20 years after the Madrid attacks, violent extremism is far from over

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

As we reflect on the lessons learned in the past two decades, it is clear that there are no easy solutions or quick fixes to the threat posed by Islamist terrorism, Dr Hans-Jakob Schindler writes.

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Two decades ago, on March 11, 2004, Europe was shaken by what is still one of the deadliest terror attacks on its soil. 

The Madrid train bombings, which claimed the lives of 191 people and injured over 2,000 others, left an indelible mark on Spain and the global community. 

As we mark the anniversary of this tragic event, it is evident that despite significant advances in counter-terrorism capabilities, the challenges posed by Islamist extremism and terrorism remain as complex and formidable as ever.

The intervening years have seen a string of horrific attacks hit Europe, from the 7/7 Underground attacks in London, to the Manchester Arena bombing and the attacks on the offices of Charlie Hebdo and the Bataclan theatre in Paris, as well as the attack on a Christmas Market in Berlin, along with countless smaller incidents that have claimed the lives of innocent civilians and sowed fear and division in communities across Europe and beyond.

While many more attacks have been prevented in time, the inability of security services to stop them entirely underscores the complexity and persistence of the threat. 

A rapidly moving target

One of the central challenges faced by counter-terrorism practitioners is the dynamic and adaptive nature of Islamist terrorist groups. 

Despite concerted efforts to degrade their capabilities and disrupt their networks, groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS as well as their various branches continue to demonstrate resilience and an appetite to carry out or inspire attacks. 

Their ability to adapt to changing geopolitical dynamics, exploit technological advancements, and capitalise on local grievances makes them formidable adversaries.

The ongoing conflict in Gaza has provided an apparent impetus for these groups to stay relevant. In the immediate aftermath of Hamas’ attack on 7 October last year, both the so-called ISIS and al-Qaeda called on their followers to carry out strikes against the West and Jews in particular. 

Hamas itself has been revealed to rely on worrying levels of support in the West, and it is a question of when, and not if its sympathisers will be inspired to more violence on our streets.

The phenomenon of returning foreign fighters further compounds the challenge of countering Islamist terrorism. 

In recent years, Europe has struggled to address the influx of battle-hardened individuals with the potential to carry out attacks here. 

Repeated arrests of cells loyal to ISKP, the ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan, in several countries in Europe since 2020 demonstrate that organised attacks of trained fighters also remain a clear threat. 

The scale and scope of this challenge are daunting, requiring robust border security measures, effective intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and comprehensive strategies for rehabilitation and reintegration.

Putting a stop to it online

Over the past decade, the proliferation of online radicalisation represented a real paradigm shift in the threat landscape. 

While online radicalisation is itself not new, the COVID-19 pandemic turbo-charged the dissemination of terrorist and extremist propaganda and increased online recruitment and incitement on a global scale. 

The anonymity and accessibility afforded by online platforms have facilitated the radicalisation of individuals who may never have come into contact with extremists or terrorists and their ideologies in the physical world. 

In the last few years, we have increasingly seen young people in particular prosecuted for planning such attacks inspired by online content. These solitary online radicalisations pose a significant challenge for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

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Despite recent legislation at EU and national level, addressing this challenge in practice is remarkably difficult. 

Most social media platforms and online fora have struggled to prevent extremist and terrorist content from being shared and promoted, while others simply still do not invest sufficient resources.

Beyond removing such content, the focus of the authorities and counter-extremism organisations must also be on countering these messages through education and de-radicalisation. 

The fact that a group as brutal as the Houthis, previously unknown to most of those who now champion them, has been able to stylise itself successfully as a liberation movement online, shows just how serious the information vacuum is and how weak the defensive mechanisms of online platforms are, some of which are among the most profitable business entities in human history.

No easy solutions, no quick fixes

Recent events underscore the need not only for proper targeting of extremism prevention, but also for greater vigilance and cooperation among international partners. 

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The transnational nature of the Islamist terrorism threat necessitates a coordinated and collaborative response that transcends borders and bureaucratic silos. 

Intelligence-sharing, capacity-building, and diplomatic engagement are essential components of a holistic approach to countering violent extremism. 

Similar to the financial industry, online service providers must finally become fully part of the first line of defence. 

Treating them primarily as outside partners, with only general regulatory guidelines and fines not commensurate with their immense profit margins, is a gap in the system protecting our societies that should be eliminated.

As we reflect on the lessons learned in the past two decades, it is clear that there are no easy solutions or quick fixes to the threat posed by Islamist terrorism. 

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We must remain vigilant and proactive in our efforts to confront the poison of violent extremism if we want to minimise the recurrence of further tragedies like the Madrid train bombings. 

The 20th anniversary serves as a poignant reminder of the enduring nature of the threat and the imperative of collective action to address it.

Dr Hans-Jakob Schindler is Senior Director at the Counter Extremism Project.

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Why are conflicts spreading in West Asia? | Explained

The story so far: West Asia is in flux. What started as a direct military confrontation between Israel and Hamas has snowballed into a regional security crisis. Hezbollah, Kataib Hezbollah, Hashad al-Shabi, Houthis, Iran, Pakistan and the United States are all now part of an expanding conflict theatre. As Israel’s war on Gaza, which has killed more than 24,000 people in 100 days, is continuing with no foreseeable end, the related security crisis in the region is widening.

How has the Israel-Hamas war spilled over?

When Israel launched its war on Gaza, after Hamas’s October 7 cross-border attack in which at least 1,200 Israelis were killed, there were fears that the conflict could spill over beyond Palestine. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia group that’s backed by Iran, fired rockets at Israeli forces in the Shebaa Farms, an Israeli-controlled territory which Lebanon claims as its own, in solidarity with the Palestinians. Ever since, Hezbollah and Israel have exchanged fire many times, though both were careful not to let tensions escalate into a full-blown war. While Arab countries, upset with Israel’s indiscriminate bombing, stuck to the path of diplomacy to turn up pressure on the Jewish state, Iran-backed militias elsewhere opened new fronts. Houthis, the Shia militias of Yemen, started attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea from mid-November, again in “solidarity with the Palestinians”. Houthis, who control much of Yemen, including its Red Sea coast, has used sea denial tactics to target dozens of ships ever since, forcing several shipping giants to suspend operations in the Red Sea, which connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Arabian Sea (and the Indian Ocean) through the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

When Houthi attacks imperilled the Red Sea traffic, the U.S., which continues to support Israel’s war on Gaza, started carrying out airstrikes in Yemen, targeting Houthi positions. Hashad al-Shabi, the Shia Mobilisation Forces of Iraq and Syria, who are also backed by Iran, launched more than 100 attacks against U.S. troops deployed in the two countries. In retaliation, the U.S. carried out attacks in Syria, and killed a commander of Hashad al-Shabi in a hit in Baghdad, which led to protests by Iraq. Israel has carried out multiple strikes inside Syria and Lebanon, killing Hamas, Hezbollah and Iranian commanders. As instability spread, the Islamic State terror group attacked a memorial event for Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian general assassinated by the U.S. in January 2020, in Kerman, southeastern Iran. As it was coming under growing regional and domestic pressure, Iran carried out strikes on January 16, in Iraq’s Kurdistan, Syria and Pakistan, claiming to have hit a Mossad operational centre and Sunni Islamist militants. In retaliation, Pakistan carried out air strikes in Iran on January 18.

Who are the main players in the crisis?

While multiple players are present in the crisis, there are three major operational centres — Israel, Iran and the U.S. Israel says it has the right to attack Gaza until it meets its objectives — dismantling Hamas and releasing hostages; Iran is the main backer of all anti-Israel non-state actors in West Asia, be it Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Houthis or the Shia militias of Iraq and Syria. The U.S., which has a widespread military presence in the region, has three objectives — to ensure the security of Israel, the security of America’s troops and assets deployed in the region and the perseverance of the U.S.-led order in the region. So, the bottomline is that Israel is fighting a vengeful war on the Palestinians with full U.S. support; Iran-backed proxies are attacking Israel and American interests in the region in retaliation, while Iran seeks to strengthen its deterrence; and the U.S. is attacking these proxies to meet its objectives.

What does this mean for regional security?

This is an unstable situation. West Asia has seen conflicts in the past, between nation states (Iran and Iraq; and Israel and Arab nations) and states and non-state actors (Israel’s wars with Hezbollah and Hamas). But currently, the region is witnessing a widespread security crisis, involving both powerful states and non-state actors.


Editorial | Regional turmoil: On the West Asia situation

Last time West Asia faced a major transnational war was in 1967 when Israel launched attacks on surrounding Arab countries. But the 1967 war concluded within six days, with Israel’s decisive victory against the Arabs. Today, even after 100 days, the conflict is only escalating and widening.

In the past, the U.S. had retained a domineering presence in West Asia, shaping its geopolitical outcomes, and America’s rivals were wary of breaching certain red lines. This was the backbone of the U.S.-led order in West Asia. Though Iran stayed out of it since 1979, it never risked a direct war with the U.S. or Israel. The current crisis suggests that the old order is in tatters. Iran-backed proxies are directly attacking both Israeli and American positions, while Iran is flexing its military muscle through cross-border attacks. The Houthis have challenged the U.S.’s ability to provide security to one of the world’s busiest shipping routes. Arab countries remain America’s allies, but are increasingly frustrated with Washington’s unconditional support for Israel’s war on Gaza. The U.S., despite its support for Israel, seems unable or unwilling to push Israel to end its disastrous war and bring back some stability.

Being unable to end the war and having picked a fight with Shia militias, the world’s most powerful country is acting like one of the several disruptors in West Asia, and not as a guarantor of peace, stability and deterrence.

What’s next?

There is no clear way-out from this polycentric crisis. After more than 100 days of war, Israel has achieved little in Gaza, given the targets it set for itself. It is unlikely to wind down the offensive in the near term.

As long as Israel continues the war, Hezbollah and Houthis will continue their attacks. It’s to be seen whether the U.S. air strikes on Houthis, who survived Saudi bombing for seven years, would have any real deterring effect other than symbolic values. The U.S. strikes on the Shia units in Iraq and Syria have not stopped them from launching new attacks. If instability spreads further, the Islamic State and other jihadists would seek to exploit the situation. Iraq and Syria remain vulnerable to internal and external challenges. Iran has sought to project force, but Pakistan’s response has underscored Iran’s limitations. The U.S., once a shaper of outcomes in West Asia, watches the region plunge into chaos.

The only silver lining amid this spiral of crisis, as of now, is that the Saudi-Iran detente, and the associated Saudi-Houthi peace, is holding.

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Somalia-Ethiopia jitters could plunge the Horn of Africa into chaos

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

A breakout of a war between Ethiopia and Somalia would carry catastrophic consequences not just for the region, but for Africa as a whole, Mohamed El-Bendary writes.

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As the world welcomes the arrival of a new year and eyes are focused on the war in Gaza, tension continues to escalate in the Horn of Africa — a region of immense political instability. 

This comes following Somalia’s cancellation on 6 January of a pact which Ethiopia signed five days earlier with Somalia’s breakaway territory of Somaliland. 

The agreement would grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the Somaliland port in the Gulf of Aden to establish a marine force base that aims at strengthening political, economic and security ties between them. 

Somaliland, which seceded from Somalia in 1991, borders the Red Sea — a security hotspot and a strategic maritime corridor not just for African and Arab Gulf states, but also for world powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. 

The port agreement will grant Addis Ababa access to Red Sea shipping lanes through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait between Djibouti (in the Horn of Africa) and Yemen (in the Middle East), and which connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The controversial deal has received condemnation from other Red Sea neighbours, including Egypt and Eritrea, which fear a possible naval access to the Red Sea which Ethiopia lost the right to use following Eritrea’s secession in 1993. 

Little attention paid to one of the world’s most volatile regions

Ethiopia has instead been utilising the port in neighbouring Djibouti for channelling the vast majority of its imports and exports in return for generous financial returns. 

There is also fear that the agreement could mount tension among Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile.

Regrettably, the West’s perception of Horn of Africa countries is weak with little attention currently paid to the rising concern among Africans that the port agreement could enflame conflict in one of the world’s most volatile regions. 

With a population of close to 120 million, Ethiopia is the biggest landlocked country globally and is viewed as an African giant after Nigeria. 

Somaliland, on the other hand, is far smaller in population and size and, hence, it can’t counter the giant next door which has been indulged in acts of retaliations and retributions.

Somaliland is not recognised by the United Nations or the African Union as an independent state, and this has hindered its economic and political development. 

Yet, one must admit that the de facto independent Republic of Somaliland has achieved some progress in those areas than several recognised states in west and central Africa. 

It is viewed today as one of the continent’s most democratic countries, with Kenya, Denmark, the UK, and the EU having offices or some form of presence in its capital Hargeisa.

Colonialism and autocracy at the root of conflict

Access to the Red Sea is viewed as an existential issue by many Ethiopians, with Addis Ababa promising to recognise Somaliland as an independent country in the near future. 

Most Somalis still, however, consider Somaliland as part of their territory, and hence tension is likely to increase. 

And with the African Union planning to withdraw its peacekeeping force from a politically bankrupt Somalia by the end of 2024, we are likely to witness an increase in attacks by al-Shabaab — a non-state militant group which controls half of Somalia’s territory — against Ethiopia.

Yet, the Somaliland-Ethiopian port agreement can also be viewed as an endeavour by the Ethiopian government to divert the world focus from its economic difficulties and internal conflicts, particularly in the aftermath of the 2020-2022 Tigray War — which has left hundreds of thousands of people killed and displaced — and the eruption of a new war with the Amhara and Oromia militias. 

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The Tigray War has left Ethiopia on the brink of a humanitarian disaster and further underlined its need for a port.

The port agreement has indeed uncovered the labyrinth of interests and political realities across the beleaguered Horn of Africa — in a region in which decades of colonialism, along with the autocratic rule implemented thereafter, have deeply planted schisms, rivalries and territorial disputes. 

Rising fear of conflict to engulf the entire continent

The rupture in Ethiopian-Somali ties could have grave consequences for the region and the Red Sea countries as a whole. 

The ongoing US-British attacks on the Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen — which is located along the Gulf of Aden at the intersection of the Red Sea and Arabian Sea — could also threaten shipping operations through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

Guarding the strategic strait poses a major challenge to today’s Arab Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia and Emirates fearing attacks on shipping lanes in it and the Red Sea. 

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The Gulf states have always viewed the Horn of Africa region as a strategic borderline, with claims made that the United Arab Emirates — which has diligently been increasing its economic clout in the region — played a role in striking the port agreement. 

There is also rising fear of conflict extending to endanger ships passing from Egypt’s Suez Canal which connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea.

The political and economic grievances of the Horn of Africa region are so great that they can’t solve them alone. 

A breakout of a war between Ethiopia and Somalia would carry catastrophic consequences not just for the region, but for Africa as a whole. 

It is incumbent upon the UN and the African Union to push for calm and play a more active role in settling the dispute.

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Mohamed El-Bendary is an independent researcher based in Egypt and a former journalism lecturer in the US and New Zealand. He is the author of “The ‘Ugly American’ in the Arab Mind: Why Do Arabs Resent America?”.

At Euronews, we believe all views matter. Contact us at [email protected] to send pitches or submissions and be part of the conversation.

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