Turkey is counting down to elections on 14 May, with the economy the single most important issue for voters.
But the migrant crisis is also seen as critical — not just for the public, but for the political parties vying for power.
The last decade has witnessed a wave of arrivals with people fleeing the war in Syria. Many passed through Turkey and went on to Europe, but millions remained in the first point of safety.
Some surveys show that as the number of foreigners has increased, so has anti-migrant sentiment.
That has meant immigration issues are a hot election subject, which could have implications for the EU as well.
The opposition ‘National Alliance‘ bloc is hoping to gain votes by pledging to send two million Syrians back to their homeland within two years. According to official figures, Turkey hosts 3,447,837 Syrian refugees registered under temporary protection as of March 2023.
Meanwhile, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, facing harsh criticism for his migration policy from his own supporters, has tried to keep one foot in each camp.
Last year, he reiterated that his government was working on a return scheme to send one million Syrians back to their homeland on a voluntary basis. A few days later he also said “we will never expel them from this land. Our door is wide open. We’ll continue to host them and not throw them into the lap of murderers.”
Five months before the election, Erdogan announced more than half a million Syrians returned to northern Syria and he added “voluntary return of Syrians back to their homes is accelerating”.
An alternative to the EU-Turkey deal
Migrants have become a bargaining tool between Ankara and the European Union too.
In 2016, both parties reached a deal on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation, better known as the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. It aimed to stop the influx of refugees and migrants into the EU by sending anyone trying to enter Greece irregularly back to Turkey.
In return, the EU promised to fund €6 billion to help Turkey accommodate Syrians, as well as offer visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals. The deal meant that for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greece, another Syrian will be resettled in the EU.
For Professor Dr Kemal Kirişci, a nonresident senior fellow and director of the Turkey Project at the Brookings Institution, the deal was “utterly successful” for Brussels, though the possibility of a similar agreement is highly unlikely.
Statistics from Turkish authorities show that about 37,000 Syrians have been relocated to Western countries under the one-for-one principle.
According to Kirişci, integrating them into reconstruction plans of the disaster zone following February’s devastating earthquake, is much more feasible and realistic than any other solution.
He points out there is already a United Nations plan on the table which focuses on “the EU and other Western partners extending trade concessions to Turkey, enabling private businesses to expand their exports and in return create formal and sustainable employment for both Syrian refugees and locals.”
In his article about the proposal, Kirişci writes: “It would reduce Syrian refugees’ dependence on humanitarian assistance, help alleviate public resentment, and diminish the prospects of secondary movements”.
Speaking to Euronews, he added the EU would be much more receptive to this idea and there is great support for the proposal from concerned organisations.
“Until last year, Syrian refugees were increasingly feeling integrated into Turkish society, but the situation has changed due to the public resentment that surfaced during the course of the last year. With that resentment, you begin to see refugees doubting their presence and acceptance in Turkey. Their consideration to turn towards a third destination is increasing too”, Kirişci continues.
A 2021 report suggests that most Syrians, who five years ago wanted to stay in Turkey, now want to relocate to another country.
In 2017 only around 32% of Syrians wanted to settle in a third country, by 2021 this number had risen to 64%.
Kirişci also points out that migrants are unlikely to be a top priority for the new government after the elections because whoever will be in power, will face more pressing issues such as the economy.
‘Immigration [is] a key element in EU-Turkey relations’
Dr Sibel Karadag from Kadir Has University, an expert on migration and borders, says the policy of return is already in place internationally.
“Deportation and returns have been a hot topic for a long time. Western countries are deporting migrants to their neighbouring countries and the neighbours sending them to the countries of origin.”
“On the way to elections, Turkey increases the level of returns and deportations as we previously witnessed during the 2019 municipality elections. Since January 2022, another episode is at stake which is officially called as the policy of dilution and sweeping.
“Under this policy, Syrians are sent back to the areas under Turkish control in northern Syria under the name of voluntary returns and other irregular migrants are deported through charter flights”, she explains.
Karadag believes regardless of the election result, this practice will continue.
In its election campaign, the opposition bloc has outlined four step solution to the migrant crisis in Turkey.
“First of all, we will make peace with all our neighbours” they say as their number one priority: “We will sit down with the Syrian government to discuss and find a peaceful solution”.
On the other hand, the current government is yet to announce its election manifesto. However, Erdogan’s desire to negotiate with Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and his efforts on a scheme to relocate at least one million Syrian to northern Syria are seen as a part of his election campaign.
For both experts, shaking hands with the Syrian president is not a possibility on the horizon while Turkey maintains its military presence in northern Syria, at least not in the very near future.
According to Karadag, migration and border governance became key elements in EU-Turkey relations.
“The EU has aimed to externalise this issue to Turkey as part of its wider global approach to control migration, and Turkey has used its ‘guardian’ role by turning it into multi bargaining tool”, she argues.
She adds: “At times, the government aimed to bargain with the threat of opening of borders which finally became materialised during the Pazarkule events in 2020. At other times it sought additional financial support or tacit political tolerance for the regime”.
In late 2019, Erdogan threatened to open European borders to let migrants leave the country unless more international support was provided, plus as a response to criticisms of Turkish military intervention in northern Syria.
Following his announcement, thousands of migrants and refugees, mainly from Somalia and Afghanistan, flocked to Turkey’s Pazarkule border crossing with Greece.
Clashes broke out as desperate groups faced fierce resistance from Greek police.
For Karadag, in the event of implementing the plans of mass returns, we may see similar scenes again, as she argues the Turkey-Greece border is much deadlier than in 2015 with proven pushbacks from Greek security forces.
“The European Union will continue to support any kind of extra-legal action to stop migrants reaching its doorstep,” she says.
“The first task should be to build a critical and strong diplomacy with rights-based principles against EU’s migration and border policies,” adds Karadag.
“The new government should carry out a policy that puts human dignity at the forefront.”
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