The elusive political solution in Sri Lanka

Early February, a group of saffron-clad Buddhist monks gathered near the Sri Lankan Parliament and burnt a copy of the 13th Amendment. They were registering their rage and protest after President Ranil Wickremesinghe vowed to implement the law in full. He had told an all-party conference that it was his “responsibility” as the Executive to carry out the current law.

“For approximately 37 years, the 13th Amendment has been a part of the Constitution. I must implement or someone has to abolish it…,” he said. The monks resisted it, despite Mr. Wickremesinghe stressing he was “not ready to divide the country at all” and would not “betray the Sinhalese nation”.

An unfulfilled promise

Neither the pledge made by President Wickremesinghe nor the monks’ reaction is new to Sri Lankans. Past presidents, including Mahinda Rajapaksa, have made the same promise more than once. Monks and other reactionary groups similarly agitated then too. At the same time, Sri Lankan Tamils, who continue to demand equality, dignity, and the right to self-determination, do not know what it might look like, when the promise is indeed kept. Despite power devolution being enshrined in the Constitution for nearly four decades — it was an outcome of the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987 — they have never seen the piece of legislation being implemented in letter and spirit till date.

The 13th Amendment is, and has always been, contentious. For those Sinhalese opposing it, the legislation is an “Indian imposition”, symbolising “too much power” to the Tamils at the provincial level and a threat to the central government in Colombo. The position disregards the fact that the Amendment guarantees the same measure of devolved power to all nine provinces, seven of which are in the Sinhala-majority areas of the island nation. The Tamils, on the other hand, have maintained that the legislation, under Sri Lanka’s unitary Constitution, entails very limited powers that don’t amount to meaningful devolution. All the same, some see it as a “starting point” in negotiating a more wholesome and durable political settlement, for the 13th Amendment is currently the only legislative guarantee of some power sharing, even if widely considered inadequate. Although the Amendment gave provinces legislative power over agriculture, education, health, housing, local government, planning, road transport and social services, the Centre is all-powerful, because of an ambiguous concurrent list and certain overriding clauses in the Constitution.

Tamils’ engagement

Months into his unexpected Presidency, Mr. Wickremesinghe announced that he would ensure that the country’s long-pending ethnic question is resolved by February 4, 2023, the day Sri Lanka marked 75 years of its Independence from colonial rule. His unambiguous announcement and the imminent deadline had a “now or never” ring to it.

The Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the main grouping of Tamil legislators from the north and east, agreed to engage, although its MPs were sceptical of Mr. Wickremesinghe’s outreach. The Alliance’s rival Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) took a clear position that there was no point in participating in talks, unless the President openly agreed to discuss a solution based on a federal Constitution. The TNA went in for talks with a proposal that instead of reinventing the wheel, the government should take some immediate steps in regard to five actionable points, such as establishing a national land commission and provincial police forces; amending or reversing certain acts to restore power to the provincial councils; and giving provincial councils the necessary administrative powers to run schools and hospitals. With no tangible action on any of the areas, the TNA said it was “pointless” to continue discussions.

In a parliamentary speech in July 2019, TNA Leader and veteran Tamil politician R. Sampanthan elaborated on the many attempts in the past, by different governments, to solve the pending national question, going well past what was envisaged in the 13th Amendment of 1987. He pointed to the proposals of the Mangala Moonasinghe Select Committee set up in 1991, during President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s term; the new constitutional proposals that were tabled in Parliament in 2000, when President Chandrika Kumaratunga Bandaranaike was in power; the proposals of the Prof. Tissa Vitharana-led All Party Representative Committee (APRC) — set up in 2006 — when President Mahinda Rajapaksa was in power, and efforts taken during the Maithripala Sirisena – Wickremesinghe administration’s term to draft a new Constitution.

In an impassioned account of the Tamil community’s long political pursuit Mr. Sampanthan said: “The Tamils are a distinct people with a distinct linguistic and cultural identity. We have historically inhabited the north and the east. We cannot live as second-class citizens. We must live with self-respect and dignity. Maximum possible power-sharing must be effected, power must be devolved within a united, undivided, indivisible Sri Lanka. We must be able to determine our destiny”

“The earlier you do it, the better. If you do not do it and abstain from doing the right thing, I do not think the Tamil people will take it lying down for too long,” he roared in the House.

Regardless, the outcome of each of these exercises remains on paper, or as yet another promise in the long list of upkept ones. The ruling Sinhalese establishment did not follow through on any of the pledges made. The end of the civil war in 2009, which came with enormous human cost and suffering to Tamil civilians, was seen as offering a chance for genuine reconciliation through, among other things, a just political solution.

According to the Tamils, the many missed opportunities make one thing amply clear – that there was, and is, no political will yet, they contend. The bogey of separatism, an idea that the Tamils have given up for years now, is lazily invoked by some Sinhalese politicians even before a conversation on power sharing begins. Or, economic development in the war-battered region is pitched as an alternative, as if it can compensate for the lack of actual decision-making powers, including on the type of developmental activity.

Indian involvement

The deadline that President Wickremesinghe set for himself, to solve the national question, expired a month ago. The government held elaborate celebrations to observe its 75th year of Independence, although some Sri Lankans still feel they are treated as “second class” citizens. The President’s promise to implement the 13th Amendment is already fading into oblivion.

The dominant headlines in Sri Lanka today are about the International Monetary Fund’s “bailout package”, that has now come within touching distance after China agreed to restructure Sri Lanka’s loans; and about the new wave of protests from sections who are reeling under the lingering impact of last year’s economic crisis. With supporters of the government adopting an “economic recovery before everything” approach, there is little indication that the country’s unresolved ethnic conflict may be addressed soon.

While India has historically been an arbiter on Sri Lanka’s Tamil national question, many in Tamil polity and community say both New Delhi’s interest in — and influence — on the issue are waning. Critics argue that India, pre-occupied with countering Chinese influence in Sri Lanka, does little more than make customary statements on the need to implement the 13th Amendment.

Where does that leave Sri Lanka’s war-affected Tamil community in the north and east? After decades of relentless agitations, and an armed struggle, they are still demanding justice, equality, and dignity. And the long-pending political solution remains elusive.

This is the second part of a series of articles looking at Sri Lanka’s economic recovery and political course

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The aftermath of Sri Lanka’s economic crash

For nearly a year now, many in Sri Lanka have been fervently chanting three letters — IMF (International Monetary Fund).

As the country’s familiar balance of payments problem escalated last year, citizens experienced crippling shortages and painfully long power cuts. They took to the streets in a staggering mass protest and ousted the Rajapaksas, who they held responsible for their suffering. The chant, seeking IMF support, persisted through these dramatic developments.

In July 2022, former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was elected President, through an urgent parliamentary vote. One of the first tasks he set for himself was to negotiate an IMF deal to resurrect the country’s battered economy. Sri Lanka entered a staff level agreement with the Fund on September 1, 2022.

Looking for a bail-out

Mr. Wickremesinghe recently announced that his government had completed 15 tasks prescribed by the IMF, in preparation for its assistance. The IMF’s provisional $2.9 billion package will come through by end of this month, he said.

In fact, Sri Lanka had hoped to tap it by the end of last year, or at least in January this year, but the process had dragged on. One of the main reasons for the delay had to do with written financing assurances from China, Japan, and India, Sri Lanka’s top three bilateral creditors. The IMF had made its programme contingent on their cooperation. India took the lead and sent its assurances to the Fund this January, with the Paris Club group of creditors, which includes Japan, following suit. China’s written financing assurances alone are pending.

Should the IMF package kick in later this month, either with China coming on board, or with other official lenders expressing confidence for the Fund to go ahead and clear it, Sri Lanka will see it as a critical milestone in its economic recovery. Evidently, a $2.9 billion-Extended Fund Facility, over a period of four years, is not big money for Sri Lanka. Even after streamlining imports to save dollars, the island nation spends well over a billion dollars every month on essential imports alone. Exports totalled $978 million in January, pointing to an enduring trade deficit.

However, an ongoing IMF programme helps Sri Lanka become more credit worthy in the eye of global lenders, be it multilateral agencies like the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, bilateral partners, or private creditors. The bankrupt nation that defaulted on its $51-billion external debt last year hopes that with an IMF programme, it can borrow again. After falling into a cycle of indiscriminate borrowing, especially in the last 15 years, Sri Lanka finds itself in a position where its problem, and its solution, look eerily similar at this point.

Tackling corruption

What could potentially make a difference this time is the IMF’s emphasis on fixing Sri Lanka’s corruption vulnerabilities, which has been a rallying point for many Sri Lankan economists and policy analysts. It is corruption that led Sri Lanka to this precipice in the first place, they argue. Corruption, coupled with the state’s tendency to implement “populist” welfare programmes that are “unsustainable”, made the country’s economy fragile over time, in their view. So much so that 16 of the past IMF agreements could not turn the tables for Sri Lanka.

Critics of the IMF, a very small minority in Sri Lanka, see an IMF package as part of the problem, not the solution. They worry that the austerity measures that come attached with it will be a deadly blow to the people, especially the country’s working class that is worst affected in this crisis. Apart from that, there is no raging public debate on, or popular resistance to, the IMF within Sri Lanka unlike in say, Argentina in recent times. On the IMF package, the average Sri Lankan is preoccupied more with when it might come through, rather than whether the country really needs it.

Even worker unions, currently protesting against the sharp increase in taxes and utility bills — introduced by the government in anticipation of the IMF programme — are resisting only the specific policy measures that are hurting them. Otherwise, they appear reconciled to yet another IMF-led reform agenda, an “inevitable, bitter pill”, as it is often projected.

Food insecurity

Over the last year, poor families have been forced to reduce their food intake drastically. Soaring prices have kept eggs, fish, and meat out of reach for many, raising concern among medical practitioners over nutrition levels in the community. With inflation persisting over 50%, half of the families in Sri Lanka are forced to reduce the amount they feed their children, humanitarian organisation Save the Children found in a recent survey. Additionally, they warned of a “full-blown hunger crisis”. The World Food Programme, in its January update, estimated that 33% of Sri Lankan households are food insecure.

Irrespective of when the IMF programme kicks in, and how much more money Sri Lanka can borrow after that, it will be a rather rocky road before possible recovery.

Members of Sri Lankan opposition party National People’s Power carry an injured Buddhist monk during a clash with the police in Colombo on February 26.
| Photo Credit:
AP

The country is currently witnessing a new wave of protests, mainly by workers and professionals, as people’s economic hardships increase. The government also faces criticism for the recent postponement of local body elections, even as multiple surveys point to a significant rise in support for opposition parties. But for those looking for policy coherence, such as the business community, the Wickremesinghe administration symbolises a version of stability. Democracy can wait, they contend, since economic recovery is urgent. For many others, Mr. Wickremesinghe, who lost his mandate in the last general election and rose to power with the support of the widely despised Rajapaksas’ party, represents continuity of a political order they fought to change. They see election as a vital barometer that will reflect this sentiment.

Meanwhile, how Sri Lanka charts its path of economic recovery will be evident in the coming months. Nearly half a century after liberalising its economy — Sri Lanka was the first in the region to do so — the country has confronted some fundamental questions, about how much it produces, how much it still imports, and how little its export basket has diversified in all these years.

These are questions that go beyond the problem of corruption. These are also questions that have a bearing on the country’s overall progress, which can’t be measured without factoring in the extent of inequality.

The latest Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 2019, conducted before the pandemic and Sri Lanka’s crisis, showed an increase in the Gini coefficient, a measure of income distribution, to 0.46, reflecting widening inequality. The IMF has said that a key element of its programme would be to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the poor by raising social spending and improve the coverage and targeting of a social safety net.

As the government goes ahead with its austerity measures, it remains to be seen if it can support its most vulnerable citizens.

This is the first part of a series of articles looking at Sri Lanka’s economic recovery and political course

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