens, while boosting the opposition CDU-CSU.

Turnout for EU elections has traditionally been lower than national elections in Germany. Many expect a significant increase in participation but still don’t expect it to match the 2021 national vote.

France

In France, the vote is between Europe and France—a uniquely French perspective for a European Parliament election.

More than half of French voters will be casting ballots based on domestic issues, largely a product of motivations from the right.

Meanwhile, President Macron has been a key voice in the greater pro-European movement, putting him drastically at odds with many French voters.

Key to the turnout count will be young French voters, who have polled consistently in favour of Macron’s rival RN.

If the youth vote turns out, then expect RN to match what the polls have been telling us: a resounding victory with double the support of Macron’s Renew list.

Italy

Italy has one of the fastest-growing rates (relative to previous elections) of voter abstention from EU elections, after Portugal.

Increased Euroscepticism in Italy could further lower the vote count. However, the position of Prime Minister Girorgia Meloni as a European force could slow the rate of decline among right-wing, Europe-hesitant voters.

Hungary

Relative to National votes in Hungary, lower participation is expected for the EU vote. Lower turnouts in Hungary traditionally benefit Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, who maintain a motivated base with strong mobilisation capabilities.

The centre and left, however, could see a boost from Budapest, home to more than 10 percent of the population.

Budapest voters will be also casting ballots for their mayor.

Greece

While Greece has “compulsory voting,” the law is unenforced. How Greeks plan to vote is not clear.

The postal ballot implementation was not a success in Greece, casting doubts on participation rates.

One set of voters to track in Greece are young voters, who have lately broken out strongly in favour of the centre-right (ND/EPP). If their turnout continues to grow, ND could be in for another successful election.

Portugal

Portugal had Western Europe’s lowest turnout rate in 2019, just 30% Following a snap parliamentary election in March in which only 59% participated, weary would-be voters may stay at home.

But those who voted for the Socialist party’s last time, and only narrowly lost, might just be more motivated to vote. The Democratic Alliance won with 80 seats and the Socialist party was a close second with 78 seats.

Poland

Poland is set to vote for the third time in less than a year—following national and regional elections since October.

In the more recent regional elections, voter turnout was lower than expected, especially in urban districts.

If this trend continues, it could most negatively impact the centre-right, government-leading Civic Coalition (KO).

Any blow in turnout to the KO is an automatic boon for their far-right rival, the Law and Justice party. PiS barely edged out KO in the regional elections voting share.

With polls showing a neck-and-neck race, any drop in turnout could give PiS the boost it needs.

Slovakia

Slovakia had the lowest share of voter turnout in 2019, with just 22.7% of voters participating. But in 2023’s Slovakia’s parliamentary election, more than 68% of eligible voters turned out.

With polarisation at a peak in Slovakia following the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico, many expect turnout to be higher than the 2019 mark.

Still, given the subdued nature of the campaigns following the assassination attempt, voter excitement isn’t very strong in Slovakia.

Don’t expect over 60% participation but expect a better showing than 2019.

Czech Republic

Czech voters have historically not turned out well for EU elections. The country is largely considered a Eurosceptic one, leading to a drop in turnout relative to their national votes.

However, 2024 could shift things in Czechia. Campaigns are reporting stronger than usual interest in European affairs and politics.

Meanwhile, opposition campaigns are launching strong attacks on ruling coalition parties, trying to make the European vote a referendum on the national leaders.

Romania

Interest in European politics is at an all-time high with young voters in Romania. According to the EU’s barometer survey this spring, more than 75% of under 30-year-olds in Romania intend to vote—the highest rate of any country in Europe.

Right-wing parties have become social media focal points in Romania. If young voters do indeed turn out as expected, it could be a massive gain for the far-right AUR and other right-wing parties.

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The bonds that bind: Our adversarial sovereign bond habit

Post By World Bonds, business, China, European Union, euroviews, United States

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

No one is obligated to help China fund its war machine. The decision to buy Chinese sovereign bonds should reside with informed investors, Elaine Dezenski and Joshua Birenbaum write.

In Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Serbia, he extolled bonds “forged with blood” between the two countries from NATO’s bombing of Belgrade.

Yet, it is concerns over future aggression, not past wars, that have the world focused on China.

The Biden administration, the US Congress, and other governments have raised alarms about China’s military build-up, arguing that Western investors should not be sending money to Chinese companies that are helping to support the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

As the UK non-profit Hong Kong Watch explained in a statement before the House of Lords: “China’s strategy of military-civil fusion ensures that unchecked institutional investment could directly counter Britain’s national security interests if British pensions funds and other major players are funding firms in partnership with the Chinese military.”

Direct investment in private Chinese companies supporting the PLA is a serious risk. Yet a far larger pool of Western investments is flowing directly to the state budget of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through the purchase of Chinese sovereign bonds, funding whatever the PRC budget may prioritise — from Chinese battleships and EV subsidies to concentration camps.

How do sovereign bonds contribute to China’s defence spending?

Chinese defence spending, which has doubled since 2015, is paid for from the state budget, which is, in turn, funded by numerous sources, including the issuance of sovereign bonds.

Those bonds are often passively purchased by global investors based upon their default inclusion in funds that follow key benchmarks, sending vast quantities of money to China with little oversight or awareness of China’s military benefits.

Chinese sovereign bonds are bought by major institutional investors and individual mutual fund owners alike. These investors are rarely making an intentional choice to invest in China. Rather, huge swaths of the market passively base their portfolio composition on aggregated benchmarks.

The default options on many retirement plans, for instance, are target date plans based upon predetermined mixes from established indexes — one of the risks of what The Wall Street Journal has described as “retirement funds on autopilot”. Indeed, one of the purported benefits of so-called “passive investing” — which now makes up the majority of the market — is its strict adherence to the benchmarks.

Until relatively recently, China’s sovereign bonds were excluded from the global indexes. Then, starting in 2017, a handful of index providers began adding Chinese government bonds to their bond benchmarks. In 2018, MSCI changed its equities index to include Chinese stocks.

As The Wall Street Journal noted at the time, “In 2018, more than $13.9 trillion (€12.85tr) in investment funds had stock portfolios that mimic the composition of MSCI indexes or used them as performance yardsticks, and nearly all investments by US pension funds in global stocks are benchmarked against MSCI indexes.”

Benchmarks, which are designed to give a representative and diversified slice of the market, have become the unelected arbiters of whether given stocks or bonds are held by all funds that are pegged to the index.

This decision to add Chinese investments to global benchmarks caused a cascade effect as passive investment funds and others who tied their portfolio to the benchmark followed suit, sending billions of dollars directly to the Chinese state.

FTSE Russell, a global provider of benchmarks, explained the issue this way: “Fund managers seeking to match, or outperform, benchmark indexes are therefore obliged to increase the weightings in Chinese bonds.”

What is the role of index providers in all of this?

Index providers are for-profit companies, with those profits inextricably linked to the decision of what to include in the benchmarks.

When MSCI, one of the world’s largest index providers, initially resisted adding Chinese stocks to its benchmark, Beijing threatened to cut off MSCI’s access to critical pricing data in a move described as “business blackmail.” MSCI relented and included the Chinese stocks.

Index providers aren’t motivated only by threats. Bloomberg, Citigroup, and others garnered benefits for adding Chinese bonds to their benchmarks, including receiving a bond settlement license from China.

That pivot, made on behalf of millions of investors, fundamentally realigned capital toward authoritarian regimes. As The New York Times said at the time about Citigroup’s decision to lead the pack into the Chinese sovereign bond market, “That is a propaganda victory for Beijing, which has struggled to entice foreign investors. For Citigroup, it is a relatively low-risk diplomatic win.”

When Bloomberg and other companies added Chinese bonds to their indexes, it was estimated that Chinese securities would account for just over 5% of Bloomberg’s $53tr (€49tr) Global Aggregates bond index, but those numbers have substantially increased since then.

Today, the Bloomberg index allocates nearly 10% of its $65 trillion Global Aggregates benchmark to Chinese bonds.

No one is obligated to fund Beijing’s war machine

The adversarial bond issue is a market problem with market solutions. Numerous indexes already exclude Chinese bonds (called “ex-China” indexes), but those are limited products that are marketed to clients who must proactively direct their fund managers to include them. Rather, ex-China benchmarks should be the default.

Clients could be permitted, consistent with sanctions and other restrictions, to add those bonds in, but passive investment flows should not be blindly directed to adversarial regimes. Similarly, default options for retirement plans and passive investments should not be funnelled to the Chinese war machine.

Improving the hygiene of financial markets is a necessity, starting with a much deeper discussion about how key decisions — like the inclusion of adversarial bonds in benchmark indexes — impact investors, the global financial system, and the economic security of democratic governments.

No one is obligated to help China fund its war machine. The decision to buy Chinese sovereign bonds should reside with informed investors.

Elaine Dezenski is Senior Director and Head of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). She was formerly an acting and deputy assistant secretary for policy at the US Department of Homeland Security. Joshua Birenbaum is Deputy Director of the Center on Economic and Financial Power at the FDD.

At Euronews, we believe all views matter. Contact us at [email protected] to send pitches or submissions and be part of the conversation.

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Timeline: Which countries have recognised Palestinian state and why?

Post By World European Union, Israel-Palestine Peace Process, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Palestine, Palestinian Territories, united nations

After three European countries said on Wednesday they would recognise Palestinian statehood, Euronews looked at why recognition is such a polarising issue, who has recognised Palestine so far, and under what circumstances.

All eyes are again on the Middle East and some 5.5 million Palestinians following coordinated announcements by Spain, Ireland and Norway on Wednesday they would recognise Palestine as a state.

The Palestinian state’s road to recognition and participation in international institutions has been arduous and pockmarked with major roadblocks.

For the Palestinian people, each diplomatic victory came at the cost of heightened tensions, significant pushback and outright conflict on the ground.

As Dublin, Madrid and Oslo all announced their decision on Wednesday — with Slovenia, Malta and Belgium expected to follow suit — Israel continued its months-long military campaign in Gaza prompted by the 7 October Hamas attack.

The bombing campaign and incursion into the enclave are reported to have caused more than 35,000 Palestinian deaths, according to the United Nations. Most casualties have been women and children.

Why is recognising the Palestinian state such a polarising issue? And who has recognised it so far, and under what circumstances?

Foreign mandate turns sour

The UN and its predecessor, the League of Nations, have been at the centre of the issue. After the latter handed it over to Great Britain as a former Ottoman territory in 1922, Palestinians found their demands for an independent state repeatedly rejected by London, leading to an open rebellion in 1937.

Unable to find a solution, the UK returned the territory — with all its predicaments — back to the UN a decade later, in 1947.

The UN settled on scrapping the British Mandate altogether and proposed to split the Palestinian lands into two states, one Palestinian and another Israeli.

However, two wars — the 1948 Palestine war and the resulting Arab-Israel War — led to Israel controlling not only the territory earmarked by the UN for its homeland but also some two-thirds of the proposed Palestinian state, resulting in more than half of Palestinians fleeing or getting expelled.

Further hostilities in 1967 and 1973 saw Palestinian territories reduced even more.

While the UN and its General Assembly acknowledged Palestinians’ rights to sovereignty and independence, it wasn’t until 1988 that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) officially declared the State of Palestine within the borders recognised by 78 countries.

For the territory including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, the recognition troubles were only beginning.

Decades of conflict and peace accords

While gaining recognition from communist and non-aligned countries, including the Soviet Union, China, India, Greece and Yugoslavia, major Western actors remained staunchly against Palestinian statehood.

A US-led initiative of actively discouraging countries from recognising Palestine meant that little more was on the table aside from the Egypt-brokered 1977 Camp David Accords, granting Palestinians the right to self-govern in their territories.

For Washington at the time, recognition was a no-go matter.

The PLO’s participation in the conflict in Lebanon, open acts of violence against Israeli civilians, and Arafat’s friendly relations with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and the regime in Tehran alike all compounded the issue further.

An earlier pledge by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to stay away from recognising Palestine until the Yasser Arafat-led group gave up on its rejection of Israel’s right to exist also hindered any diplomatic efforts that would involve softening Israel’s stance on the matter.

Further violence in the 1980s by PLO factions and Israeli settlers’ increasing ruthlessness towards Palestinians added fuel to the belief that peace in the Middle East was unattainable and that an independent Palestinian state would only make matters worse.

The US ended up designating PLO as a terrorist group in 1987, representing a major red flag for its allies that was extended to any debate over Palestine’s recognition.

Although numerous Arab League and developing countries in Asia and Africa pledged their support, by February 1989, only 94 countries officially recognised Palestine as an independent state.

Meanwhile, the thawing of relations towards Arafat and the PLO and the US-led Oslo Accords in the 1990s gave hope that a two-state solution could finally see Palestine gain full sovereignty.

Yet, the assassination of Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and the death of Arafat almost a decade later saw Israel toughening its stance once again and PLO’s political authority on the wane alike.

European countries divided

In the following years, the number of states officially recognising Palestine grew slowly but steadily, but due to some countries’ ambiguity on the issue, the total is often reported as being between 122 and 146.

Some countries have established diplomatic relations with the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, seen by many as the de facto government of the Palestinian state.

However, today, the Palestinian Authority only has administrative control over the West Bank, with Hamas ruling in Gaza since the 2006 elections.

At the same time, the UN still only recognises the PLO as the representatives of the Palestine people.

EU countries remain divided on the issue, and some have changed their position dramatically over the years.

Ireland, one of the leading countries in the renewed push to recognise Palestine today, was the first EU member state to endorse its establishment in 1980.

Sweden recognised Palestinian statehood in 2014, but its officials have since walked back on the pledge, with former Foreign Minister Tobias Billström calling it “unfortunate and premature” in 2022.

Romania has maintained close diplomatic relations with the PLO and was one of the first countries to recognise the Palestinian Authority in 1988.

Hungary also recognised Palestine as a sovereign state in the same year, while both European countries were still part of the Soviet bloc.

Meanwhile, Budapest was one of just nine countries voting against Palestine’s UN membership earlier this month, and many consider the central European country to be one of Israel’s closest allies in Europe.

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North Macedonia and Greece shook hands in Prespa. Don’t give up on it

Post By World European Union, euroviews, Greece, North Macedonia, Prespa Agreement

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

The agreement is a welcome reality, even among many of its opponents, because reopening the dispute would be much worse. I plead for a display of leadership in both countries, Greece and North Macedonia, to face this reality and stop playing petty politics with this issue, Nikola Dimitrov writes.

The swearing-in ceremony of the newly elected President of North Macedonia, Gordana Davkova Siljanovska, caused an uproar in Athens, Brussels, and many other European capitals.

Not because she is the first-ever female president of the country or because she just won a landslide victory. It also wasn’t about something she said. Actually, it was about what she did not say.

While taking her oath of office, President Davkova omitted the directional adjective “North” and said just “Macedonia” despite signing a formal oath under her country’s constitutional name on the same day.

Yet, given that she campaigned on a pledge to respect but not pronounce the full constitutional name of the country she now leads, citing her personal right of self-determination and taking into account her criticism of the Prespa Agreement, her gesture alarmed neighbouring Greece.

Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis warned that any deviation from the agreement would have severe consequences for the relations between the two and the European integration path of us here in North Macedonia.

The now infamous name issue strained the relationship between Skopje and Athens for 27 years, ever since the independence of the then-Republic of Macedonia in 1991, until it was resolved with the signing of the Prespa Agreement in 2018.

It also blocked North Macedonia’s NATO membership and EU accession for over a decade.

‘You are my hero, may you rot in hell’

I have personally spent 15 years trying to solve the problem: initially as a diplomat and chief negotiator, then as a co-agent before the ICJ on a related case, and finally serving as foreign minister.

Together with my Greek colleague Nikos Kotzias, we achieved what had previously seemed impossible and succeeded where Sisyphus couldn’t.

Meeting half way took time for both nations. Kotzias and I both received threats and hate mail on one side and praise on the other.

“You are my hero” and “May you rot in hell” were the starkly contrasted greetings I received in Skopje on a daily basis back in 2017 and 2018.

The agreement we signed is a good compromise, addressing the critical concerns of both sides. It calmed bilateral relations at the time and kickstarted renewed connections between our peoples, opening the door for friendship and cooperation.

You can’t please everyone

Prespa has elements that are difficult for both countries. The Macedonian language, for instance — an expression of the right of self-determination of ethnic Macedonians — is something many Greek politicians struggle to accept or pronounce.

The same goes for the country’s international codes: we can still use MK and MKD, except on vehicle license plates.

Yet, although the international traffic rules say otherwise, these codes are not found on the road signs to Skopje across Greece. You wouldn’t even see “North Macedonia” beside the signs directing you towards Bulgaria or Turkey.

On our end, using “North” remains a stumbling block for many Macedonian politicians, especially when they have to say it back home.

However, if we had not accepted the use of the compound name North Macedonia for all official purposes and at all times, there would have been no deal because this was a critically important issue for the Greek side.

For many in Greece, even the compound name is unacceptable, as they would prefer their neighbouring country not to have the word Macedonia in its name at all.

All this shows is that no agreement could be reached that would completely satisfy both sides.

Yet, the Prespa Agreement, globally praised as a triumph of diplomacy and the most significant agreement in the Balkans — the region has an abundance of disputes but few solutions — since Bosnia’s 1995 Dayton Peace Accord, was hampered by various sides.

How many blows can you take before collapsing?

The first blow came from VMRO-DPMNE, the landslide winner of the recent elections. In 2018, the party, in essence, boycotted the referendum on the compromise.

While the Macedonian citizens (or the citizens of North Macedonia, if you prefer) voted “yes” in huge numbers, the “no” votes — expected to come from VMRO-DPMNE’s supporters — were too few, and the required turnout was not reached.

The boycott kept the national wound half-open. The people did not decide.

The second blow — and this may come as a surprise to many readers not familiar with our pains in the Balkans — came from the EU itself.

Before the referendum on the Prespa Agreement, many European leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel (France’s President Emmanuel Macron sent a video message), came to Skopje and made a public promise to the people: support the agreement and we will open accession talks with your country.

Well, that promise was broken. France first walked it back in 2019, with another neighbour, Bulgaria, proudly taking over the veto torch ever since.

Politics of humiliation prove costly

Worse still, Bulgaria adopted a formal hostile stance against one of the two fundamental pillars of the Prespa Agreement — the Macedonian language and identity.

As Bulgaria got away with its indecent and counterproductive policy on its smaller neighbour and managed to pave the European path for North Macedonia with Bulgarian demands, the EU as a whole became complicit in undermining the agreement it loudly praised, as well as its own enlargement policy.

Not surprisingly, only about one-third of the Macedonian public today believes that the EU is serious about enlargement — an embarrassing defeat for Brussels, considering that an overwhelming majority of Macedonians trusted the EU just a few years earlier.

Finally, the outgoing government in Skopje’s gross incompetence in organising the replacement of the citizens’ ID cards, passports and driver’s licenses under the constitutional name — forcing citizens into a situation where they can’t travel, drive, or even go to the bank to get their paychecks or pensions — caused humiliation and aggravated the problem to the extreme.

On the other side of the border, the New Democracy government did not invest much political energy in implementing the Prespa Agreement. It simply tolerated it. I recently wrote that the incoming government of North Macedonia should do the same. It looks like I was wrong.

A plea for reason to prevail has to be made

What we need instead of tolerance is leadership. The agreement is a welcome reality, even among many of its opponents, because reopening the dispute would be much worse.

And I plead for a display of leadership in both countries, Greece and North Macedonia, to face this reality and stop playing petty politics with this issue.

Face those within your respective constituencies who would only accept maximalist solutions for their side and who are nostalgic for disputes and antagonisms.

Remind them that they have lost. And push forward with the full implementation of the Prespa Agreement, including the challenging and sometimes painful steps.

Leadership is also desperately needed on the EU side. Deliver on your promise, limit the ridiculous number of veto opportunities in the accession process, and do not fall prey to the domestically driven past-century whims of any single member state on things that truly matter.

Be a force for good, and do not undermine but rather amplify the efforts of those who have invested political capital in solving intractable disputes.

Nikola Dimitrov is a diplomat, think-tanker and political activist from North Macedonia. As Foreign Minister, he negotiated and signed the Prespa Agreement in 2018.

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Nicolas Schmit: S&D won’t do deals with far right after elections

Post By World EU Parliament, European Commission, European elections 2024, European politics, European Union

The S&D’s lead candidate in the European elections outlined his views on revising the Migration Pact and opposing the far right to Global Conversation’s Isabel da Silva Marques.

For the past five years, Nicholas Schmit has held the Jobs and Social Rights portfolio in the Ursula von der Leyen-led European Commission. Why has he decided to run for the presidency of the EU’s executive body?

“I think that after the five years where we tried to put social [agenda] at the centre, I thought that there was still more to be done. I think this is the right moment for social democracy to get the Commission [presidency] after such a long period, because we had for 30 years, well for 25 years, conservative presidents of the Commission. It’s time for change.”

Schmit believes EU citizens are living through a time of great instability and insecurity, and that that has fuelled the rise of the extreme right:

“We are living in a very uncertain period. It’s uncertain for different reasons. We are coming out of major crisis: the COVID crisis was not so far away, the financial crisis. We had difficult moments for many, many European citizens due to inflation. We have a war in Europe. So, I think this uncertainty, plus the topic of migration, has now being focus of the debates. And finally, the extreme right are playing on fear. They are not proposing anything, but they are playing on fear. And I think this creates this special situation. But we still have a few weeks to go and to show that it’s not about fear, it’s about building confidence.”

To save the Green Deal, support farmers

A major undertaking of the next five years will be building confidence in the Green Deal, according to Schmit. The future of the EU’s landmark strategy to achieve net zero climate goals has been called into question by angry farmers’ protests in recent months.

“We have seen during the last years and decades that farmers’ income has gone down,” Schmit says. “We have seen immense hikes in their production cost but their income, their prices have not reflected these increases. I think we have to reflect about how far also the idea of a pure market functioning is adequate, because it penalises, finally, many, many farmers. In many cases, smaller and medium sized farmers have big difficulties.”

“This another fact: how to support the transformation of our farming industry, of our farming. Also introducing technology, obviously is important. We are developing artificial intelligence. How can farmers be supported by artificial intelligence or other technological means? And, at the end, it’s also about bureaucracy. I agree that if the farmer spends more time in the office than on the field, this is something which is not normal. But, at the end, farmers have a big interest in the success of a fair, socially fair and economically fair Green Deal.”

Deep concerns about Migration Pact

The EU’s groundbreaking Migration Pact is another transformative piece of legislation from the current parliament. Years in the making, it centres on bilateral agreements with Tunisia, Egypt and Mauritania. But Schmit views it as a work in progress:

“I am quite reluctant about these deals, which have still to be prove efficient. We are spending now huge amounts of money, giving these money to different regimes or governments like the Tunisian government. We know that the authorities there are really treating very badly the refugees. We have still the problem in Libya, where there is no real… there is a government there, even two governments. We have the question in Egypt. So I’m quite reluctant with this kind of, deals. […]

“I think we have to revise them and see what can be done. How can we do it differently? Because we do not know exactly also how the money is used. That’s another issue. I’ve heard now that there has been a deal with Lebanon too, to keep the Syrians away from Europe. Nobody knows exactly how the money which has been announced will be spent in Lebanon, given the situation of the Lebanon’s government, which is in some way a very weak government. And the Hezbollah and other influences, being there.”

Countering a resurgent far right

Migration is among the main issues of the European election campaign and one that far-right parties seek to capitalise on. Polls suggest they will make major gains in June and become a substantial force within the next parliament. Schmit believes the conservatives of the European People’s Party may be willing to negotiate deals with the hard right on the legislative agenda, but he is adamant that his Socialists and Democrats bloc will not.

“There is no way. I’m very clear on that. There’s no way to have any arrangement, deal or whatever with the extreme right. Because I noticed that, with EPP, they make some very special distinction between extreme rights; the ‘decent’ extreme right and the pariah extreme right. Well, when I look at the so-called decent extreme right, who are these people? They are Vox. They are Franco admirers. They are Mussolini admirers. They are PiS party, who was about to abolish the rule of law in Poland and was sanctioned by the commission. So where is the decent extreme right? There is none. And that’s why there is no way to have any arrangement to just buying votes. Because the extreme right is intelligent, they will not give their votes for nothing. So, they will ask concessions on the way how European policy will be defined.

“Their [the far right] idea, their conception of Europe is fundamentally different from ours, social democrats. But I suppose, I suppose now I am not sure anymore of the EPP conception, because the EPP conception is very much linked to the former Christian Democrats. Now, I know that for real Christian Democrats, there’s no way to have an alliance with whichever form of the extreme right. And that’s our position too. I’m very clear. No way to have any understanding here.”

To see more on this and on Nicolas Schmit’s views on supporting Ukraine, dealing with China, and other issues, click on the video above.

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