Tag: Viktor Orbán

Crisis for Hungary’s Viktor Orban as President and Minister resign | explained

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The story so far: Five-term Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is facing his biggest backlash since taking office in 2010, as the nation’s President Katalin Novák resigned on February 10 over pardoning a man involved in child sex abuse. Along with Ms. Novak, former Justice Minister Judit Varga, who had also signed off on the pardon, resigned from Parliament, taking responsibility for the act.

With the exit of both Ms. Varga and Ms. Novak — the only two high-ranking women officials in Mr. Orban’s government — resentment against the Hungarian Prime Minister has increased, with several critics accusing him of shielding himself with the two women. Protestors have taken to the streets demanding Mr. Orban’s resignation as well.

After several days of silence, Mr. Orban issued a statement on February 17, promising several new laws cracking down on child abuse. He has accepted both Ms. Vagra and Ms. Novak’s resignations, stating that there is no room for clemency to child abusers. He also urged party MPs to urgently vote for a new President.

 Why has the President resigned?

46-year-old President Novak has come under fire for granting clemency to Endre Konya, former deputy director of a state orphanage who was jailed for helping to cover up sexual abuse of children. Mr. Konya had persuaded children to withdraw their testimony of sexual abuse against the orphanage’s director and was sentenced to a three-year prison sentence in 2022. He was also barred for a further five years from all activities and occupations involving minors.

In April 2023, Ms. Novak pardoned twenty-five people during a visit by Pope Francis, including Mr. Konya. The names of the pardoned individuals were made public on February 2, leading to an outcry. Around a thousand people took to the streets of Budapest on February 9, demanding Ms. Novak’s resignation. The call for her ouster was backed by Opposition parties, who pointed out that Ms. Novak’s ‘family-centric’ beliefs were in conflict with her actions.

A handout picture shows Hungary’s President Katalin Novak as she announces her resignation in the presidential palace of Budapest on February 10, 2024. Hungary’s President Katalin Novak announced her resignation on February 10, 2024 following outrage sparked in the central European country by a decision to pardon a man implicated in child sexual abuse case.

Ms. Novak, a mother of three, has staunchly advocated for a ‘family friendly’ Hungary, supporting traditional roles for men and women. As Mr. Orban’s Minister of Family Affairs, she had introduced several financial regulations aimed at mothers, large families and grandparents, highlighting the woman’s primary role as ‘child-bearers and caregivers.’

A practising conservative Christian, Ms. Novak has supported Mr. Orban’s anti-LGBTQ and anti-abortion views, backing ‘traditional families’ (with male-female couples). After being elected as the first woman President of Hungary in 2022, Ms. Novak vowed to rule by ‘values predicated on Christianity’ and to ‘protect human life from conception.’

She stepped down as President on February 10, issuing a statement on state television. “I made a mistake … Today is the last day that I address you as a President,” she said, adding she had thought the pardoned individual had not abused the vulnerability of children under his care. “I made a mistake as the pardon and the lack of reasoning was suitable to trigger doubts over the zero tolerance that applies to paedophilia,” she said.

 Political backlash following Novak’s resignation

Immediately after Ms. Novak’s resignation, her fellow Fidesz member and former Minister of Justice Judit Vagra, who had signed off on the presidential pardon, resigned an an MP and retired from public life.

In a Facebook post, Ms. Vagra took political responsibility for her actions and wrote that she was ‘”resigning my seat as a member of parliament and also as leader of the European Parliament list.” The 43-year-old Fidesz MP was on the top of the list of leaders from her party to lead Hungary in the 2024 European Parliament election scheduled in June.

Both Ms Novak and Ms Vagra are long-time allies of Mr. Orban and have been at the forefront of pushing his conservative agenda. While Ms. Novak has been responsible for ‘softening’ Mr. Orban’s image domestically by pushing a family-focused, Christian agenda, Ms. Vagra is the face of the Fidesz party’s battle against left of centre European Union (EU) lawmakers.

Prior to being elected to the highest office, Ms. Novak had worked in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Human Capacities and Family and Youth Affairs and was later elected as Vice President of Fidesz. She also served as Mr. Orban’s Minster of Families between 2020-21 before being his pick for President. Touted as a motherly figure, Ms. Novak was picked in a bid to woo female voters ahead of Mr. Orban’s re-election in 2022.

Judit Varga with Viktor Orban

Judit Varga with Viktor Orban

Meanwhile, Ms. Vagra, who speaks Hungarian, English, German, French, and Spanish, is known as a Orban loyalist with the necessary foreign experience to deal with Brussels. Apart from being Mr. Orban’s ally, Ms. Vagra has previously worked as an adviser for Hungarian members in the European Parliament (MEP) between 2009 and 2018, before being appointed as Minister for Justice in 2019. A vocal critic of the EU, she has taken the lead in defending Mr. Orban’s policies and negotiating with the EU to unfreeze funds marked for Hungary.

The departure of both women has created a vacuum in Mr. Orban’s all-male cabinet — the only such one in Europe — as criticism of Mr. Orban’s autocratic governing increases. Apart from the two women, Mr. Orban’s communications chief Antal Rogan and his personal adviser Zoltan Balog too are under fire for their role in the controversial pardon. Mr. Balog had allegedly lobbied for Mr. Konya’s clemency — a charge he has denied. Both men are still in office and are yet to comment on the issue.

Accusing Mr. Orban of shirking accountability, Hungarian MEP Anna Donath said, “Viktor Orbán was not ashamed to hide behind the skirts of two women instead of taking responsibility. That is why this matter cannot be allowed to close like this.” The Democratic Coalition, Hungary’s largest Opposition party, has called for direct presidential elections to replace Ms. Novak, instead of a replacement being appointed by the Fidesz lawmakers.

 What has Orban done in response?

To limit political damage, Mr. Orban has tabled a constitutional amendment which prohibits the President from pardoning crimes committed against children. However, according to analyst Dániel Hegedus of the German Marshall Fund, core supporters of the Fidesz were shocked by the resignations, questioning why the two senior politicians were made scapegoats in the scandal, despite their steadfast loyalty to Mr. Orban.

Mr. Hegedus claims that an internal polling by the party had revealed that the pardon did not sit well with conservative voters, threatening to alienate them. According to him, the two women leaders were made to step down, at the behest of Mr. Orban, to appease these voters. However, the move has not gone down well among Fidesz members, several of whom have criticised the callousness with which Ms. Novak and Ms. Vagra were discarded.

Peter Magyar, a top Fidesz leader and Ms. Vagra’s ex-husband has openly criticised the government and resigned from several state-owned companies. In a series of social media posts, he has questioned Mr. Rogan’s silence and accused several high-ranking officials, including Mr. Orban’s son-in-law Istvan Tiborcz, of being power-hungry and corrupt. Denouncing the Orban regime, he claimed, “I do not want to be part of a system for a minute longer where the real culprits hide behind women’s skirts,” adding that the regime was “a political product to conceal the operation of the power factory and to acquire enormous wealth.”

 EU elections in mind?

With the twin ousters, Mr. Orban seems to be refocusing his party’s efforts on the European Parliament elections in June. According to the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), with the rise in right-wing leaders across Europe, Fidesz is expected to retain a majority of the 21 seats in the European Parliament while the Opposition is likely to settle for one or two seats.

By consolidating his power in the EU, Mr. Orban is hoping that anti-EU groups will gain more votes, allowing him to push his pro-Russia agenda and obstruct EU sanctions against Moscow. He had also single-handedly delayed EU’s €50 billion aid to Ukraine before backtracking in February, and is holding up Sweden’s bid to join the military bloc NATO. Mr. Orban has batted for closer ties with Russia and China and projected Hungary as a ‘bridge’ between the East and the West, rather than being a faithful member of the European bloc.

As per BIRN estimates, groupings like the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), with a fading liberal Renew Europe, are set to retain power.

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, right, talks to Finland’s Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, center, next to Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, left, during a round table meeting at an EU summit in Brussels, Thursday, Feb. 1, 2024.

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, right, talks to Finland’s Prime Minister Petteri Orpo, center, next to Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, left, during a round table meeting at an EU summit in Brussels, Thursday, Feb. 1, 2024.
| Photo Credit:
Geert Vanden Wijngaert

Mr. Orban’s party Fidesz, which was part of EPP till 2020, is currently part of the non-aligned group Non-Inscrits, which is barred from holding office and granted limited speaking time. BIRN claims that Mr. Orban is hoping for a strong shift to the right in the EU (several European nations have elected right-wing governments) and may join the far-right Identity and Democracy group or the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament.

Moreover, Hungary will also hold the rotating presidency of the EU Council from July 1 to end of 2024, allowing Mr. Orban to spearhead the bloc’s policy-making process for six months. With Hungary being deemed an ‘elected autocracy’ by EU, and considering Mr. Orban’s strong anti-EU views, several member nations have questioned his ability to chair the council democratically.

Despite Mr. Orban’s efforts to douse the domestic fire, hundreds of protestors took to the streets in Budapest on February 15, demanding his resignation over the pardon.

In response, Mr. Orban made a statement at his annual state address inside the Castle Garden building, where only pro-government media were allowed. Promising a new package of laws, he informed that the government would also review staff appointments at state orphanages, where 7,000 children live, according to a BBC report. He has also relented on Sweden’s NATO membership, urging party MPs to elect a President soon to facilitate green-lighting Sweden’s NATO entry on February 26.

However, calls for his resignation remain strong among the people, signalling no end to Mr. Orban’s biggest political crisis till date.

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Ukraine needs a government of national unity

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Adrian Karatnycky, a senior fellow of the Atlantic Council and the author of the forthcoming book, “Battleground Ukraine: From Independence to the War with Russia” (Yale University Press).

In recent weeks, discourse about the war with Russia has turned deeply pessimistic in Ukraine.

A difficult Ukrainian counter-offensive, with lesser results than anticipated, has fueled deeply dark discussions about a deadlocked and bloody long-term war with Russia. Meanwhile, analysts and politicians have started to snipe at Ukraine’s military and political leaders, blaming them for the war effort’s failure and even speculating about defeat.

Further feeding this atmosphere of pessimism is evidence of tension between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the country’s military command, as well as delays in military aid from the United States. And these pressures now need to be addressed.

Clearly, the period of euphoria propelled by major Ukrainian military victories and territorial advances is over. So, too, is the period of grandiose promises by Ukrainian officials.

Last winter, an official spokesman for the president had proclaimed he expected to spend the next summer in Crimea. No less extravagant a promise was echoed by the head of military intelligence, who predicted Crimea would be liberated within six months, bringing official promises of a major spring counter-offensive with significant territorial gains along with it.

Early battlefield success also contributed to near universal approval for Zelenskyy among Ukrainians. Despite slow Russian advances in the Donbas and scant Ukrainian victories later on, happy talk on the state-dominated TV “marathon” — joint programming produced by the bulk of the country’s main television networks — continued to promote frontline success, helping Zelenskyy maintain his popularity.

All this changed, however, when Ukraine’s 2023 counter-offensive stalled. The massive loss of fighters amid meagre gains and a slow-moving positional war eroded public trust in the president and his team for the first time since the war began.

A subsequent mid-November poll gave Zelenskyy a trust rating of only net 32 percent plus — meaning two-thirds of Ukrainians trusted the president, while a third now did not. This was a steep decline from polls earlier in the year, and far below the trust ratings of the armed forces and their commander, General Valery Zaluzhny.

A later poll conducted for the President’s Office and leaked to the Ukrainska Pravda news site showed Zelenskyy was neck and neck with Zaluzhny in a hypothetical race for president. Moreover, Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party — which currently holds over two-thirds of the seats in parliament — would see its presence shrink dramatically if elections were held today.

And as Zelenskyy’s support weakens, Ukraine now faces a number of challenges and difficult decisions. These include a deadlock on the front, a rapidly depleting supply of munitions, some erosion of support from Europe, and an impasse in the U.S. Congress over a bill to provide for the military needs of both Ukraine and Israel. His star power notwithstanding, Zelenskyy faces new difficulties in maintaining high levels of military and financial support for Ukraine both in North America and in Europe.

Additionally, the ranks of Ukraine’s armed forces — initially populated by experienced military professionals with combat experience and highly motivated volunteers — have suffered mass casualties during these brutal two years of war. Аs a result, military recruiters — now called “people snatchers” — are scouring cities and villages in search of males aged 18 to 60 for military service. Sometimes, these recruiters are not merely using coercive tactics against draft dodgers but detaining and pressuring those not called or exempt from service into signing on. And such tactics are contributing to justifiable public anger toward the authorities

In addition to such unpopular tactics, Zelenskyy will soon likely need to need to dramatically widen the national military mobilization and shift social spending toward military expenditures, if only to hedge against any decline in, or interruption of, financing from key allies. Both moves will be highly unpopular.

All this doesn’t mean Russia will prevail. Indeed, Ukraine has basically fought Russia to a standstill. Taking minor territorial losses in the Donbas, while gaining modest territory in the south and forcing Russia’s navy to the eastern reaches of the Black Sea, it has effectively restored freedom of navigation for commercial vessels in the sea’s west.

Zelenskyy has also been a courageous and successful wartime leader. But much of this was dependent on steadfast public support. Near-universal domestic approval gave him political carte blanche to shape policy and strategy. But while Ukrainians remain united in their aim of defending the country, unqualified support for Zelenskyy and his policies is declining. And the embattled democracy is subsequently witnessing a revival in national politics.

Zelenskyy’s team itself has contributed to this politicization. After Zaluzhny soberly spoke about the difficulties of Ukraine’s war effort, while providing a road map that could ensure victory, his public comments were shot down by officials from the President’s Office.

In early November, Zelenskyy’s foreign policy advisor Ihor Zhovkva went on national television to assert that Zaluzhny’s statement “eases the work of the aggressor” by stirring “panic,” adding there should be no public discussion of the situation at the front. Zelenskyy himself then chided the general in an interview, warning the military not to engage in politics.

Deputy Head of the Committee on National Security, Defense and Intelligence Maryana Bezuhla piled on, alleging Zaluzhny had ignored U.S. General Mark Milley’s recommendations to mine Ukraine’s border with Russian occupied Crimea back in 2021 — an act of negligence, she implied, that cost Ukraine large swaths of territory in the south. However, Zelenskyy is unlikely to seek Zaluzhny’s dismissal, as it would instantly launch the soldier on a political career.

And that’s not all. On the heels of this kerfuffle, Zelenskyy’s allies in parliament then blocked a visit to Poland and the U.S. by former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko. The ostensible reason behind this was a report from Ukraine’s security service suggesting Poroshenko’s trip would be exploited by Russian propaganda. Of particular concern was a planned meeting between Poroshenko and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

The idea that a seasoned leader like Poroshenko, whose tenure as president earned Western praise for his diplomatic skills, could be manipulated is, on the face of it, preposterous. And it later turned out that Zelenskyy himself would be meeting Orbán and didn’t want to be preempted.

These clear fractures need to be dealt with now.

Furthermore, as importantly, as domestic support erodes, Zelenskyy’s term in office is due to formally expire in May 2024, while the parliament’s four-year term expired in October. New elections are well-nigh impossible with millions of voters outside the country, a million engaged at the front and millions more internally displaced or under Russian occupation. Elections amid bloody combat and constant missiles and drone attacks on urban centers are unlikely, and would require both legislative and constitutional changes.

This issue of expiring mandates would be moot were the ratings of Zelenskyy and his party unassailable, but polls show a creeping disenchantment with both.

In this context, the time is ripe for Ukraine’s president to consider establishing a broad-based government of national unity. Opening the government to opposition and civil society leaders in this way would instantly provide legitimacy to the leadership team, reduce opposition criticism and widen the circle of voices that have the president’s ear.

There are compelling precedents for such a step too. For example, as World War II began, Conservative Prime Minister Winston Churchill understood Britain faced an existential threat that required sustaining national unity and created a broad-based coalition government. Churchill installed his main rival — Labour leader Clement Attlee — as deputy prime minister, and added Labour’s Ernest Bevin, a former trade union leader, to the national unity cabinet.

Similarly, this practice was followed most recently by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who offered opposition party leaders a place in a unity government after Hamas’s brutal October 7 attacks. The proposal was accepted by centrist Benny Gantz.

Since the beginning of his presidency, Zelenskyy has relied on an exceedingly narrow circle of trusted advisors. But while he meets with his top military command, intelligence officials, visiting Western leaders and the media, he has largely shut himself off from civic leaders, political critics and rivals — including some with important foreign policy, national security and economic experience.

Their inclusion in leadership posts would offer Zelenskyy additional input on policy options, allow for discussions of alternative tactics and contribute to new approaches when it comes to external relations. With national unity showing signs of fraying, a government that includes the opposition would truly give it a boost.

The only questions are whether Zelenskyy is flexible enough to overcome his contempt for most opposition leaders, and change his style of governing from highly centralized decision-making to more broad-based consensus-building.



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In fact, this is why Sweden should ultimately join NATO

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The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

One does not need to be a master strategist to realise that due to the country’s geographic position, Sweden’s accession to NATO would significantly strengthen the alliance in the entire Baltic Sea region, Dr András Rácz writes.

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On 6 October, Euronews published an op-ed by Dr Gladden Pappin, president of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, about why Sweden may not join NATO. 

Some of Dr Pappin’s arguments are indeed worth attention, though certainly not endorsement, while others, unfortunately, require factual corrections.

For one, Russia definitely is a threat.

Dr Pappin, known more as a political philosopher than a security expert, argues that there is not much urgency to get Sweden into the alliance. 

According to him, with its forces bogged down in Ukraine, Russia is not going to launch incursions into NATO territory anytime soon and “claims about Russia’s imperial ambitions seem hardly credible.” 

This assessment is indeed surprising taking into account that Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine is raging in the direct neighbourhood of Hungary, while also claiming the lives of ethnic Hungarian soldiers in the Ukrainian army.

What makes Dr Pappin’s line particularly noteworthy is that it directly contradicts the newest assessment of NATO. 

According to the final communique of the Vilnius Summit, released on 11 July, “the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” 

In other words, while all members of the alliance agreed in Vilnius that Russia is the most important threat NATO needs to face, for some reason Dr Pappin tried to convince his readers about the opposite. 

By doing so, he implicitly contradicted even the Hungarian government, which also approved the Vilnius summit communique.

Sweden would make NATO considerably stronger

Another surprising element of Dr Pappin’s article is that according to him, “Sweden’s military contribution to NATO would be rather slender.” 

However, the opposite is true, even according to Hungarian officials. Only a few days after his opinion article, Hungary’s Chief of General Staff Lieutenant General Gábor Böröndi gave an interview in which he explicitly stated that the Swedish armed forces are suitably ready for NATO accession, adding that that the question of Sweden’s accession is primarily a political matter.

General Böröndi is certainly right. According to The Military Balance 2023, Sweden’s defence budget was slightly above $8 billion (€7.5bn) in 2022, thus nearly 2,5 times bigger than Hungary’s $2,99bn (€2.8bn).

Sweden has a small, but well-trained, very well-equipped armed force configured for territorial defence. Just to give one example: the country’s air force possesses nearly a hundred JAS-39 Gripen fighters. 

Somewhat ironically, the sole jet fighter operated by the Hungarian Air Force happens to be the same Gripen: approximately a dozen of them were leased from Sweden. Budapest is in the process of extending the lease contract that is about the expire in 2026.

A key element of Dr Pappin’s argument for the delayed accession ratification is that there is a deficit of trust in Budapest vis-à-vis Stockholm, meaning that Sweden shall not join until disagreements are resolved. 

However, had there been a real loss of trust, it is highly unlikely that Hungary would strive to maintain its military technological dependence on Sweden by extending the Gripen lease contract.

Putting cold steel aside, one does not need to be a master strategist to realise that due to the country’s geographic position, Sweden’s accession to NATO would significantly strengthen the alliance in the entire Baltic Sea region. 

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Sweden’s membership would decisively help improve the collective defence provided to our Finnish, Polish and Baltic allies on all levels, ranging from strategic planning to military logistics.

Concerted ambiguity in Hungary’s communication

Dr Pappin’s article appears to be part of a wider Hungarian communication manoeuvre aimed at creating ambiguity about Budapest’s position on Sweden’s accession, thus probably buying it time. 

The Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, presided by him, is an integral part of the Hungarian government. The HIIA is directly subordinated to the Office of the Prime Minister, and so is Dr Pappin. 

Generally speaking, no employee of any government would be allowed to publish opinion pieces on the policies of the given government without prior coordination and approval. 

Hence, the article of Dr Pappin is certainly not independent of the official policy of the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

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Interestingly enough, in terms of content, the article appears to contradict the official Hungarian explanations of why Sweden’s accession has not yet been ratified. 

Earlier, the government claimed that it already endorsed and supported Sweden in joining NATO; it is only the parliament that is unwilling to ratify the accession. 

However, this article casts some doubt on the credibility of this argument: had the Hungarian government been really in favour of Stockholm’s accession, no government officials would have published critical articles about Sweden’s readiness.

Contradictions aplenty

The Hungarian parliament, which is officially delaying the ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession, is dominated by the constitutional majority of the ruling coalition led by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party. 

Their parliamentary supermajority has been serving the government with impeccable obedience since 2010: in the Hungarian parliament, it is fairly normal that core numbers of the budget get modified literally overnight or that the parliament amends the constitution in a few days’ time, without any meaningful debate. 

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This parliament is unlikely to suddenly stand up against the government, particularly in a question of such strategic importance as the expansion of NATO.

Still, on the very same day when Dr Pappin’s article came out, an interview came out with Zsolt Németh, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian parliament, a veteran Fidesz politician and known foreign policy expert. 

Németh, who is as independent of the government as the rest of his parliamentary fraction, argued that Hungary would certainly support Sweden’s accession and the alliance would be stronger with Stockholm joining. 

In other words, two Hungarian officials voiced their opinions directly contradicting each other and did so exactly at the same time. The interview of General Böröndi may well be part of the same communication effort.

Who profits?

While discussing in detail why Sweden is supposedly not ready for NATO, Dr Pappin elegantly avoids even mentioning a key question: who does the Hungarian policy line actually benefit? 

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Németh was more open in his interview: he admitted that Hungary closely coordinates with Turkey on when the Swedish accession should be ratified.

Turkey is certainly benefiting from the Hungarian policy, as Ankara does not need to be alone in delaying Sweden’s accession. 

Turkey has been conducting a tough, but entirely rational, calculated policy: it has set a number of demands both vis-à-vis Sweden and the US. Once Ankara’s requests can be agreed upon, Turkey is highly likely to approve Sweden’s accession.

Meanwhile, there are simply no demands from the Hungarian side. Unlike Ankara, Budapest is not asking for anything at all from Stockholm, focusing solely on making critical remarks. 

This renders it unclear what Hungary would actually gain from delaying Sweden’s accession. It is at least questionable whether paying lip service to Ankara would be worth the damage inflicted upon the credibility of Budapest as a NATO ally.

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Meanwhile, Russia is applauding the delay

Meanwhile, there is another player that certainly does not mind the delayed Swedish NATO accession: Russia. 

Moscow has long been opposed to any enlargement of NATO. From the Kremlin’s perspective, Sweden’s NATO membership would mean that the Baltic Sea became “Lake NATO”, limiting the power of Russia’s Baltic Fleet, as well as of the other assets deployed to Kaliningrad. 

This forces Moscow to adjust its entire military posture in the Baltic Sea region. This is already happening, as Russia is in the process of recreating the old Leningrad Military District. 

As the process is at least cumbersome, Moscow certainly applauds the extra time granted by the delayed Swedish NATO accession. And from this perspective, Hungary is serving not only Turkish but also Russian interests.

Dr András Rácz is a Senior Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

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