Watch | Arunachal border tussle | India’s diplomatic challenges on LAC

As China’s claims over India’s easternmost state of Arunachal Pradesh get shriller, and what the MEA calls more absurd, the US wades in, says it backs India’s territorial sovereignty in Arunachal? Is Beijing preparing for a bigger confrontation over the boundary, and how do Bhutan-China boundary talks fit in?

Hello and Welcome to WV at TH with me SH

We will look at some of the geopolitical- and also the geospatial angles of the India-China military standoff at the Line of Actual Control since 2020.

 But first, here are the latest developments on the LAC :

-Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a visit to Arunachal Pradesh on March 9, to inaugurate a number of projects, including most notably, the Sela Tunnel at a height of 13,000 ft, meant to be an all-weather access to Tawang and especially for troops heading to the Line of Actual Control with China

-Within days China’s Foreign Ministry and its Defence Ministry spokespersons had issued statement, making claims on Arunachal Pradesh and even suggesting that the PM’s visit would “disrupt” India-China talks to resolve the 4-year old military standoff at the LAC

-India’s response was equally sharp, MEA calling the claims absurd, and asserting Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India

Significantly, the US State department also waded into the spat, saying it recognizes Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. The comments are interesting, and while many in India welcomed them, it would be a double edged sword if the US began recognising individual parts of India, like Jammu Kashmir, Ladakh, PoK etc as Delhi and Washington may have differences there.

Meanwhile the big diplomacy moves this week were over India and Bhutan, as Bhutanese PM Tshering Tobgay visited India, and PM Modi headed to Thimpu in practically back-to-back visits. Mr. Modi’s visit was particularly significant as by convention, PMs do not travel abroad after elections are announced, and he went despite having to put the visit off by a day due to the weather. While the ostensible reason for the visit was to receive an award from the Bhutanese King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, the important discussions with both the King and his father, former King Jigme Singye Wangchuck is to discuss bilateral issues like hydropower, investment in infrastructure and the Gelephu Mindfulness city project, and importantly, Bhutan-China boundary talks and the direction they will take.

China’s claims over Arunachal have become shriller and more determined in the last few years:

1. China has renamed Arunachal Pradesh in its maps as Zangnan( South Tibet) and published new maps with Chinese names for Arunachal towns, despite the fact that they are firmly in Indian territory

2. China routinely protests visits by PM Modi, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to the state, and also by the US Ambassador

3. China is building border villages, which India believes are dual purpose, for military use as well, in possible preparation for operations at the LAC. China has recently passed laws that more or less allow it to claim land where it has settled populations

4. India is also speeding up border infrastructure, and improving villages along the LAC, of course, but Beijing’s intentions towards the region, given how it has made assertions in the south china sea and Taiwan, are a growing worry.

There is an important paper brought out by Takshshila where you can look at how the border villages are coming up, using geospatial imagery

A word about Bhutan-China boundary talks (Map would be great here)

1. These began in 1984, and the two sides have held 25 rounds of talks, mainly over the resolution of 2 valleys to Bhutan’s north Jakarlung and Pasamlung, and Doklam to the West of Bhutan, just above the trijunction with India.

2. Bhutan and China don’t have full diplomatic ties, don’t maintain embassies, but Bhutan and the Tibetan Autonomous Region share a contiguous border to Bhutan’s north and west of about 470 km. Bhutan is keen to demarcate this boundary, and China is keen to ensure a swap where it keeps the dominant part of Doklam plateau instead of the northern valleys.

3. Talks had come to a standstill in 2016, followed by the India-China Doklam standoff in 2017, and subsequently the Covid pandemic.

4. In 2020, China laid a new claim, on Sakteng to Bhutan’s east, which also abuts Arunachal Pradesh, effectively putting pressure on Bhutan to make progress on talks

5. Once talks restarted in 2021, Bhutan and China made quick progress, signing a 3-step roadmap to demarcate the boundary

In 2023, Bhutan and China also signed a cooperation agreement for the Joint Technical Team to carry out and mark the demarcated boundaries on the ground and on paper.

In January 2024, with a new government at the helm, reports that the MEA has declined to comment on have suggested that Bhutan has requested that India hold off on its Arunachal Road construction that goes via the Bhutanese Trashiyangste district, until its talks are completed.

Here’s what EAM Jaishankar said recently, speaking at a conference in Tokyo:

“Our own experience in the case of China is that between 1975-2020 there was no bloodshed on the border, and in 2020 it changed. We can disagree on many things but when a country does not observe written agreements, it raises concerns, both about the stability of the relationship and about intentions.”

Given all of the signs, India’s diplomatic challenges are set to multiply over the next few months on the LAC for a number of reasons:

1. China is increasingly upping its responses to India , and the worry is that during election season, there may be attempts for destabilizing operations at the LAC

2. The US too is going into election season, which could turn even more turbulent as Trump makes gains, and similar worries remain about Chinese plans at other parts of its geography

3. Bhutan has to decide how quickly to proceed with its talks on the boundary, given it has also now announced its ambitious plans for Gelephu, a 1000 sq km special administration area, and would want to stabilize its borders at the earliest

4. India’s other neighbours will be watching closely, given their own economic ties with China, like the Maldives- where the new government is getting closer to Beijing, and both Pakistan and Sri Lanka are looking for economic stability

5. Chinese tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, most recently with the Philippines could cause maritime instability as well.

WV Take: China’s growing loud responses on Arunachal Pradesh are cause for both concern and vigil, militarily and diplomatically for New Delhi. Eventually India’s 3,500 km LAC with China as a whole is going to need more resources, and the worry is that this will strain India’s other defence commitments, including in the maritime sphere. The government needs to broadly acknowledge the threat, and be more transparent about how it plans to counter China’s incursions, that it has yet to fully acknowledge since 2020.

WV Reading Recommendations

1. Understanding The India-China Border: The Enduring Threat of War in the High Himalayas by Manoj Joshi

2. Crosswinds: Nehru, Zhou and the Anglo-American Competition over China: Nehru, Zhou and the Anglo-American Competition over China by Vijay Gokhale

3. Beyond Binaries:The World Of India And China (2008-2022) Hardcover – 1 January 2024 by Shastri Ramachandaran

4. Four Stars of Destiny: An Autobiography Hardcover – Import, 30 April 2024 by General Manoj Mukund Naravane

5. China’s World View: Demystifying China to Prevent Global Conflict by David Daokui Li

6. The Return of Great Powers: Russia, China, and the Next World War by Jim Sciutto

Script and Presentation: Suhasini Haidar

Production: Gayatri Menon and Shibu Narayan

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Explained | Why is the U.S. shifting its approach to China from decoupling to de-risking?

The U.S: President Joe Biden with European Commission Ursula von der Leyen during the G-7 Summit in Japan.
| Photo Credit: ANI

The story so far: The Trump-era focus of the U.S. to decouple from China is being phased out by a new concept. The U.S. has expressed that it is shifting its policy on China from decoupling to de-risking. The EU has already declared that its approach to China will be based on de-risking. The recently concluded G-7 summit at Hiroshima, through its Leader’s Communique, has also expressed the grouping’s consensus on de-risking.

What is ‘de-risking’?

After the establishment of diplomatic ties between the U.S. and China in 1979, both the countries embarked on a path of increasing economic interdependence. China gained immensely from this relationship, as it helped the country drastically widen and deepen its diplomatic and economic engagement with the rest of the world. As China’s economic and military power grew, its ambition to challenge the primacy of the U.S. in the international system became increasingly apparent. China’s rise not only came at the expense of America’s global clout, but also the latter’s domestic industry, which got “hollowed out” in its four-decade old economic embrace with China.

By the time Donald Trump took over the reins of power in the U.S., dealing with the techno-economic challenge from China became a matter of urgency. The Trump administration made it a point to attack the gargantuan bilateral trade imbalance in favour of China. It also wished to keep the U.S’s high technology sector out of China’s reach. In a series of moves, Trump raised tariffs on Chinese imports which invited retaliatory tariffs from China. The U.S.-China ‘trade war’ started, and bilateral relations were set on course for a “decoupling” from the American standpoint. This approach was marked by a rare sense of bipartisanship in an otherwise polarised domestic political climate in the U.S.

Therefore, the Biden administration which took over from the Trump administration continued with the latter’s China policy. However, over time, the Biden administration added its own features into the China policy inherited from Trump. Most recently the label of “decoupling” has been changed to “de-risking”. According to the U.S. National Security Advisor Jack Sullivan, “de-risking fundamentally means having resilient, effective supply chains and ensuring we cannot be subjected to the coercion of any other country”. While decoupling stands for an eventual reversal of the four-decade old project to enmesh the two economies, de-risking aims to limit such an effect only in areas where it undercuts the national security and industrial competence of the U.S.

This shift has been articulated by the Biden administration in two recent landmark speeches — by the Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen on the “U.S.-China Economic Relationship” at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on April 20, followed by that of Jake Sullivan on “Renewing American Economic Leadership” at the Brookings Institution on April 27. Recent legislations in the U.S. such as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, CHIPS and Science Act as well as the Inflation Reduction Act have been subsumed under this new approach. The U.S.’s geo-economic initiatives like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment as well as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity are also supposed to reflect the spirit of de-risking.

Why de-risking?

In order to understand the rationale behind the U.S.’s shift from decoupling to de-risking, it is important to comprehend the timing of the move. The policy change has been announced in the wake of several events of high geopolitical significance. The world has just emerged out of the tentacles of the pandemic after three disruptive years and the global economy is hoping for a resulting rebound. The U.S.-China rivalry had peaked in the past few months — from the ratcheting of tensions across the Taiwan Strait to the acrimonious spy balloon episode between the two countries. China also witnessed Xi Jinping beginning his second decade of rule over China in an unprecedented third term as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Chairman of the Central Military Commission and President of the People’s Republic of China, ever since the dawn of the reform era. In parallel, a year has passed since Russia began its special military operation in Ukraine, with the conflict going on without any end in sight. Mr. Xi, after starting his third consecutive leadership term, made his first foreign visit to Russia where he proposed a peace plan. He has also, in his third leadership tenure, extended his “peacemaking diplomacy” to West Asia, striking gold in normalising the frayed Saudi-Iran ties. All of these developments have necessitated the U.S. to recalibrate its posture towards China. In such a situation, casting the U.S.-China relations as a new Cold War and a zero-sum game appears to be risky for the U.S. Bringing more nuance into its earlier decoupling approach could bring down China’s guard and give the U.S. more room to re-consolidate its strength.

Perhaps, the Russia-Ukraine conflict could have played a pivotal role in enabling the U.S’s policy shift towards China. The Biden administration, unlike its predecessor, has made it a point to reassure its European allies. At a time when China has been backing Russia in its shadow battle in Ukraine against the West, the idea of decoupling hardly appeals to the European Union (EU). The EU has in fact been looking to woo China in order to convince it to stop supporting Russia from skirting Western sanctions.

In this context, a watered down version in the form of de-risking could better achieve the objective of getting Europe on board the U.S’s efforts to counter China. It is therefore no surprise that the U.S’s recent articulation of its de-risking approach repeatedly draws references to the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s milestone speech on “EU-China relations” to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre on March 30. In her speech, Ms. von der Leyen stressed that the EU’s strategy to China will be based on de-risking. This was a precursor to her visit to China in April, along with the French President Emmanuel Macron, with the Russia-Ukraine war as the main agenda. In fact, China policies of the U.S. and the EU have been witnessing a significant convergence of late — recent developments may have only triggered the Trans-Atlantic consensus on de-risking vis-à-vis China.

What could be the geopolitical ramifications of de-risking?

The U.S. efforts to keep its allies closer in its geopolitical rivalry against China by adopting the path of de-risking has already won a significant victory in Japan at the G-7 summit. The leaders at the summit declared that they will coordinate their “approach to economic resilience and economic security that is based on diversifying and deepening partnerships and de-risking, not de-coupling”. China has expressed its scepticism to the West’s de-risking approach, portraying it as a façade to the decoupling agenda. Moreover, China has expressed its disapproval in painting China as the actor responsible for heightening geopolitical risks. According to China, the real source of risks is the U.S., which it alleges to have created instability across the world by pursuing political and military interventions and perpetuating a Cold War mindset.

The continuing emphasis in de-risking to diversify supply chains away from China demonstrates that the Trump-era spirit of decoupling is being carried forward, albeit with some changes. This could also make the West’s moves to counter China’s rise much more sustainable by facilitating a united front among allies. However, its effectiveness could be questionable, as it has dialled down U.S’s rhetoric against China which could be read by the latter as a sign of its adversary’s weakness. Though countries like India will stand to benefit from de-risking by leveraging its benefits like attracting supply chains and confronting China’s aggressive moves, it could also come at a cost. With the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the consolidation of the European alliance being the major triggers behind this shift, de-risking could lead to U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific being diluted, at least for the short term.

Dr. Anand V. is Assistant Professor (Senior Scale) at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education

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