Sheikh Hasina | The rebel who became the ruler

On April 30, 1991, a cyclone hit the coastal Bangladesh with monstrous ferocity. Storm surges drove sea water deep inland. At the end of the nearly seven-hour-long cyclone, at least 140,000 people were left dead. Sheikh Hasina, then the leader of the principal opposition Awami League, reached the affected areas near Chittagong before the Government of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) could muster any response. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia should take moral responsibility for failing to provide timely assistance to the people and resign immediately, Ms. Hasina demanded. The images of Ms. Hasina walking in the devastated landmass of coastal Bangladesh drove her into the centre of a grieving nation. The BNP sensed a growing threat, and violent attacks targeted Ms. Hasina in the following months.

Earlier, on November 10, 1987, the police of military ruler Mohammed Ershad had targeted her, which killed three of her young colleagues from the student wing of the Awami League. Sensing that a deeply unpopular and confused military dictator was failing in governance, Ms. Hasina and Ms. Zia came together in 1987. The two were known to be opposed to each other. Yet, they formed an alliance, asking for genuine democracy. In the winter of 1990, the Hasina-Zia duo mobilised lakhs of people in Dhaka, shaking the foundations of Ershad’s regime. Ershad responded by declaring emergency, but in the face of mounting pressure, he resigned on December 4. In the February 1991 election, the BNP came to power, and Ms. Hasina emerged as the main opposition leader. The cyclone of April that year gave Ms. Hasina the rebirth that she wanted.

Also Read: OPINION | The road ahead for Sheikh Hasina

Long before the 1991 cyclone, the coastal part of the country was devastated in the winter of 1970 by cyclone ‘Bhola’. For days, the government of Yahya Khan, sitting in a distant Islamabad, did not know the scale of the devastation. The apathy of the Yahya Khan government was matched by the brutality of Operation Searchlight that was launched by the Pakistani military to crush the democratic aspirations of the winner of general election — the Awami League, under Sheikh Mujib. The Awami League, which took power after the birth of Bangladesh following the India-Pakistan war of 1971, represented the young and restless youth of East Pakistan.

When Mujib was assassinated on August 15, 1975, Ms. Hasina was in West Germany. She and her sister Rehana survived the massacre that wiped out their entire family, including their five-year-old brother Sheikh Russell. After the killings, Ms. Hasina took refuge in India for six years. This was the formative period of the future Prime Minister. In this phase, Ms. Hasina struck a friendship with Congress leader Pranab Mukherjee and the Gandhis of India.

On May 17, 1981, Ms. Hasina returned to Bangladesh. By then, the Awami League had elected her in absentia as its General Secretary. The battle against the Ershad regime was tough and the battle against the Zia government was no less. Ms. Zia, widow of former military ruler Zia-ur Rahman who founded the BNP, tried to corner Ms. Hasina as attacks continued. But the Zia government could not recover from the blow of the cyclone and the BNP was defeated in the election of 1996, paving the way for the first term of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The rebel became the ruler.

Agreement with India

In 1997, Ms. Hasina concluded the 30-year Ganga Water Sharing Agreement with India that was to last till 2026. She also announced the plan for building the ambitious bridge across the Padma in this tenure. She reached out to the Chakmas in the Chittagong Hill Tract and concluded a peace treaty on December 2, 1997 with the Parbattyo Chattogram Jana Samhati Samiti. Despite striking several right notes, Ms. Hasina lost the 2001 election that was held under a caretaker government, to a four-party alliance led by the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, Jatiya Party (Manju) and Islamic Oikyo Jote.

The BNP-led government became known subsequently for the alleged support that it provided to the secessionist forces like the ULFA and other groups in India’s Northeast. Rampant corruption and public protests crippled the country.

A new Caretaker Government came in January 2007 with support from the military, which imposed emergency and postponed the elections. During this time, Ms. Hasina was jailed on corruption charges which helped her gain public sympathy. The election held in December 29, 2008 returned her to power. This time, she returned to take advantage of her partnership with India and reached an in-principle agreement on Teesta water sharing and started negotiation and survey for the historic Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) with India.

In February 2013, the trial of Abdul Quader Mollah reignited the painful memories of the genocide committed during March-December 1971 under the supervision of the Pakistani military. The powerful Shahbag movement that started in February 2013 demanded death sentence for Mollah, who had earlier got a life sentence. In December that year, Mollah was hanged. Ms. Hasina returned to power in 2014 in an election that was boycotted by the BNP. Unfazed, Ms. Hasina next year sealed the LBA with India.

Continuing with the Shahbag spirit, her government kept up the heat on the collaborators in the genocide and hanged a number of leaders, including Motiur Rahman Nizami and Mir Quasem Ali of Jamaat-e-Islami in 2016. That year, extremism posed the toughest challenge to Hasina with the Islamic State attack on the Holey Artisan Bakery of Dhaka. She vowed to continue her campaign against terrorists which became synonymous with her rule. A tough fighter who had taken on a military dictator in the 1980s, she had by now become a grandmother and acquired a front rank as one of the longest ruling female leaders in the world.

Election controversy

There has been no indications from the party so far about who might succeed Ms. Hasina. Her son Sajeeb Wazed Joy, an entrepreneur, and daughter Saima Wazed, have both hit the headlines. Ms. Saima recently became the South East Asia Regional Director of the World Health Organization, prompting criticism of nepotism. However, for the veteran leader, succession is not yet a priority. The coming election is already in international focus as the BNP has planned to boycott the polls once again. Ms. Hasina has maintained that there will not be the repeat of the past caretaker governments as that provision in the Constitution has been removed. The BNP, however, demands a “neutral government” before polling.

As global pressure mounts on her, Bangladesh is all set to hold the election on January 7. Ms. Hasina has sent emissaries abroad to invite observers and diplomats and promised a fair contest. Despite her assurances, around 14 parties, including the BNP, are boycotting the election. With the completed Padma bridge, and a series of new airports and roadways, Ms. Hasina showcases her achievements while seeking re-election, though there is economic stress and criticism of a widening crackdown on the opposition. It remains to be seen if Ms. Hasina, the former rebel, would be willing to test her popularity in the ring of a truly “free and fair election” and convince the opposition to join the race at the last moment.

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The Tatmadaw | Junta down but not out

In a world and time where absolute rule by a military junta in a country is considered an anachronism, the Tatmadaw, or the military in Myanmar, seeks to maintain such a regime after gaining absolute power through a coup in February 2021. But the backlash against the coup has arguably been the severest that the Tatmadaw has faced in six decades of dominance in Myanmar post independence.

The current iteration of the junta goes by the appellation State Administration Council (SAC), which organised the third major coup in the country’s independent history to oust the elected civilian National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government. To tackle the agitations that followed the coup, the military reverted to its oft-used tactics of repression even as the NLD and other pro-democracy activists went on to form a National Unity Government (NUG) in exile.


Editorial | Changing tide: On democracy and Myanmar’s civil war

This led to the creation of the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), militias across the country that took on the junta using guerilla warfare and inflicted losses in several villages in Myanmar’s rural hinterland, even in places dominated by the majority Bamar ethnicity. Various ethnic armed actors, some of whom have been fighting the Burmese state for decades, also went on to break their prior ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw and entered into a loose alliance with the PDF and the NUG, expanding the skirmishes into a full-fledged civil war.

This alliance was enabled by political developments after the coup — members of the deposed NLD and other elected ethnic lawmakers formed a new political body called the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (or National Parliament in Burmese), which, along with other civil society actors and ethnic party representatives later formed the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), a dialogue platform seeking to unite pro-democratic forces.

The NUCC then agreed upon a “federal democratic charter” (FDC) that sought to come up with a future constitution, and a political roadmap to a “federal democratic” country to be led by the NUG that was announced in April 2021. A final publication of the FDC happened in March 2022, after incorporating ethnic demands of recognition of non-Bamar minority identities and equality.

Ethnic armed groups such as the Karen (Karen National Union), Kachin (Kachin Independence Organization), Chin (Chin National Front) and Karenni (Karenni National Progressive Party) supported the NUG, fighting the army and helping forming anti-coup militias. They did so while rejecting an NUG proposal for a single ‘Federal Army’ under a unified NUG command.

Eight groups, including the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO) initially joined the NUCC dialogue, but after the junta’s crackdown, decided to retain their ceasefire status with the junta.

The Shan-State based Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), representing the interests of the Palaung people; the Kokang-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA); and other northern groups in Shan State, besides the Rakhine State-based AA, used the post-coup situation to strengthen themselves without provoking the junta. These groups are also loosely allied with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), one of the largest ethnic armed forces, which has repudiated any ties with the NUG and retains its pre-coup relationship with the junta.

On October 27, 2023, however, these three groups — the MNDAA, the TNLA and the AA — launched coordinated attacks against military bases across northern Shan State. The attacks, termed ‘Operation 1027’ denoting the date of the operations, October 27, by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, as the three groups called their collective, led to serious setbacks for the junta’s forces.

Scores of military outposts and bases were either abandoned by the junta forces or were captured by the rebels, with the UN stating that 60,000 people in Shan State and 2,00,000 overall in the country have been displaced following the current hostilities taking the total number of civilian displacements to more than two million since the coup.

In the ensuing weeks after the coordinated offensive by the Brotherhood Alliance, other ethnic armed groups besides the PDF were engaged in attacks against military establishments across the country — from Kachin state in the north, Sagaing, Magwe and Bago in the central plains, Chin and Rakhine States in the west, Kayah in the east and the Karen State in the south. As an analyst put it in the news outlet The Irrawaddy, “For the first time in history, the military now faces simultaneous attacks from armed resistance of various types, ranging from conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics and from overt to covert operations, in 12 out of Myanmar’s 14 states and regions. The evidence of a coordinated nationwide offensive by the combined forces opposing the hapless coup regime has become unmistakable”. The Tatmadaw still controls major roads, towns and urban centres but have lost significant territory in the form of outposts in rural areas of large parts of Myanmar.

Stretched thin

This situation where the Tatmadaw has been stretched thin by the coordinated attacks from different armed groups, and to its alarm, even in its Bamar strongholds, has led to some analysts excitedly suggesting that the military has finally received an existential threat to its dominance. But other seasoned observers of Myanmar have taken a cautionary stance. One such observer, veteran journalist Bertil Lintner, argues that the Myanmar army remains the “most effective and best-armed fighting force in the country”.

A UN report in May 2023 said arms worth $1 billion were used by the military against the people of Myanmar with the bulk of them (more than 90%) from entities from three countries (Russia 41%; China 27%; and Singapore 25%). Supplies from India amounted to $51 million. The war crimes-committing junta has used fighter planes and artillery to bomb its own rural people using scorched-earth methods to deter the rebels.

The PDFs, meanwhile, were using locally sourced arms and Mr. Lintner also argues that there was significant lack of cohesion among the ethnic armies. More vitally, he says, the “everlasting unity of Myanmar’s armed forces” and the fact that the Tatmadaw has “become a powerful state within a state with its own institutions and privileges for its members” has made it a formidable organisation, which has weathered many crises and storms since Burma’s independence from Britain in 1948.

The Tatmadaw’s recent history can be traced to the formation of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) that was founded in 1941 by a group of activists along with Japanese help to take on the British. Led by Aung San, the father of Aung San Suu Kyi, the BIA initially fought in the Second World War against the British alongside the Japanese and renamed itself as the Burma Defence Army which later on joined the Allied forces against Japanese occupation by 1945.

After substantive reorganisation in a period marked with conflict with ethnic insurgent groups, the military led by General Ne Win led a coup against the civilian government (then led by U Nu) in 1962 to form a unitary state led by the military and that espoused a “Burmese socialist” regime based on dirigiste principles. The unitary state allowed for only a single party that was dominated by the military and this ruled the country for 26 years, pursuing policies of international isolation, autarky and rule by dictatorial fiat.

With Myanmar’s economy rapidly deteriorating, a massive civilian uprising occurred in 1988 against the military rule. It was put down with force and by September 1988, martial law was declared. The military now ruled through a new regime called the State Law and Order Restoration Council that metamorphosed into the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. The SPDC, with senior general Than Shwe at the helm, consisted of 11 senior military officials and effectively controlled the reins of government till 2011, when following a new Constitution in 2010, power was handed over in the form of a sequence of steps to a hybrid civilian-military regime led by former general Thein Sein.

NLD victory

In 2015, the NLD won a supermajority of seats in the combined national Parliament and sought to restrict the military’s overarching powers gradually but was rebuffed by military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who went on to become chairman of the SAC, the new iteration of the Tatmadaw regime that captured absolute power in 2021.

The Tatmadaw’s decades’ long organisation as a professional force that draws from the Bamar ethnicity, its untrammelled use of resources by setting up and controlling corporate firms and business interests, its insulation from any civilian scrutiny or oversight, besides its utilisation of geopolitical ties with Myanmar’s neighbours, China in particular, has allowed it to remain a formidable force.

While international sanctions against its leaders, the wrath of the Myanmar diaspora due to its failures and excesses as the ruler of the country, which include the genocidal policies against minorities such as the Rohingya, and support for the NUG have thrown up a strong challenge, its successful use of ethnic divisions, besides its resourcefulness has ensured its hegemony despite lack of popular support in Myanmar.

This is perhaps why observers like Mr. Lintner argue that Myanmar is in for a prolonged war of attrition unless there is an internal split within the Tatmadaw for the pro-democracy and pro-federal forces to exploit for a decisive military win. And even then, the task to build a post-junta, federal and democratic Myanmar will be enormously complicated.

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Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber | The Grand Vizier of COP28

The 28th edition of the Conference of Parties (COP) under way in Dubai is hot, flat and crowded — a Thomas Friedmanic mural of globalisation.

The hundreds of pavilions sprawled across Expo City host conferences, exhibits, food courts, stages, laser light shows all tie into the larger theme of climate change. The Grand Vizier, as an orchestrator of this confluence, is a man in his 50s. In some of the plenary meetings under way in the operatic halls, he can be seen in the centre in an elegant thawb. His beard is sharp and trimmed and his 6’3”frame lean. As the President of COP28, Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber plays the role of Persuader-in-Chief.

His role, to get the various heads of state, Ministers to meet on common ground on the greatest simmering problem that humanity faces as a collective. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that came into force in 1994 was a landmark one of sorts that, over the years, has got 194 countries to agree that the globe faces an existential threat from rising levels of greenhouse gas emissions. In the 1990s, this wasn’t yet scientific fact despite which, nations came around to acknowledging the existence of the problem.

The UNFCCC also classifies countries as ‘Annex’ and ‘Non-Annex,’ where the latter consist of the bulk of developing and industrialising countries who have contributed minimally to the historical store of carbon in the atmosphere. Annex countries (and there are sub-classifications within them) are expected to finance clean energy development in non-annex nations. Over the years, this arrangement has taken byzantine turns, with different coalitions forming, sometimes breaking, grand promises made, pledges broken, subtle and veiled threats of non-cooperation and with the result that greenhouse gas emissions are nowhere close to what science says they should be for a chance at keeping temperatures below the levels necessary to avoid cataclysm.

What has, however, stayed constant since 1995 are the annual COP meetings where ministerial delegations congregate and spend close to two weeks, trying to iron out an agreement that moves the world, by inches, towards meeting the goals of the UNFCCC. Ahead of the year’s COP, a team from the UN Secretariat assesses the logistical and technical suitability of a country to host one. Once done, a President is chosen. Like the Speaker of India’s Parliament, the President is expected to be neutral.

At COPs, the President ensures the observance of rules of procedure and works with country delegations to reach consensus on key issues. Before being designated as President, the chosen one spends nearly a year as the ‘President-designate,’ during which time they work at raising ambition to tackle climate change internationally. The Presidency works to develop effective international relationships with countries, institutions, businesses and stakeholders to achieve the necessary commitments in advance of and at COP.

Best possible outcome

The role also includes developing a vision for the best possible outcome of the meeting. Though Presidents are not obliged to recuse themselves when matters involving their countries emerge, the onus of maintaining neutrality and rising above national constraints — in the service of the greater UNFCCC good — is expected. It was this key balance that appeared off-kilter in the case of Sultan Al Jaber.

His position as the Chief Executive Officer of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), one of the largest oil companies globally, implied, the criticism went, that he could not be expected to further the elimination of fossil fuels. Rather than the gavel, he would most likely hold a flaming torch, that would give an even longer rope to the fossil fuel industry — oil and gas especially — to avoid producing and exporting these propellants that, while indispensable to the world as we know it, contributed to nearly 60% of annual emissions.

In his year as President-designate, Mr. Al Jaber, who’s also the United Arab Emirates’ Minister for industry and advanced technology, has given a few interviews. In those ones he has underlined that he sees no conflict in his role as a CEO of an oil company. Rather, this actually enabled him to involve more such industrialists, bring them to the table at COP, and have them commit to a timeline to phase out fossil fuels.

“Never in history has a COP President confronted the oil industry, let alone the fact that he’s a CEO of an oil company,” he told The Guardian. “Not having oil and gas and high-emitting industries on the same table is not the right thing to do. You need to bring them all. We need to reimagine this relationship between producers and consumers. We need this integrated approach.”

‘Zero carbon’ city

He has also sought to highlight his former leadership of another prominent renewable energy company, Masdar, in the UAE. Masdar, whose development strategy lies in buying significant stakes in renewable energy companies, boasts as its flagship project Masdar city, a ‘zero carbon’ city that is situated a few kilometres of Abu Dhabi, Mr. Al Jaber’s home city.

In the run-up to the COP meet, reports emerged that the UAE planned to use its role as host of the climate talks to facilitate oil deals with at least 15 countries. Mr. Al Jaber vociferously denied this, a day ahead of the commencement of the COP. Later, on another report, he said that he had in an online discussion raised questions about whether a fully fossil-free future was even possible, unless humanity “chose to go back to living in caves”.

He addressed this during a press conference, as President. “I am quite surprised with the constant and repeated attempts to undermine the work of the COP28 presidency.” He said his training as an engineer had taught him all his life to “respect science” and that said, for a shot at 1.5°C, all unabated coal had to be phased out and fossil fuel use “greatly reduced”.

Loss and Damage Fund

Perhaps to make up, Mr. Al Jaber, on the very first day of the COP, got countries to begin committing money to the Loss and Damage Fund, a key outcome at last year’s talks in Egypt. So far $750 million has come in that will go towards assisting countries adapt to the damage being wreaked by climate change. He even got several oil companies to become ‘net zero’, or net carbon emissions free, by 2050. He has also claimed credit for getting the United States and China, amidst their diplomatic chill, to come together and commit to a roadmap to cut methane, a potent greenhouse gas.

Negotiations are nearing the final stretch with acrimony and the sabre-rattling over punctuation approaching a crescendo. Versions of the final text do seem to suggest a concerted push by developed countries to take a decisive step towards the phasing out of fossil fuels. COP history shows that momentous changes can unfurled as the last minute. If he aspires to set a legacy and make the COP the “historic” one that he claims it will be, Mr. Al Jaber must pull a rabbit out of his gavel.

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