How many more years will Afghan girls lose to Taliban oppression?

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

Afghanistan has dropped off the news agenda, but the violence and oppression continue — and for too many of us Afghan women, no matter how loud we shout, it feels like the world has stopped listening, Meetra Qutb writes.

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Earlier in March, Afghan teenage girls should have been going back to school, marking the beginning of a new academic year. 

In most other countries, girls of 11 or 12 years of age would be preparing to begin their secondary education.

In Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, female education ends at grade six.

I know full well how it feels to live in fear and uncertainty. My first encounter with the Taliban was back in 1996 when I saw two women whipped on their feet for not covering their faces.

I was five years old and had become one of the millions of girls deprived of their education during the first Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001.

I was one of the “lucky” ones, however — I was home-schooled and attended a secret school for girls in Kabul. 

But the fear of getting caught followed us everywhere, especially as we travelled to and from our classes. My classmates and I would hide our schoolbooks in cloths used to cover the Qur’an.

Two years ago, I watched in horror in March 2022 as the Taliban U-turned on their promise to reopen girls’ secondary schools — a ban that is estimated to affect over 1 million girls. I saw girls break down in tears in front of news cameras. 

It was a pain that felt personal to me.

A vortex women are stuck in

Since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, girls have been banned from secondary school for over 900 days — a shocking figure when we consider the effects of school closures on children globally during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Just think of how Afghan girls have been impacted — not only have they lost the opportunity to progress academically, but they’re missing vital opportunities to socialise, develop friendships, and grow as individuals during the formative years of their lives.

Health experts have expressed concerns over the impacts on girls’ mental health, with surging cases of depression and anxiety, and near-daily reports of female suicides.

Here at Afghan Witness, a project run by the Centre for Information Resilience, we’ve been speaking to women and girls since the Taliban’s takeover. Their sobering accounts reveal how it feels to be deprived of the most basic of human rights.

Sofia*, a university student, described the current situation as a vortex: “the women and girls of Afghanistan are stuck in it. No one can even shake their foot from it. All their dreams and goals are outside”, she said.

Gawhar*, a high school student before the ban, told us: “I wanted to become a journalist in a local media agency. A fellow female classmate wanted to become a doctor — unfortunately, all of us became hopeless.”

Edicts as a means of oppression

Since their takeover, the Taliban have issued 80 edicts in total — 54 of which specifically target women and girls, according to the Feminist Majority Foundation. Among them are requirements for women to be accompanied by a male guardian when travelling over 72 kilometres and to cover their faces in public.

These edicts have strengthened male family members’ control over women’s behaviour and clothing and could potentially pave the way for more inter-familial violence, thanks to a culture of impunity that thrives under the group’s rule.

There are also very real economic consequences to restrictions on women’s work and education. The talent and opportunity lost will impact not only individuals but Afghanistan as a country. 

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There’s already been an exodus of professionals, and, with half of the population deprived of higher education, sectors such as health, justice and education are destined to suffer.

But make no mistake: the women who have studied and become lawyers, journalists, teachers or doctors over the last twenty years refuse to give up their livelihoods so easily.

Some have taken to the streets in protest, and when their protests were met with suppression and violence, they took their campaigns online. They have shared videos of indoor demonstrations, coined hashtags, campaigned for the release of those in detention, and used theatre, music and dance to tell stories of Taliban brutality.

Do not underestimate Afghan women — but do protect them

The ability of Afghan women to adapt should not be understated. 

Many have poured their time into advocacy, while others have set up secret schools or online classes. Those who managed to leave Afghanistan have worked tirelessly to tell the stories of those who remain, establishing women-led newsrooms that operate in exile to ensure Afghanistan is not forgotten.

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And while the resilience, strength and creativity of these women offer a glimmer of hope in the darkness — the reality is that being a woman in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan means living in fear and uncertainty.

In January, reports emerged that a number of girls and women had been arrested for non-compliance with the Taliban’s hijab rules. 

Suicide cases among women in Afghanistan appear to rise year on year and are possibly linked to domestic violence, forced marriage, and the group’s restrictions. Reports of femicide are also frequently recorded by our investigators at Afghan Witness, with family members, Taliban, and unknown individuals often cited as perpetrators.

Afghanistan has dropped off the news agenda, but the violence and oppression continues — and for too many of us Afghan women, no matter how loud we shout, it feels like the world has stopped listening.

Meetra Qutb is the Relationship Manager and Communications Specialist at the Centre for Information Resilience’s Afghan Witness project. She previously worked as an associate lecturer at Kabul University’s law and political science faculty and is an independent researcher and commentator on human rights and politics in Afghanistan.

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*Names have been changed by Afghan Witness to protect the women who chose to speak out from repercussions by the Taliban.

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This Ramadan, Muslim world can end gender apartheid in Afghanistan

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

The Taliban’s authority hinges on their purported adherence to Islamic law. However, that is based on a fundamentally flawed, selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts, meaning their policies are against their own stated principles, Dr Mohammad bin Abdulkarim Al Issa writes.

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Since the Taliban re-took power in Afghanistan in 2021, “women (have been) banned from gyms, public spaces, schools, university, and from most jobs.” They have marginalized Afghan women, hurting Afghan society in the process.

But now, a groundbreaking gathering last week reveals another uncomfortable truth for an already embattled government: the Taliban had little hope of engaging with the non-Islamic world. But they’re also fast losing confidence in the Muslim world, too.

Last week, during our most sacred month of Ramadan, and in our most sacred city of Mecca, we at the Muslim World League convened hundreds of the world’s leading Muslim scholars from all sects and denominations.

This historic gathering was a return to a venerable Muslim practice called ijma’ (consensus), and over two days, leaders representing the rich diversity of Islam took a defiant stand against sectarianism and condemned all practices that fail to represent true Islam.

This includes the Taliban’s ongoing mistreatment of women.

The Taliban’s estrangement keeps growing

The Taliban have long defended their gender restrictions like preventing women from accessing education, through Islam. 

However, hundreds of leading Islamic leaders forcefully rebutting such claims radically undermines their justifications, including the Taliban’s “inclusive Islamic Emirate”.

Our feelings towards the Taliban were clearly indicated in one of the articles of the Charter on Building Bridges Between the Islamic Schools of Thought and Sects, which underlined the importance of the family unit, access to education, and the protection of women’s rights.

In fact, all Islamic nations follow principles that the Taliban’s ideologies starkly deviate from. Contrary to the Taliban’s claims of facing opposition only from political figures, the reality is drastically different. 

The fact that senior Afghan scholars attended the conference in Mecca and opposed the Taliban’s stance highlights the group’s growing estrangement from mainstream Islamic teachings.

This is why the Taliban must realign with the broader principles of Islam to avoid further isolation as extremists within the Islamic community.

This acute gender apartheid is still apartheid. What they dismiss as malign Western constructs is actually deeply rooted in Islamic teachings, values, and history.

No one has the right to take away women’s right to learn

The Qur’an and hadith, the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, make this clear. In the Qur’an, God describes human beings as rational, and nowhere in the Islamic tradition is the capacity for reason gendered. 

The Qur’an not only describes women as the religious equals of men, but men and women as partners and protectors for one another. Not only that, but the Qur’an condemns discrimination against women once rampant in Arabia.

One of the reasons the Qur’an calls on “believing men and believing women” is to make clear that men and women have the same fundamental moral standing, the same essential moral rights, and the same basic moral responsibilities. 

In fact, there is a well-known hadith in which the blessed Prophet Muhammad describes “seeking knowledge” as an obligation “for every Muslim,” which has always been taken to mean Muslim men and Muslim women.

Most intriguingly, the expression in Arabic, “talab al-‘ilm,” or “seeking knowledge,” is the root of the word Taliban. The origins of the movement’s name belie their own claims. 

Learning is a responsibility we owe to God, which means it is a right no government can abrogate. 

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And it is an argument no Muslim can easily overlook, which is why we sought this ijma’, or consensus, in Mecca, following a long Muslim practice of seeking unanimity on core questions.

The Taliban can’t dismiss our call

Throughout Islamic history, in fact, whenever we have faced new threats or the recurrence of religious distortions, Muslim scholars have come together to reaffirm our core commitments, even across our sectarian differences.

In Mecca, we followed that tradition once more. And the Taliban are no doubt paying attention.

While the West issues critiques of the Taliban’s excesses in a language unfamiliar to them, the Taliban cannot so easily dismiss our call. 

The sheer number and diversity of Muslim scholars, from different parts of the world and different perspectives within Islam, undermines the Taliban’s claim to authority. 

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For these Muslim scholars are declaring their unanimous commitment to the place of women in religious life, including the right to education, work, worship, and movement.

The Taliban’s authority hinges on their purported adherence to Islamic law. But in this instance, their adherence is based on a fundamentally flawed, selective and extreme interpretation of Islamic texts, meaning their policies are against their own stated principles. 

The collective declaration by scholars in Mecca underscores a commitment to reclaiming the essence of Islamic teachings — promoting a vision of Islam that champions the rights and dignity of all individuals, especially women, who have been disproportionately affected by the Taliban’s rule.

Aligning with Islamic principles would be true to our shared faith

This is as substantive a rebuke as possible. The Islamic Emirate is already isolated on the international stage, confronts neighbours like Pakistan, and now faces a lack of confidence from the Muslim world.

But it is not only a rebuke. For the interests of Afghanistan, and especially Afghan women, the Taliban should know we — the Muslim scholars from various global schools of thought and sects — are keen to work with them to align their policies with Islamic principles. 

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That would of course be in their interest. It would also be true to our shared faith.

The virtues we call for are not the property of the West nor restricted to any one part of the world. 

The values we are calling the Taliban to follow are not imitations of Western culture but come from our sacred texts and traditions. 

This is why we close with the first verse of the fourth chapter of the Qur’an, named simply, “Women,” which commands believers “to remember God, who created you from one soul, and from that soul a partner, and spread forth from those two many men and many women.”

Dr Mohammad bin Abdulkarim Al Issa is the Secretary General of the Muslim World League (MWL), the world’s largest Islamic NGO.

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Women’s rights and women wronged in 2023

The year saw progress on women’s rights in some countries, such as Spain’s introduction of menstrual leave, France’s bid to enshrine abortion rights in the constitution and the arrival of the #MeToo movement in Taiwan. But there were also setbacks in 2023, from Taliban edicts tightening restrictions on Afghan women to what the UN called a “global epidemic of femicide”.

The year 2022 was marked by major convulsions in women’s rights across the world, from the US Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade to the “Woman, life, freedom” chants in Iran, which were followed by a massive government crackdown.

This year saw more gradual developments, from the continuing assaults on and pushback against diminishing abortion rights in the US to the steady disappearance of women from public life in Afghanistan.

FRANCE 24 looks back at some of the major developments in 2023 that left their mark on women’s rights across the world.

Spain becomes first European country to introduce menstrual leave

Spain’s Equality Minister Irene Montero after a parliamentary vote in Madrid, on December 22, 2022. © Thomas Coex, AFP

In February, Spain became the first European country to pass a law creating menstrual leave for women suffering from painful periods. Equality Minister Irene Montero – from the far-left Podemos party, part of the Socialist-led ruling coalition – called it “a historic day for feminist progress”.

The law, which passed by 185 votes in favour to 154 against, entitles employees experiencing period pain to time off, with the state social security system – not employers – picking up the tab.

As with paid leave for other health reasons, it requires a doctor’s approval. The length of sick leave was not specified in the law.

The new legislation also allows minors aged 16 and 17 to have an abortion without parental permission, reversing a requirement introduced by a previous conservative government in 2015.

Read moreSpain passes Europe’s first menstrual leave law

The #MeToo wave reaches Taiwan’s shores

Chen Chien-jou, 22, during an interview in New Taipei City, Taiwan during the #MeToo movement crisis.
Chen Chien-jou, 22, during an interview in New Taipei City, Taiwan during the #MeToo movement crisis. © Sam Yeh, AFP

It was a Netflix series that triggered the #MeToo movement in Taiwan – more than five years after the Harvey Weinstein abuse case sparked the social media-driven awareness campaign in the US and many parts of the world.

“Wave Makers”, an eight-episode Netflix drama released in April, is a political thriller that revealed the inner workings of a fictional presidential campaign team – and how women in power on the island deal with sexual harassment.  

The effect was instantaneous. Over the weeks that followed, several Taiwanese women broke social taboo to reveal their experiences at work. Female employees of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party kicked off the first major wave by accusing powerful politicians of sexual harassment and assault. The phenomenon spread to cultural and academic circles, with alleged victims accusing celebrities, doctors and professors.

A year after Roe v. Wade overturned, abortion battles rage in the US

Abortion rights demonstrators at rally in Washington, DC on June 24, 2023.
Abortion rights demonstrators at rally in Washington, DC on June 24, 2023. © Andrew Caballero-Reynolds, AFP

In its June 2022 ruling that overturned Roe v. Wade, the US Supreme Court ended a half-century federal protection of abortion rights and allowed each state to legislate on the issue.

In 14 states, abortion has been outlawed, in some cases without exceptions for rape or incest. On the other hand, 17 states enacted laws or held referendums to protect abortion rights.

In other states, access to abortion is not prohibited, but is threatened by laws designed to restrict or prohibit the procedure. This is notably the case in Montana, Wyoming, Indiana and Ohio.

In April, a legal battle over the abortion pill opened a new front in the US battle for reproductive rights when a Texas district court judge invalidated the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of the abortion pill.

Days later, an appeals court struck down parts of the Texas judge’s ruling, but affirmed many restrictions on access to mifepristone, the abortion drug. The Justice Department under the Biden administration as well as the company manufacturing mifepristone sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court, which temporarily halted any changes.

In December, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal by the FDA and mifepristone manufacturer Danco Laboratories. A decision is expected by end-June 2024, making abortion rights a likely campaign issue ahead of the 2024 US presidential election in November.

South of the US border, Mexico decriminalises abortion

A demonstrator in favour of decriminalizing abortion in Mexico City on September 28, 2023.
A demonstrator in favour of decriminalizing abortion in Mexico City on September 28, 2023. © Silvana Flores, AFP

Going against the grain of other Latin American countries and the US, Mexico decriminalised abortion across the country on September 6.

In a landmark judgement, Mexico’s Supreme Court ruled that criminal penalties for terminating pregnancies were unconstitutional.

Abortion was already decriminalised in a dozen of the country’s 32 states. The capital, Mexico City, was the first jurisdiction in Latin America to authorise abortions, in 2007.

Macron announces a bill to enshrine abortion rights in France’s constitution

Placards read
Placards read “My body my choice” (L) and “Abortion in the Constitution” at rally outside the Senate in Paris, February 1, 2023. © Ludovic Marin, AFP

In a speech on March 8, International Woman’s Day, President Emmanuel Macron announced a plan to put forward a bill enshrining abortion rights in France’s constitution.

The commitment was made during a tribute to feminist activist Gisèle Halimi, who played a key role in the passing of the 1975 Veil Act granting women the right to abortion and contraception.

Seven months later, the French president stepped up the pace, when he revealed that a draft project would be submitted to the State Council, France‘s highest administrative court, so that “by 2024, women’s freedom to have an abortion will be irreversible”.

Read moreThe challenge of enshrining abortion rights in the French constitution

Taliban slides into ‘gender apartheid’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ terrain

Afghan women wait to receive aid from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in Ghazni, Afghanistan on October 31, 2023.
Afghan women wait to receive aid from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in Ghazni, Afghanistan on October 31, 2023. © Mohammad Faisal Naweed, AFP

The year began with a Taliban ban on Afghan women from working in national and international aid organisations. It ended with an edict forcing the closure of all-women beauty salons, one of the few places left in Afghanistan where women could gather outside their homes.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Afghan women’s rights have been steadily rolled back, exposing the impoverished country to the “most serious women’s rights crisis in the world”, according to Human Rights Watch.

The Taliban have “completely dismantled the system” that had been developed to respond to domestic and gender-based violence in Afghanistan, noted the New York-based rights organisation. The beauty salon ban spelled the closure of “one of the last havens for mutual support among Afghan women”. Around 60,000 women lost their jobs in the process.

In a joint report to UN Human Rights Council, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and the Working Group on discrimination against women and girls, said the Taliban’s actions “could amount to gender apartheid”.

The report also noted that the severe discrimination “may amount to gender persecution – a crime against humanity”.

Read moreAfghanistan’s NGO ban for women exposes rifts in Taliban ranks

Iran toughens penalties for women defying hijab rules

A woman holds up a placard with a picture of Mahsa Amini at a solidarity demonstration in Hasakeh, in Syria's Kurdish northeast on September 25, 2022.
A woman holds up a placard with a picture of Mahsa Amini at a solidarity demonstration in Hasakeh, in Syria’s Kurdish northeast on September 25, 2022. © Delil Souleiman, AFP

On September 20, a few days after Mahsa Amini‘s first death anniversary, the Iranian parliament approved a bill increasing prison terms, fines and penalties for women and girls breaking the country’s strict dress codes.

Penalties were also increased for employers as well as management of shopping malls and small businesses for failing to enforce the dress code.

The legal measures came after nearly a year of protests that saw women appearing in public without their hijabs as anger over Amini’s death while in custody exploded on the streets across Iran.

Following a brutal crackdown on the protests, many Iranian women continued to record and post anti-hijab clips and posts on social media. The new measures include penalties for “mockery of the hijab” in the media and on social networks.

Before the bill becomes law, it must be approved by Iran’s powerful Guardian Council.

Read moreYear after Mahsa Amini’s death, Iran crushes anti-veil protests

Morocco’s monarch nudges family code reform – again

On September 26, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI sent a letter to the country’s head of government, Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, instructing the latter to ensure the revision of the country’s family code.

The letter followed a speech by the monarch on July 30, 2022 – marking the country’s annual “Throne Day” festivities, when Mohammed VI called for a revision of the Mudawana, Morocco’s family code.

The speech raised the hopes of Moroccan women – deprived of numerous rights such as inheritance, alimony and custody – to see enhanced gender rights in the kingdom.

In his letter to the prime minister, the king stated that the family code needed to adhere to the principle of “broad participatory consultation” with all concerned parties, including civil society activists and experts.

The king also asked the prime minister to speed up the reform so that a first version of the text could be presented to him within six months.

The family code, which had already reformed in 2004, has enabled joint responsibility between spouses, raised the minimum age of marriage to 18, granted women the right to request a divorce and the freedom to choose a husband without the authorisation of a guardian. But the weight of tradition and the discretion left to judges – much to the regret of women’s rights activists – have created a significant gap between the text and enforcement of the family code.

Feminicide hits global record high

A woman wears a mask during a
A woman wears a mask during a “Not One Less” demo against feminicide outside Congress in Buenos Aires, Argentina. © Luis Robayo, AFP

Around 89,000 women and girls were deliberately killed in 2022, the highest yearly number recorded in the past 20 years, according to a study by the Research and Trend Analysis Branch, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and UN Women.

In a joint statement issued ahead of International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on November 25, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women called for an end to the “global epidemic of femicide”.

While #MeToo and other movements “have broken the silence and demonstrated that violence against women, girls and adolescents is happening throughout our communities, they have not always been followed by adequate reforms of laws and policies, nor have they produced much needed results and changes in women’s daily lives”, the statement noted.

This article has been translated from the original in French.

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Pakistan prepares for crucial elections in 2024 as ties with India remain frozen

Pakistan-India bilateral relations remained frozen for the fourth year over the vexed Kashmir issue but analysts hope the strained ties could be repaired if Nawaz Sharif becomes the Prime Minister for a record fourth time in the general elections in February in the absence of his main challenger Imran Khan who is in jail in multiple cases.

The main highlight of the outgoing year was a visit to India by then-foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in May to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation ministerial moot in Goa.

The usual pre-visit hype centred on the question of any meeting between Mr. Bilawal and Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar. But both sides did not show any desire for such a meeting. Instead, the two leaders in their official speeches at the ministerial huddle, targeted each other’s countries through innuendoes and pointed jargon.

Mr. Bilawal’s choice of words, especially urging the participants not to let terrorism hinder political relations, irked many in India. Mr. Jaishankar in his address to the SCO meeting underscored the importance of stopping the issue of cross-border terrorism.

Thus, Mr. Bilawal’s trip, which was the first by a Pakistani foreign minister to India in almost 12 years, failed to repair the strained ties which remained frozen over the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan downgraded its diplomatic relations with India by expelling its envoy in Islamabad and stopped trade ties following New Delhi’s decision to revoke the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 after abrogating Article 370 of the Constitution.

In December, Pakistan’s current caretaker government and Pakistani political leaders also reacted sharply to India’s Supreme Court upholding the Indian government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution.

As the year 2023 fades into history, it leaves a feeble ray of hope that changes may come in the India-Pakistan equation due to the changing regional situation and domestic compulsions.

Afghanistan gamble

Pakistan has lately found itself in an enviable position due to the floundering of its gamble in Afghanistan. The Taliban takeover has badly backfired, as the rulers in Kabul have refused to break ties with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan militants, who are responsible for the endless bloodbath in the country, forcing Islamabad to recalibrate its stance and options.

The immediate result has been the issuance of marching orders for hundreds and thousands of Afghans living illegally. So far, more than 400,000 have been expelled. The orders have not been reversed despite protests and threats by the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Second, elections are slated to take place on February 8 next year, and former three-time premier Nawaz Sharif, who returned from the UK after a four-year self-exile, is likely to make a record fourth-time ascendancy to power.

Explained | Why is Pakistan deporting Afghan migrants and refugees?

Nawaz Sharif’s rise

As a prelude to his rise to power, 73-year-old Sharif has been acquitted in all corruption cases and enjoys the protocols of a prime minister-designate.

According to analysts, Mr. Sharif is considered an ardent advocate of having good ties with all neighbours, especially India. He made his intention clear while addressing his party leaders in Lahore on December 7, when he said that repairing diplomatic ties with neighbouring nations, including India, Afghanistan, and Iran, was on the agenda of his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) party.

“How can you achieve global status when your neighbours are upset with you?” he asked.

Mr. Sharif, who had opposed the Kargil war of 1999 and was later ousted by then-military chief Pervez Musharraf because he was against this “misadventure,” said that he was right to oppose it.

“Time has proved us right as far as the Kargil episode is concerned,” he said, which may have been well received by his audience in India.

Mr. Sharif talking about his successes during his previous tenures also included improvement in the ties with India and sought endorsement of his policy towards India by posing a question: “During whose tenures did two Indian Prime Ministers visit Pakistan? First Atal Bihari Vajpayee and later Narendra Modi.” After his Lahore address, the leading Dawn newspaper quoted a political observer saying Sharif has a record of improving ties with India.

“Improving ties with India has always remained a point of conflict between Nawaz and the establishment in the past. Whenever Nawaz Sharif came to power, he tried to shake hands with India against the wishes of the powers that be,” the paper quoted the expert without identifying him.

He enjoys good relations with Prime Minister Narendra Modi who, like him, is in a race to gain power for another term in the next year’s elections. Their presence on the two countries’ national scenes may help ease bilateral tension.

Pakistan would also like to keep its eastern front quiet to focus on the Taliban threat. Caretaker foreign minister Jalil Abbas Gilani also referred to this point during a press conference after the Indian Supreme Court judgment on Kashmir status. When asked about the decision’s impact on the security situation on the Line of Control, he said that Pakistan would like to maintain peace on the LoC.

While Mr. Sharif’s return is smooth, former cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan is struggling in jail to remain relevant in politics. He has alleged that his party members were targeted, arrested and stopped from filing nomination papers for the February 8 elections despite assurances from the top poll body and the judiciary.

Mr. Khan, who was granted bail in the Cipher case, will remain in jail as he is convicted in the Toshakhana corruption case.

Economy troubles

On the economic front, cash-strapped Pakistan’s economy has been in a free-fall mode for the last many years, bringing untold pressure on the poor masses in the form of unchecked inflation.

Pakistan’s shaken economy has compelled it to approach several nations seeking fiscal help in the form of loans. A loan package from the International Monetary Fund, approved in July, helped Pakistan avert a sovereign debt default. Under the $3 billion standby arrangement (SBA), Pakistan received ₹1.2 billion from the IMF as the first tranche in July.

Pakistan has also been facing a rise in violence in the wake of the Taliban seizing power in Afghanistan in August 2021. Throughout this year, terrorists and separatists have been targeting security forces across Pakistan.

The outgoing year saw the rise of a new militant outfit – Tehrik-e-Jihad Pakistan (TJP), a newly formed militant group that is an affiliate of the banned TTP. The group carried out multiple attacks targeting security forces including one of the worst terror attacks targeting the military in recent years that killed 23 soldiers in the restive Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province in December’s second week.

On November 4, the TJP militants attacked the Pakistan Air Force’s Mianwali Training Air Base, some 300 km from Lahore, damaging three grounded aircraft. A day earlier 17 soldiers were killed in three separate terror strikes in the country.

Pakistan’s establishment has said it will fight back till the menace of terrorism is eliminated.

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Why is Pakistan deporting Afghan migrants and refugees? | Explained

The story so far: On October 31, the Torkham Crossing — five kilometres west of Khyber Pass, on the border connecting Pakistan’s Peshawar with Afghanistan’s Jalalabad — saw a sudden influx of at least 24,000 Afghan refugees packed in trucks and convoys, with whatever luggage they could take from demolished homes. Some crossed over, while others were stranded, unclear about where to go.

The mass exodus was triggered by an order from Pakistan’s interim government asking ‘illegal refugees’ to leave the country by October end, or face deportation. The new anti-immigrant policy comes beforethe general elections next year, when hyperinflation, political instability and rising crime rates are expected to dominate voter issues.

The United Nations called the decision a ‘human rights catastrophe’ which, if not stopped, will put hundreds of thousands of refugees who fled persecution in neighbouring Afghanistan at ‘grave risk.’

Afghan nationals with their belongings gather as they head back to Afghanistan, after Pakistan gives last warning to undocumented immigrants to leave, at the Torkham border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
| Photo Credit:
Reuters

Who is Pakistan deporting?

A few days before the October 31 deadline, Pakistan’s acting interior minister Sarfraz Bugti told reporters, “There will be no compromise against illegal refugees… We are going door to door, and we have done geofencing. We will detain and deport them.”

‘Them’ here refers to the almost 17 lakh people living in Pakistan with no legal documentation, a large number of whom are Afghans who sought refuge in the country after fleeing persecution in a war-stricken Afghanistan. Human rights agencies estimate that about 60% of Afghan refugees in Pakistan are undocumented, and say the decision will worsen the trend of arbitrary detentions and harassment Afghan migrants have faced over the last two years.

Almost two lakh refugees have ‘voluntarily’ complied with the October expulsion orders, Mr. Bugti said, some using the Torkham stretch while others used the Chaman crossing in Balochistan. The exodus started as a trickle, with authorities seeing 300 people a day at the outset; this has now increased to more than 10,000 arrivals per day, aid agencies said. Authorities reportedly demolished the houses of Afghan nationals living in illegal settlements, leaving many stranded and fearing arrest. Rights groups allege the police have harassed and illegally detained all migrants, with or without documentation, under the guise of implementing its new anti-immigration policy.

Pakistan’s Afghan refugee population

Government figures show Pakistan is home to about 40 lakh refugees and migrants. As of June this year, Afghan refugees number above 13 lakhs, forming a large chunk of the immigrant pool.

The migration of Afghan nationals to Pakistanhappened in waves. The most recent wave was in August 2021 after the Taliban came to power, compelling some six lakh people to flee persecution in their home country. The starting point of steady migration along this route dates back to 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan; families fled to neighbouring Pakistan andbuilt lives, livelihoods and families there. “I was born and raised in Pakistan. All my siblings were born here…Pakistan is now home, not Afghanistan, and we will be refugees there,” Mir Agha, a 23-year-old who was forcibly deported, told The Guardian this week.

Afghan refugees require a Proof of Registration (PoR) card to legally remain in Pakistan. The route to a PoR is, however, barricaded by an onerous bureaucratic regime, paperwork and interminable delays. Many find their visas have expired while undergoing the registration process. Amnesty International flagged that the delayed process and expired visas amplify the legal vulnerability of Afghan refugees.

During the current exodus, Mr. Agha’s proof of refuge card issued by the UNHCR was “scissored by the police” after arrest, he told a reporter. As things stand, Afghan nationals in Pakistan are caught in an “impossible situation,” as Dinushika Dissanayake, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director for South Asia, has previously highlighted. People were uprooted and forsaken by a home they had been born into, and a home they had sought out of necessity. “Their ambiguous legal status and arduous processes for asylum or third-country relocation have made them even more vulnerable,” she added.

The UNHCR in February 2023 renewed its non-return advisory, first issued in August 2021, barring a forced return of Afghan nationals and asylum seekers whose claims were rejected. The alarm bells ring louder for minorities, women and journalists who are being forced to return to a country languishing under the Taliban regime. “This would particularly put women and girls in grave danger as they would be exposed to persecution and other serious human rights violations simply because of their sex and their gender. For an overwhelming majority of them, living and studying in Pakistan may be their only chance of gaining a formal education,” Amnesty International said in a statement. Since August 2021, the Taliban has imposed bans on young and unmarried women from accessing health centres, schools and universities, public spaces, or pursuing means of employment.

Also vulnerable are those who worked for the U.S., the U.K. and other Western countries before the Taliban took control of Afghanistan. Currently, two Afghan families awaiting transfer are suing the British government for not doing enough. Washington has asked Islamabad “to ensure the protection of Afghan refugees and asylum seekers, including those in the U.S. resettlement and immigration pipelines,” per an NPR report.

Afghanistan’s fragility compounds the refugees’ struggle. Taliban’s human rights violations aside, food insecurity, earthquakes and economic woes further ail the nation. Philippa Candler, the UNHCR representative in Pakistan, told the BBC that a series of devastating earthquakes have “heavily” impacted the situation. “On top of that, winter is approaching so it’s not the best season to have people going back to a country that is already in a very fragile situation,” she said.

The Taliban has criticised the decision and asked for more time; in the meantime, it has prepared temporary refugee camps equipped with water, food, and health facilities and said it would help refugees find jobs, per media reports.

“Afghan refugees’ lives and rights are at stake due to the collective failure of the Pakistan Government and the international community to share the responsibility for their protection. This is simply unacceptable.”Deprose Muchena, senior director of Amnesty

Is the deportation legal?

The Dawn reported that some human rights activists and politicians challenged the “mass deportation” before the Supreme Court this week. The forceful detention and harassment are illegal, unconstitutional and violative of people’s fundamental rights, their petition argues. The government has “failed to distinguish between birthright citizens and illegal immigrants,” as the law grants those born in Pakistan a claim to birthright citizenship, it says. For others, it has urged the Court to allow aid agencies to expeditiously process registration applications.

Rights groups have also urged Pakistan to “stop the crackdown against, and harassment of, Afghan refugees across the country” in keeping with international legal obligations. Under the principle of non-refoulment, the United Nations specifies that countries are forbidden from directly or indirectly forcing people from returning to a place of persecution, “where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm” and this principle “applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status.” 

Why did Pakistan announce deportation?

Pakistan says it is operating from a place of self-preservation — to protect its economy and national security. The cash-strapped government has struggled to stabilise a collapsing economy, as a depreciating rupee, plummeting foreign exchange reserves and inflation add to people’s woes. Critics fear Pakistan’s worsening political crisis — marked by a power tussle between the military and civilian government — will further stir the economic pot. The present caretaker government, led by interim Prime Minister Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar, is expected to remain safe from any fallout from contentious immigration or economic policies, as Mr. Kakar is perceived to be “closer” to the military.

Hameed Hakimi, an associate at Chatham House, told a media outlet, “From a domestic socio-political and security environment point of view, this is the time for the state to show that it’s doing something about it. And the refugees seem to be a natural target….”

While announcing the deportation, Mr. Bugti also linked the migrant population with crimes and drug trafficking. “There have been 24 suicide bomb attacks since January this year and 14 of them were carried out by Afghan nationals,” he said. Terror-related incidents peaked in 2022 and 2023, with deadly suicide bombings in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa region and a mosque in Peshawar. Mr. Bugti implied a linear relationship between the flow of Afghan nationals and crime rates; however, analysts attribute the violence to Pakistan’s ‘dual policy’ of supporting some terror groups for geopolitical goals. The “terror triad”, as researcher Imtiaz Gul called it in an article, plays out between Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the ethnic Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) — with Pakistan tailoring its war on terror depending on the militant group. Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban regime has also deteriorated as the TTP leadership, which plotted the Peshawar attacks on Afghan soil, enjoys freedom in Afghanistan.

Research has made tenuous links between refugee intake and crime rates: a 2021 study highlighted that it is often the host countries’ attitudes about foreigners and the economic conditions that shape domestic terrorism risks.

Also Read | Pakistan’s internal challenges, shifting dynamics

Political analysts argue that Afghan refugees are being ‘scapegoated’ for the government’s collective failure to take responsibility for Pakistan’s economic and security woes. “To deflect blame from the challenges that the government or the country overall is facing, they always raised the issue of illegal immigrants chiefly from Afghanistan,” Mr. Hakimi noted. This ‘blame game’ is used as a fig leaf, indicating that “the country’s problem largely arises from neighbouring countries instead of focusing internally on their own government’s policies.”

Pakistan had previously censured Western countries for a lack of effort and initiative to support Afghan refugees for their return. Rights groups and aid agencies note that in addition to the government, the international community has also defaulted on its responsibility to protect refugees who find themselves at the centre of Pakistan’s turbulent triad of economics, security and politics.

Fortyt-seven-year-old Khair Muhammad, who was “harassed” and forced out of his rented house in Dina, told Al Jazeera: “I am tired. How many times do I have to move countries to protect myself and my family?”

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A look inside the UN’s most mysterious body

The United Nations Credentials Committee is a solidly closed doors group – but their work is among some of the most important in the entire organisation.

If you haven’t heard of the United Nations Credentials Committee, you’re not alone.

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Despite its rather innocuous sounding name, it’s actually one of the most important bodies in the entire organisation.

It has no official space to call its own in the UN’s New York City HQ and doesn’t even appear on the body’s own organisational chart of its many agencies, councils, committees and departments.

It could be considered the ugly sister of international diplomacy when all that is taken into account but, in fact, when it comes to countries riven by political divisions or coups, the body is the gatekeeper to the world’s stage at the UN General Assembly’s annual meeting.

For most universally recognised governments, credentialing is a mere formality.

But for leaders of factions and reasons with weak claims of ownership, the Committee is the only way towards legitimacy within divided nations.

Until recently, the workings of the Credentials Committee received little to no scrutiny from the worldwide press.

That all changed when the Taliban and Myanmar military junta sought entry but, nevertheless, it remains “an astonishingly opaque body” – according to Richard Gowan, UN director for the International Crisis Group.

What is the Committee – and how does it work?

The president of the General Assembly proposes the members for the nine-member body at the beginning of each year-long session.

Russia, China and the United States have occupied permanent committee seats since its 1947 inception, while the others rotate on a yearly basis.

The current seats are made up of representatives from Andorra, Grenada, Nigeria, Solomon Islands, Suriname and Togo.

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A handful of times a year, the Committee meets behind closed doors. At the end of each session, they issue recommendations in reports which shed virtually no light on what actually happened in the gathering, with many adding up to just three pages.

The General Assembly itself rarely discusses or debates the report before giving its approval.

“I think everyone finds the Credentials Committee a bit of a mystery. It is one of the least transparent UN bodies,” Richard Gowan tells the AP.

“To some extent, everyone sort of lives with this, because the fact that it isn’t transparent allows it to fudge certain decisions and kick hard decisions down the road,” Gowan adds.

Decisions on credentials are well known to be politically treacherous.

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Rival authorities on occasion submit documents to try to credential their own would-be UN representatives – but the Committee’s criteria for recommending the UN grant or deny entry remain a matter of some conjecture.

At the top of the list is the thorny issue of effective control of territory.

According to an article in the American Society of International Law penned by Catherine Amirfar, a former president of the association, alongside two associates from her law firm Debevoise & Plimpton: “It is difficult to distill rules or principles on representation determinations from the Credentials Committee’s recommendations”.

“The Committee appears to apply a presumption of continuity from the prior session, while accounting for factors such as democratic legitimacy and commitment to human rights. Whatever factors the Committee might consider relevant, the nature of the criteria considered surely leave room for political considerations,” the lawyers added.

Although no country has diplomatically recognised the Taliban, it still manages to hold onto power throughout Afghanistan.

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Myanmar’s junta likewise controls the country despite a less than tangible claim to leadership.

Yet both countries have gone unrepresented at the General Assembly in 2021 and 2022.

Last December, having once again received competing submissions from the two ruling bodies, the Credentials Committee issued a report – but put off making a decision on the leadership status of the two countries, leaving the Taliban and the junta still boxed out.

It also declined to issue a recommendation on dual requests from Libya.

That lack of choice means that the credentials remain in the hands of the internationally recognised administration seated in the country’s capital Tripoli, as opposed to with the rival government in the east.

Some countries are in the grip of a power struggle – but choose not to go to the UN for advice or decisions (or lack thereof).

On Thursday at the General Assembly, Sudan’s General Abdel-Fattah Burhan, who seized power in a 2021 coup, sidelined a broad-based pro-democracy movement and for the last five months has been battling an equally autocratic rival general for control of the African nation.

Interestingly, despite controlling much of the country’s territory – including the capital, Khartoum – the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces have not submitted a request for UN credentials.

Issues with the process

For those that do decide to submit a request for credentials, there are occasional delays in getting a response from the Committee or the wider UN.

Following a coup in July, two competing credentials were submitted for Niger but, as yet, it’s been reported that the Credentials Committee has yet to schedule a meeting.

Before the coup, Bakary Yaou Sangaré had been Niger’s representative at the UN. Afterwards, the ruling junta made him their minister of foreign affairs and circulated his photos to journalists in the General Assembly hall on Monday, along with a statement proclaiming that he would “reaffirm the nation’s sovereignty”.

However, the UN also received a letter from the deposed government’s foreign minister “informing of the end of functions of Mr Bakary as Permanent Representative of Niger to the United Nations,” and Stéphane Dujarric, spokesperson for the Secretary-General, told the AP on Thursday that Dujarric was no longer allowed onto the premises.

That didn’t go down well with Niger’s new military rulers.

“This team, led by the army, enjoys the unconditional support of the people and we’re going to demand that our government react,” Insa Garba Saidou, a local activist who assists with their communications, told The AP.

Despite the non-transparent nature of the Committee, its recommendations can have other knock-on effects.

Catherine Amirfar’s article noted that the Credentials Committee’s reluctance to make a decision on Myanmar created confusion over who between a representative of the junta or of the prior government would represent the country at the International Court of Justice – a crucial body for every nation.

“The role of the Credentials Committee and the impact of its recommendations has grown substantially since UN member states first adopted the rules that govern its procedure. Far from its original ministerial function .. The Credentials Committee has emerged as a key player in critical questions of global governance,” the article laid out.

The question of whether or not recent events will change how opaque the Committee will be is an answer only known by those nine members.

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Two years since the fall of Kabul, German promises to Afghans remain unfulfilled

August 15, 2021 is a date that’s etched in the memory of most Afghans. It was the day the Taliban took over Kabul’s Presidential Palace, thereby becoming the de-facto ruling government of Afghanistan.

For 30-year-old former Kabul resident Mansour Haidari, it is still a nightmare he finds hard to believe. Mr. Haidari used to work at one of Kabul’s well-known five-star hotels. “Nobody thought the Taliban would come back to power, especially after 20 years of seeing improvements in Afghanistan,” said Mr. Haidari from his Berlin home.

On April 14, 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden announced that the complete withdrawal of U.S. soldiers from Afghanistan would be completed by August 31. The Taliban began to capture more Afghan territories from May onwards.

“When the Taliban took over Herat, that’s when people in Kabul got alarmed. At first, we thought this act of capturing territories was part of the U.S.-Taliban’s Doha peace negotiations. But when Mazar-i-Sharif was captured, Kabul residents realised that everything was over,” said Mr. Haidari. The day Kabul fell, recalls Mr. Haidari, the streets were empty of cars, there were massive lines outside banks as people wanted to withdraw money and very soon Afghan police were replaced by Taliban militants.

Entrepreneur Matiullah Rahmaty, 28, was still working at the startup incubator he founded in Kabul when the Taliban arrived. “As per the analyses I’d read, the soonest we expected the Taliban to reach Kabul was December 2021. But everything happened so fast that it left us confused,” said Mr. Rahmaty, who now lives in the North German city of Luebeck.

Both Mr. Rahmaty and Mr. Haidari left Afghanistan with their respective spouses within months of the fall of Kabul. They arrived in Germany via Abu Dhabi, where they stayed in a refugee camp as they finalised their paperwork and secured the right visa.

According to the UNHCR, more than 1.6 million Afghans fled their country following the Taliban takeover in 2021. Around 2% of those have been admitted in Germany.

Being a NATO member, Germany had a military presence in Afghanistan, mostly in the Northern parts of the country.

According to a source from the German Foreign Office, “Since admission procedures got under way, 30,000 affected individuals have been admitted to Germany. This group includes Afghans who worked for Federal Government institutions, as well as their family members. It also includes particularly at-risk Afghans who have been identified by the Federal Government with the help of civil society.”

On October 17, 2022, Germany announced a special Federal Admissions Programme to take in 1,000 Afghan refugees per month. The programme is applicable only for Afghans living in Afghanistan and the individuals would be recommended to the German government by ‘registration-authorized bodies’ such as NGOs. Mathematically speaking, there should have been 9,000 Afghans in Germany under this programme by now, but that’s not the case.

Clara Beunger, a German member of Parliament from the left party (Die Linke) and the spokesperson for refugee and legal policy, calls the German government’s handling of the refugees a disaster. She notes that high-ranking military, political and academic activists had warned of Taliban revenge attacks since May 2021, but little heed was paid.

Kabul Luftbruecke (translating to Kabul Airlift) is a civil society organisation that helped Mr. Haidari escape Afghanistan. It has also helped evacuate over 3,500 Afghans to neighbouring countries as well as via charter flights to Germany.

There were three phases of evacuations. The first was the military allocation where Afghans who worked closely with the German military and administration (known as Ortskräfte) were evacuated on military airplanes. This process was haphazard. When the new German coalition government came to power in December 2021, to streamline the process they began an interim evacuation process in March 2022, where Afghan individuals could apply to evacuate. This process was delayed as well. The final phase was the announcement of the Federal Admissions Programme in October 2022.

Role of NGOs

A source from Kabul Luftbruecke noted that the approach of the Federal Admissions Programme was not very practical as it left a majority of the heavy lifting –identifying people to evacuate, cross-checking their documents, co-ordinating with the government – with the NGOs.

“We see our role in advising the government and defining the criteria, but we never asked to be made the ‘gatekeepers’. Verifying applications is a time-consuming process. It isn’t feasible for NGOs to carry out the work that requires an entire government department,” said the source . The other criticism is that the programme isn’t flexible according to the changing situation on the ground.

When the Taliban came to power, it promised to uphold women’s rights within the framework of Sharia. But soon after, rights of women and girls were trampled upon. In 2022 itself, classes for teen girls were canceled immediately after schools began, it was mandatory for women to have a male guardian to accompany them outside the house, and a strict dress code for women was announced. In December 2022, women were barred from universities and working in NGOs. The male guardians would be punished if women broke the law.

Restrictions on women have not been taken into consideration in the Federal Admissions Programme. “The German Foreign Ministry postulates on feminist foreign policies, but then discards the very groups that are most vulnerable,” noted the source from Kabul Luftbruecke.

The source from the German Foreign Office noted that Germany regularly highlighted the human rights situation in Afghanistan in international fora such as the Human Rights Council of the UN. “We have strongly campaigned for the widening of EU sanctions on members of the Taliban regime who are responsible for restricting the rights of women,” said the Foreign Office.

Federal Admissions Programme

Ms. Buenger noted that the implementation of this programme has been delayed for months. “I am not aware of any entries under the programme to date. Only in the last few weeks have the first commitments been made.”

Samiullah Hadizada is an Afghan activist and a social worker with the Berlin Refugee Council. Mr. Hadizada helps Afghan asylum seekers in Germany with visa procedures, accompanies them when they need legal help, a home or even psychological support. Mr. Hadizada feels Germany has forgotten its promise with regard to the Federal Admissions Programme.

“It has been 10 months, but not a single person has been granted a visa for departure,” noted Mr. Hadizada.

In March 2023, the German government suspended the Federal Admissions Programme to do thorough security checking of applications after reports emerged of abuse of the application process. Ms. Buenger noted that this was followed by a right-wing campaign to question the admission process. These accusations were never proven. The admissions programme began again towards the end of June 2023. Only 3-5 applications were processed per day in June, as there was a huge backlog.

Germany does not have diplomatic ties with the Taliban regime. This makes paperwork within Afghanistan difficult. For Afghans who have a permission to fly to Germany, they still have to get an Afghan passport (which can cost anywhere from $700 to $1,200 for fresh ones) and a visa to reside in Pakistan which has additional costs. The German visa application process takes place in Islamabad.

“Persons who have been granted admission, receive assistance from the German government to leave for Pakistan. They also receive accommodation there for the period in which they go through the visa process,” said Ms. Buenger.

In Islamabad, the cost for German visa processing is paid by the German government.

From March to June 2023, when German visa processing was suspended, many Afghans who were eligible for the Federal Admissions Programme had to decide for themselves if they wanted to continue staying in Afghanistan or risk overstaying their visa in Pakistan. As per Kabul Luftbruecke, the German government also wasn’t supporting any exits from Afghanistan to Pakistan or Iran, as they wanted to clear the backlog of the suspended German visa applications of Afghans already present in these countries. As a result, thousands of Afghans were left in a limbo despite being eligible to enter Germany.

Even people leaving in 2021, had to undergo long wait times. Berlin-based Mr. Haidari, who was rescued by Kabul Luftbruecke, had to wait for three months in the refugee camp in Abu Dhabi, where he wasn’t allowed to leave the premises. “We weren’t treated well in Abu Dhabi. We were visited by German Embassy employees who were sympathetic to our situation. Our biometrics and photos were taken at the refugee centre and we got our visas to come to Germany in a few weeks,” said Mr. Haidari.

For Mr. Rahmaty, the entrepreneur from Kabul, the wait at the Abu Dhabi refugee centre was seven months.

Rigid regulations

Pro Asyl, Germany’s largest pro-immigration advocacy organisation, has criticised many aspects of the Federal Admissions Programme. Especially the requirement that only people living in Afghanistan can apply for the evacuation. “Many Afghans are so endangered by the Taliban that they have already fled to neighbouring countries. However, they do not have a long term residence permit there and cannot obtain it,” said a Pro Asyl spokesperson.

For many who have fled Afghanistan via illegal human trafficking routes and reached Germany, they have to go through the asylum registration process.

The first thing new refugee arrivals in Berlin have to do is to get themselves registered at the Arrival Centre located in a former psychiatric hospital complex in North-western Berlin. The official registrations only happen during working hours of the facility run by the State Office for Refugee Affairs Berlin (LAF). It’s an administrative body that does the registration, medical checkup, counselling and provides accommodation to the arriving refugees.

The asylum procedure-related interviews and document processing happens at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), which ultimately decides on whether to grant someone asylum or not.

Refugees from Ukraine

According to Destatis, “Net immigration from Ukraine in 2022 (+962,000) was higher than that from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq together in the period 2014 to 2016 (+834,000)”As of April 2023, Germany took in 1.06 million Ukrainian refugees.

One line of argument often heard in the media is that the admission of refugees from Ukraine had delayed the admission process for Afghan refugees. “I consider this to be an invalid excuse. If priorities had been set accordingly, it would have been possible to implement the Federal Admissions Programme in parallel. Overall, the handling of the refugees from Ukraine shows what is possible when there’s political will,” said Ms. Buenger.

Unlike refugees from Afghanistan or elsewhere, Ukrainian refugees do not have to undergo the asylum process. Many Germans also opened their homes to accommodate war refugees from Ukraine. But for those who couldn’t find accommodation, they were housed by the LAF.

A slight distance away from the temporary housing at the Arrival Centre in Berlin, is an area that comprises container homes. The area called ‘Haus 21’ has enough container homes to accommodate 250 refugees. In April 2022, there were reports of Afghan refugees staying in the container homes here being asked to evacuate for housing Ukrainian refugees.

“The Afghans were then sent to the housing shelters meant for homeless people. Since the Ukrainian refugees have begun arriving in Germany, other refugees including Afghans have been treated as third-class refugees,” noted Mr. Hadizada.

Ms. Monika Hebbinghaus, the press officer for LAF, agreed that the situation could have been handled better with more advanced notice. But she notes that at the time, Berlin was receiving thousands of refugees from Ukraine at the Arrival Centre, mostly women and children, who couldn’t be asked to stay in the makeshift tents on the hospital premises when temperatures were sub-zero Celcius.

“The Afghan refugees who were evacuated were given alternative accommodations. For families who wanted to stay in the neighbourhood to ensure their children didn’t have to travel far for their schools, we also worked with the district authorities to find them hostels and homes nearby. No one was left out on the streets,” said Ms. Hebbinghaus.

According to Mr. Hadizada, the decision on asylum applications in Germany are different in each of its 16 States. In Berlin, it’s on a case-by-case basis. “60% of the asylum-seeking cases are rejected as unfounded because there is no political interest.”

Even for others who have the right visa in hand even before entering Germany, there are still a lot of bureaucratic hurdles to cross.

Mr. Haidari complained about all the documentation being in German, a language that was alien to him when he had landed here. Shortage of social workers to help with bureaucracy means long wait times for refugees.

“The government can simplify bureaucratic processes for people who don’t know the language. The other difficulty is there aren’t enough accommodations for refugees. There are some families who stay in arrival centres for years,” said Mr Haidari.

Ms Hebbinghaus of LAF acknowledges the shortage of homes. “Right now there are 32,000 refugees staying in state-run accommodation in Berlin. But we need more affordable housing for arriving refugees in Berlin,” said Ms. Hebbinghaus recalling how her colleagues had to use churches to temporarily house Ukrainian refugees last year. Many refugees end up staying in temporary accommodations such as container homes for years as a result.

Moving on, in their own ways

In addition to learning enough German to settle in, Mr. Rahmaty has also pursued courses at the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management. He continues his entrepreneurial journey that began in Kabul in 2018 and has his sights set on helping migrant entrepreneurs with small investments.

Mr. Haidari keeps in regular touch with his family, who are still in Kabul. He hopes to get them to Germany some day. His connection to his home is evident from the collage of photos from back home present in his living room. Mr. Haidari is slowly integrating within the German society and is set to appear for an advanced German language exam in mid-August. He has found a job in Berlin and also volunteers with Kabul Luftbruecke, to help Afghan refugees who were in a similar situation as him.

“The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than before. The UN should be careful and the Taliban-led government shouldn’t be recognised. Else they will get away with worse atrocities and destroy Afghanistan,” said Mr. Haidari.

Nimish Sawant is an independent journalist based in Berlin.

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Uzbekistan, which once backed anti-Taliban forces, is now betting on engagement

In the late 1990s, when the Taliban were in power in Kabul, Uzbekistan, along with Tajikistan, Russia, India and others, supported the anti-Taliban United Front (Northern Alliance) that had controlled parts of northern Afghanistan. Now, when the Taliban are back in Kabul, after a gap of 20 years, Tashkent is experimenting a different policy — cautious engagement.

To be sure, Afghanistan’s domestic and regional environment is different this time from the 1990s. The Taliban now control almost all of the country’s territories. There’s no Northern Alliance. The remnants of the anti-Taliban forces have formed the National Resistance Front (NRF), but unlike the Northern Alliance of the 1990s, the NRF neither controls land inside Afghanistan nor has regional backing. As the Taliban’s grip on Afghanistan appears to be stronger, regional powers seek guarded cooperation, while pushing for changes in the Islamic Emirate’s policies. Uzbekistan is leading the effort.

Afghan people climb atop a plane as they wait at the Kabul airport in Kabul on August 16, 2021, after a stunningly swift end to Afghanistan’s 20-year war, as thousands of people mobbed the city’s airport trying to flee the group’s feared hardline brand of Islamist rule.
| Photo Credit:
AFP


Also read: Explained | Why is Afghanistan staring at a humanitarian disaster?

Tashkent meet 

Last month, Uzbekistan hosted a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries in Samarkand, in which the Taliban Foreign Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, also participated. Mr. Muttaqi, who held bilateral talks with Uzbek Foreign Minister Bahtiyor Saidov, said Kabul was ready for the Trans-Afghanistan Railway project, which will connect Uzbekistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan and will significantly contribute to regional economic integration”.

“There’s a new reality in Afghanistan. The global community has demanded that the government in Afghanistan should be inclusive; rights of minorities and women should be protected and the country should not be a staging ground for terrorism. Uzbekistan has the same demands,” Manish Prabhat, India’s Ambassador in Uzbekistan, told a media delegation from India at the embassy in Tashkent. “But at the same time, Uzbekistan is sending humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, like India is also sending. It’s our shared view that terror should not spill over into Central Asia. Any instability in Afghanistan will affect us,” Mr. Prabhat said.

Taliban fighters walk through the compound of the Hazrat-e-Ali shrine or Blue Mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif | file photo

Taliban fighters walk through the compound of the Hazrat-e-Ali shrine or Blue Mosque in Mazar-i-Sharif | file photo
| Photo Credit:
AFP

In the 1990s, the Taliban, who are mostly Pashtun, faced military resistance from the militias that represented Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. The Northern Alliance, commanded by Tajik warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud, was a conglomerate of anti-Taliban forces. Uzbekistan, under the leadership of Islam Karimov, the country’s first President after it became independent in 1991, largely acted as a patron of Gen. Abdur Rashid Dostum, who commanded an Uzbek militia that was part of the Alliance. But President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who succeeded Karimov in 2016 after his death, is pushing for dialogue, engagement and cooperation.


Also read: Analysis | How Kabul fell

Constructive contact 

In September last year, while speaking at the 22nd summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Samarkand (in which Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended), Mr. Mirziyoyev said the imposition of sanctions on the Taliban-run Afghanistan “will isolate Afghanistan and increase extremism in the country”. He called for “constructive contact with Kabul”.

In December, Mr. Mirziyoyev’s government submitted an initiative to the U.N. Security Council, calling for the formation of a high-level international negotiating group to coordinate with the Taliban for the step-by-step implementation of the demands of the international community, which includes lifting the ban on girl’s education and women’s participation in the workforce.

A Taliban fighter walks past a beauty saloon with images of women defaced using a spray paint in Shar-e-Naw in Kabul on August 18, 2021.

A Taliban fighter walks past a beauty saloon with images of women defaced using a spray paint in Shar-e-Naw in Kabul on August 18, 2021.
| Photo Credit:
AFP

“In my mind, we should listen to what they want. At least we will be able to see what they are thinking about Central Asia, about the future of our neighbours. Because we are too close. If you go to Termez, you can see Afghanistan, just across Amu-Darya (the river that divides Uzbekistan and Afghanistan). You cannot ignore them. They have taken political power. Why should we keep silent? We have to work with them,” said Beruniy Alimov, director, New Media Education Center, a Tashkent-based NGO.


Also read: Explained | What’s behind the Pakistani Taliban’s deadly insurgency?

“We have our problems with the Taliban. Look at the water problem of Central Asia. If there will be war in the region, it will be in the name of water. The Taliban started digging a canal on the Afghan side taking more water from the Amu-Darya. That could lead to Amu-Darya drying up. This is one point. Another point is about security. But how do we address these issues if we don’t talk to them?” asked Mr. Alimov, who was the Press Secretary of former President Karimov.

When in the past Uzbekistan supported Gen. Dostum and his Afghan Uzbek militias, the Taliban hosted the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a jihadist group that wanted to overthrow Karimov’s regime and create an Islamic State under Sharia. Today, Tashkent seeks assurances from the Taliban that they would not allow jihadist groups such as the IMU to launch terror attacks in Central Asia.

“We have to work with the Taliban on the security question. They have promised that they would not allow any terrorist group to operate inside Afghanistan. We should make sure that they stick to the promise,” said Mr. Alimov.

A Taliban fighter stands guard as Afghan people attend Eid al-Fitr prayers, marking the end of the holy fasting month of Ramadan, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Friday, April 21, 2023.

A Taliban fighter stands guard as Afghan people attend Eid al-Fitr prayers, marking the end of the holy fasting month of Ramadan, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Friday, April 21, 2023.
| Photo Credit:
AP

Connectivity hub

Besides the security question, the overall relationship between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan has transformed over the past 20 years. Mr. Mirziyoyev doesn’t want the regime change in Kabul to impact his strategic bets on big ticket connectivity projects.


WATCH: Worldview with Suhasini Haidar | One year of the Taliban | How far has Afghanistan fallen behind?

For example, the ambitious Trans-Afghan Project, first proposed in 2018, aims to extend the Afghan rail network from the Uzbek border through Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul and then to Nangarhar in Afghanistan’s east, from where the railway would run into Pakistan via Peshawar (roughly 573 k.m.). The Taliban are also very keen on the rail project. A rail link is already operational from Uzbekistan to Mazar through the Dustlik Bridge across Amu-Darya. The bridge is Afghanistan’s main gateway to the outside world through which humanitarian aid flows in.

Uzbekistan is also the top supplier of electricity to Afghanistan, which is importing 75% of its consumption. Uzbekistan has spent millions of dollars to build and upgrade electricity infrastructure across the border and as per an ADB report, the country is supplying 57% of Afghanistan’s imported electricity which could rise to 70% soon. Tashkent wants the business to continue, while making sure that the Taliban do not support groups that would spread instability in Central Asia, say experts.

“If Afghanistan stabilises, it’s good for both India and Uzbekistan, as well as for Central Asia,” said Mr. Alimov, who studied in the Indian Institute of Mass Communication in Delhi in the 1990s. “Afghanistan is a bridge between us. When Babur (the founder of the Mughal Empire) came to India, he went through Afghanistan. Today, we use the same route. So Afghanistan should be very peaceful. That will make our cooperation better.”  

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How fake media accounts in Afghanistan are used to push Taliban propaganda

Since the Taliban took over control of Afghanistan in August 2021, numerous accounts mimicking or trying to present themselves as media outlets have popped up online. These fake accounts share content that appears to be authentic, often using the same graphic signature and style as the real media outlet. But on closer inspection, researchers from the NGO Afghan Witness found that their posts have no basis in reality and serve to undermine opposition groups in Afghanistan and clamp down on independent media.

Since December 2022, researchers at Afghan Witness – a human rights project dedicated to documenting and verifying events in Afghanistan – have identified several of these fake accounts and the messages they are trying to share. Their analysis centred on one fake Twitter account, @AF_Inter5, which presents itself as the news media Afghanistan International.

‘It will erode trust in the opposition movement’

Tom Stubbs, Senior Analyst for Information Operations at Afghan Witness, told the FRANCE 24 Observers more. 

The content revolves around denigrating both Afghan International and opposition within Afghanistan. And a lot of the stories they were sharing weren’t backed up in any other media. Normally, when you have a news story from Afghanistan International or other news agencies, we can actually follow that up and we can understand the nature of what they’re saying is true. But what this fake account was doing was just made up. 

The @AF_Inter5 account’s posts often extol the Taliban’s impact on Afghanistan, after the group reclaimed control of the country in August 2021. 

One post, published on March 1 and viewed more than 57,000 times, claims that the former top-ranking army commander of the Republic of Afghanistan and former Deputy Interior Minister for Security, Khoshal Sadat, said that the arrival of the Taliban ended the Republic, as well as “espionage, nationalism and insurgency”. 

However, there is no other record of this statement in English, Persian or Pashto-language media. And the image shared in this post dates back to 2020, before the Taliban took control of the country. 

Posts also undermine the rival National Resistance Front (NRF), which constitutes the main organised resistance to Taliban control.

Another tweet, published on March 11 and viewed more than 20,000 times, claims that the leader of the NRF, Ahmad Massoud, told the New York Times that his organisation has close relations with the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), a part of the Islamic State organisation active in Afghanistan. 

A tweet published on March 11 claims that the leader of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan said that his group had close relations with the Islamic State organisation in the country. © Observers

However, Massoud has never been interviewed by the New York Times nor said that the NRF has a good relationship with ISKP. This claim serves to link Afghanistan’s self-proclaimed only legitimate resistance movement fighting for democracy with ISKP, a UN-designated terrorist organisation.

Another tweet claimed that an NRF commander had visited Israel to discuss bilateral goals, despite no other evidence in the media that this visit occurred.

Stubbs explained how this content reflects common Taliban talking points.

It will erode trust in the opposition movement because if people are believing what this fake account is saying about the opposition movement, they’ll believe that [the NRF] is dealing with Afghanistan’s enemies and people who want to destroy Afghanistan, that they’re dealing with the Islamic State. It really degrades people’s opinion of the NRF. 

The narratives shared in this content also vary drastically from that which is shared by the real Afghanistan International, a media outlet which claims to “provide balanced, and impartial news, about all for all Afghans, including all voices from across the political, social and business sectors inside Afghanistan and around the world”, according to its website.

Afghanistan International is a UK-based broadcaster and media outlet that emerged from the parent company of Iran International when the Taliban took over Afghanistan. Iran International has been criticised for alleged ties to the Saudi state through its parent company funding, though the media outlet denies this.

Although the fake account had only 6,500 followers at the time of writing, its posts sometimes receive over 50,000 views and numerous comments and shares. 

A poorly copied fake account

After noticing the traction that @AF_Inter5 had online, the Afghan Witness team began analysing its content and posting behaviours. It was immediately evident that the account was fake, thanks to several clear indicators on its page. 

First, the account is not verified on Twitter, unlike the official Afghan International account, which is verified through Twitter Blue. The fake account has a different bio and email address – notably a Gmail address, and not a “@Afintl.com” address. And the account was created in November 2021, several months after the Taliban took over the country.

The fake account also has posted far fewer times than the real Afghanistan International account: 236 tweets versus 34,230 tweets on the real account.

Finally, the fake account’s cover photo shows a CNN newsroom, while the real account has an Afghanistan International graphic with text. 

A comparison of the fake Afghanistan International account (left) and the real one (right). Afghan Witness
A comparison of the fake Afghanistan International account (left) and the real one (right). Afghan Witness © Afghan Witness

That being said, the account’s tweets look very convincing. They follow the same graphic formatting as the legitimate Afghanistan International’s breaking news tweets, with a logo and edited text on a photo.

An image posted by @AFIntlBrk, the real Afghanistan International Twitter account (on the left) and an image posted by @AF_Inter5 (on the right).
An image posted by @AFIntlBrk, the real Afghanistan International Twitter account (on the left) and an image posted by @AF_Inter5 (on the right). © Afghan Witness

>> Read more on The Observers: How to investigate a Twitter account or suspicious tweets

According to the Account Analysis tool, which allows you to see statistics about a Twitter account’s posting patterns, @AF_Inter5 tends to post between 6:30am and 8:30pm Afghanistan time – certainly not a 24/7 outlet as it claims.

A comparison of the posting behaviours for the fake Afghan International account (above) and the real account (below), which posts 24/7. All times indicated are in GMT+1.
A comparison of the posting behaviours for the fake Afghan International account (above) and the real account (below), which posts 24/7. All times indicated are in GMT+1. © Observers

All of @AF_Inter5’s posts were posted on Twitter for Android, which could point to it being run by an individual or group of individuals who are supportive of the Taliban. In contrast, the real Afghan International account posts from Twitter’s web client, Tweetdeck, and several social media clients – more typical of a newsroom social media outlet managed by several staff members. 

Contacted by the FRANCE 24 Observers team, the media outlet Afghanistan International confirmed that they are not at all affiliated with the @AF_Inter5 account and “have been trying to take it down for some time without much luck”.

‘The Taliban are trying to change the media environment in Afghanistan into a Taliban promotion machine’

Stubbs says the Afghan Witness has no indication that those posting on @AF_Inter5 are part of the Taliban. Nonetheless, the account typifies several important aspects of the Taliban’s online propaganda campaign.

We’re seeing that the Taliban are labelling Afghanistan International as fake news when they publish stories that criticise the Taliban. And they are incredibly quick to jump on news stories that they feel are unfair. And so having these fake accounts really chimes into the wider information operation that the Taliban is trying to create – they’re trying to erode trust away from independent news sources.

The information environment within the country is being eroded at such a massive rate. The official news sources that people can trust are diminishing. So it just means that there’s going to be one less source that people can look for. The Taliban are trying to change the media environment in Afghanistan into a Taliban promotion machine rather than a free and independent media, as was prior to August 2021. What we’re seeing is effectively a revolutionary movement trying to rapidly erode a free media environment in a way that’s never really done in the world before. Quite often restrictions on the press are gradual, but what the Taliban are doing is incredibly rapid.

Online propaganda operations are nothing new for the Taliban, and many believe they were key to helping the group regain control of the Afghan territory. 



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Taliban suppression of women’s rights may impact international financial support: EU Special Envoy on Afghanistan

India and the EU need to speak up together about human rights in Afghanistan says the European Union’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan Tomas Niklasson, who visited Delhi for consultations on the way forward.

In an interview to The Hindu, Mr. Niklasson said the Taliban’s increased restrictions on women and the ban on girl’s education is of particular concern for the EU, and may change its policy on engagement and assistance to the regime in Kabul, but that supporting armed opposition groups like the National Resistance Force (NRF) is not on the table at present.

How would you describe the situation in Afghanistan more than 18 months after the Taliban took over?


Afghanistan is going through a very difficult period. According to the U.N., about 28 million people are dependent on humanitarian assistance to survive, and 6 million are in danger of starvation. We see virtually no investment in the country, no assistance going to the Taliban or going into the state budget, as we saw before. The central bank has its reserves frozen abroad. And there is a de facto government in place that, to a large extent, lacks the experience of running a country. On top of the governance challenges, the Taliban are taking decisions that prevent Afghans from contributing to economic growth. They prevent women from working, they disinvest in the future of the country by not allowing girls to go to school or to study at university. It’s a grim picture and Afghanistan is overall at a worse place today than last winter.

Has the Taliban’s reversal on women’s education and rights changed the view of the international community towards engaging the regime?


We could have managed to build a more constructive relationship with Taliban, or helped stabilise the Afghan economy if we would have seen any progress being made towards development and upholding of human rights. If we had seen, for example, secondary schools opening for girls in March last year, or the Taliban taking positive steps towards opening a political dialogue on specific issues, taking a less harsh position on journalists and being more successful in implementing their so-called amnesty for officials from the previous government, if they had taken steps towards either recognising the Constitution in place, or proposing a new one, and implementing rule of law. But the fact is, they have not, and we cannot be seen as helping to prop up an increasingly repressive regime.

There will be a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Brussels on February 20, the first occasion when our Ministers will talk about Afghanistan substantially in this format since September 2021. I think the question about whether we should give any assistance beyond humanitarian will be on the table. I expect that some member states would also like to have a discussion on possible human rights sanctions. I think there may also be a discussion on the strengthening of what we call accountability mechanisms for human rights. Examples would be the mandate of UNAMA, which monitors the human rights situation and reports on it. Special Rapporteur Richard Bennett has a specific mandate to look into the human rights situation in Afghanistan, and the International Criminal Court is ready to also look into acts of human rights violations or suspected acts of human rights violations, primarily by the Taliban and ISIS-KP.

Where do you see India’s role today where it has a technical mission in Kabul, and is talking to the Taliban?


India has all this investment, not just financially, but culturally, the goodwill that was there in Afghanistan, strong and positive emotions toward India, and what India did, in terms of development projects throughout the country. India was the biggest regional donor, Afghanistan was the biggest recipient of Indian development assistance. There’s a need to keep that up somehow. But doing so in the current context is becoming increasingly political challenging due to the actions taken by the Taliban and some decisions not taken.

India has taken a similar position as the EU, by establishing limited presence in Kabul and saying we don’t want to close doors on engaging the regime, while not recognising it, of course. And we don’t want to sit back in Brussels and Delhi and tell ourselves that we don’t want to close doors. We actually want to be there to have a dialogue with Afghan entrepreneurs, with journalists, with civil society, with Afghan women, with Taliban, as needed. Because if we are not there, others remain. And I don’t mean to portray this as a power game, or game of influence. There are security risks. And we have seen over the last six months, attacks against two diplomatic missions, attacks against Chinese citizens and attacks against two Ministries in Kabul in high-security zones. So, deciding to be present in Kabul is not only politically risky, but also challenging from a security point of view.

During your visit here, is there something you are asking India to do?


India and the EU share and uphold common principles and values such as human rights, including women’s rights, democracy, and inclusive government. The European Union is often quite outspoken in public diplomacy and making statements to explain our positions and our expectations. India takes a different approach, I think, when it comes to public diplomacy. But it is essential we work together to defend our shared principles and values.

India has also denied most visas for Afghans, including students and medical patients since August 2021. Are you discussing that?


I would like to understand better what the Indian position is, and I would like to get the facts right as well. I don’t come with an agenda. These are issues that people have mentioned to me before I was coming here. And these are issues that also some of our Indian counterparts have raised with me, but as I said, my first point would be to have a better overview of the situation.

When it comes to alternatives to Taliban, what is the EU’s position on supporting the political opposition, or armed groups like Ahmed Massoud-led NRF?


For the EU, supporting armed groups, or military interventions is simply not on the table. I think any power considering doing so should consider the many risks: Supporting the wrong people, or the armed resistance not succeeding, or tainting any attempted armed resistance by making them be seen as supported from abroad. And if one actor would extend financial or political support to any specific group, other countries would most likely support other groups, and we would risk seeing again a spiral of violence inside the country.

Currently among Afghans abroad, most groups presenting themselves publicly as political alternatives seem to consist mainly of former ministers, politicians, ambassadors, and in some cases also Afghans referred to as warlords. We see a number of groups, formulating positions, who have approached the EU to organise platform meeting points for them.

So far, we are very cautious for a number of reasons. First, the international community collectively has a bad track record when it comes to proposing future leaders of Afghanistan. Secondly, these Afghans outside the country have resources, skills and contacts, and they should have these conversations amongst themselves. We are happy to come to listen, we are happy to engage in a dialogue, as long as armed resistance is not on the table. But we also see the risk that if any group were to be seen as set up, facilitated, pushed by us, it would be counterproductive. The truth is that many Afghans feel betrayed by those who left the country, especially the regime. Many don’t trust them, consider them part of a largely corrupt setup, see them as having ran away, and that they benefited from something which most Afghans didn’t. And that creates this trust gap that they will have to overcome. But regardless of that, and first of all, I would say that in the medium to long-term change will have to come from within Afghanistan.

In the Doha agreement, the Taliban had committed to not allowing foreign terror groups in Afghanistan. Is that promise being kept at all?


First of all, we have less intelligence, less information as the [NATO/US] troops are no longer there. Journalists cannot work freely the way they could. And there are fewer journalists present in the country. Many countries have closed embassies. Last summer, the leader of al Qaeda was killed in a building owned or controlled by senior Taliban members. And that is a clear indication that the Taliban have not delivered on one of their commitments in the Doha agreement.

We see an increasing number of attacks claimed by ISIS-KP against diplomatic missions, and their numbers are rising too. Each neighbouring country has at least one group they are worried about — IMU for Uzbekistan, ETIM for China, TTP for Pakistan and LeT and JeM for India, and none of the neighbours seems convinced that the Taliban are fully capable or fully willing to guarantee their security. Perhaps even though they have issues with each other, neighbouring countries will seek collective solutions, at least in terms of intelligence sharing among themselves.

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