With ECOWAS exit, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger leave democratic transition in limbo

The announcement that Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso will withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) “without delay” has put an abrupt end to fractious talks on organising elections and reinstating civilian rule. With their emphasis on restoring “national sovereignty” and driving out terrorist groups, the three West African countries’ military governments have made it clear that organising elections is not their primary concern.   

Since successive coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been trying to get the countries’ military leaders to commit to holding elections to reinstate civilian governments.  

Despite the heavy sanctions imposed, fractious negotiations between the three West African countries and ECOWAS have failed to produce tangible results. In their joint withdrawal announcement on January 28, the interim leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger criticised the West African regional organisation for its lack of support in the fight against terrorism and for adopting “illegal, illegitimate and inhumane” punitive measures. Their exit marks the end of negotiations regarding each country’s electoral timetable, which the military governments had shown little inclination to put in place. 

In Mali, the first country to be affected by the wave of coups that has spread across West Africa in recent years, talks initiated by ECOWAS on the duration of the transition period have seen many twists and turns. Following the August 2020 coup that toppled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, ECOWAS imposed an economic embargo, closing its borders with the country while maintaining deliveries of essential goods. The military then installed a civilian government committed to holding elections within two years, scheduled for February 27, 2022. However, a second putsch in May 2021 shattered this promise. 

Speaking to FRANCE 24 months after the second coup, Mali’s Prime Minister Choguel Maiga described the February 2022 deadline as unrealistic. “It is better to have a few more weeks, even a few more months” than to have another post-electoral crisis, like the one that led to the fall of President Keïta, he said.   

Since then, the length of the transition period has changed several times. At the end of December 2021, following a “national consultation”, Mali’s interim President Assimi Goïta proposed extending it by five years. This was later reduced to two years under pressure from ECOWAS. Before announcing their withdrawal from the West African regional organisation, the Malian authorities had again postponed the presidential election, scheduled for February 4, 2024, for “technical reasons”, without giving a new date. 

Prioritising fight against terrorism  

The electoral timetable established for Burkina Faso has also been consigned to oblivion. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who overthrew President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré in January 2022, had pledged to hold elections in July 2024 until he himself was overthrown by the young Captain Ibrahim Traoré in September 2022. Traoré initially said that he wanted to respect this timetable, but then changed his mind. “It’s not a priority, I’ll tell you that clearly, security is the priority,” he said, when asked about holding elections a year later.  

In Niger, which has been less affected by terrorist attacks by groups linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group, coup leaders have also justified their actions by citing the “deteriorating security situation”

Read moreNiger coup brings France’s complicated relationship with its former colonies into the spotlight

Following the July 2023 coup, ECOWAS once again entered into negotiations with a military junta to establish an electoral timetable. It threatened the new leaders with military intervention in order to re-establish constitutional order, but failed to bring them to heel.   

“These military regimes’ approach, which consists of prioritising the fight against terrorism over the question of democracy, effectively puts the return to constitutional order at risk, because no one knows when security will return,” said Abba Seidik, a journalist specialising in the Sahel. “It’s true that the situation in Burkina Faso is particularly difficult, but what about in Mali, where the authorities have regained control of Kidal [a town in northern Mali]? Or Niger, where it was possible to hold a presidential election at the end of 2020? Not all situations are identical. Although elections may not have been the primary reason why the three countries withdrew from ECOWAS, it is worth mentioning that [their exit from the group] removes any possibility of applying pressure in this area.” 

Military populism 

The three countries’ decision to leave ECOWAS is further evidence of the regional organisation’s failure to negotiate a return to civilian rule, said Thierry Vircoulon, a Sub-Saharan Africa expert at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI). 

“The commitments by Mali and Burkina Faso’s military governments to hold elections were part of a dialogue with ECOWAS that had already failed,” said Vircoulon. “The elections were already doomed and leaving ECOWAS is just the latest proof of this. These countries practise a form of populist militarism; they have no intention of facing up to election results and are organising popular mobilisations to legitimise themselves.” 

“Regional partners and the international community continue to press them to hold elections – as does a silent segment of their population, which we should not forget,” said Seidik. “But these people are living in a society where freedom of expression has been considerably curtailed. In Mali, critical positions expose people to online lynching campaigns, and it is even worse in Burkina Faso, where we have seen that people can be arrested for criticising the authorities.” 

In Mali’s capital Bamako, very few people spoke out against the decision to leave ECOWAS. The February 20 Coalition (Appel du 20 février), which includes opposition political parties and civil society movements critical of the transitional authorities, issued a press release, denouncing a decision “taken without any form of democratic debate”.  

Meanwhile, the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – united under the banner of the Alliance of Sahel States, a mutual defence pact established in September 2023 –organised “large mobilisations of support” on February 1 to celebrate a “courageous and historic” decision. 

In an interview with former RFI journalist Alain Foka shortly after the ECOWAS exit, Burkina Faso’s interim leader Traoré declined to commit to an election timetable. “There must be a minimum of security so that, if there is an electoral campaign, people can go anywhere in Burkina Faso to explain their ideas,” he said, before touting the army’s accomplishments. “You have to know how to awaken patriotism in a people, to give them confidence, to know that their homeland is the only thing they have left,” he added. “That’s what we’ve managed to do.”

This article has been translated from the original in French

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France’s undocumented migrants face uncertain future under new immigration law

Despite facing serious labour shortages, the French government passed a more restrictive immigration bill this week after watering down measures that would have streamlined the legalisation of foreign workers. But some of the law’s new provisions may still offer a glimmer of hope for the country’s hundreds of thousands of undocumented migrants. 

Until it became unstuck, the sticking point – as far as France’s right wing was concerned – for the Macron government’s sweeping immigration bill was how to deal with the country’s undocumented migrants.

In presenting the bill’s initial text a year ago, Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin and Labour Minister Olivier Dussopt included provisions making it easier to legalise undocumented migrants working in sectors with labour shortages. But representatives from Marine Le Pen‘s far-right National Rally party repeatedly stated they would not endorse legislation granting undocumented workers legal status. 

After the language of the bill was significantly weakened in a joint committee, Le Pen saw an opening for a strategic victory and changed course; it passed the National Assembly (lower house) on Tuesday with Le Pen’s endorsement.

While it does not go as far as the original text, the new law gives undocumented workers in high-demand occupations a path to obtaining residency permits. Speaking a day after the law was passed, Darmanin said he expects the number of legalisations (régularisations) to double, with “ten thousand additional foreign workers each year“.

At the same time, the law will make it more difficult – and more risky – for undocumented workers in France: a law abolished by former president François Hollande that allowed police to fine foreigners up to €3,750 if they are found to be in the country unlawfully has been reintroduced. The bill also steps up sanctions against companies employing illegal workers.

Sans papiers

The number of undocumented workers, or what the French call the “sans papiers” (without papers), is impossible to calculate. Darmanin himself estimates the number to be between 600,000 and 900,000.

Amadou* moved to France from Mali on a work visa in 2001 (overstaying a legal visa is the most common path to becoming an undocumented migrant in Europe).

Finding work has never been a problem. He has primarily worked in the hospitality sector and in retirement homes – he currently works at a restaurant in Paris’s 7th arrondissement (district). “I’ve been working in France for 19 years without a holiday, without any sick days or absences,” he says.

Amadou first applied for working papers – to no avail – in 2012. The second time he applied, in 2018, he was denied because he didn’t have children or a partner to support. Since then, despite help from his employer, he has been unable to get another meeting.

Amadou belongs to an association that supports undocumented migrants in Montreuil, a suburb just east of Paris. He often participates in protests but realises he and people like him are largely powerless. “I’d like to get my papers but, considering it’s [the politicians] who decide, we are not their priority,” he says.

France’s right-wing Les Republicains party and the far-right National Rally are reluctant to endorse a path towards legalisation because they believe migrants choose France for its advantageous social system. Therefore, the logic goes, making life difficult for migrants will prevent more migrants from coming – an idea that has no grounding in research.

Read moreMacron accused of doing far-right’s bidding with stricter immigration law

By contrast, studies have found that legalising migrants has positive macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes in developed countries.

Citing research from the Institute of Labour Economics, French economist Pierre Cahuc argued for the significant advantages that legalisation can have on a country’s economy in the French financial daily Les Echos.

“It is a crucial factor to take into account in the context of low growth and an ageing population,” Cahuc said. “From a purely fiscal standpoint, legalisation could also have a positive impact since declared work generates income for the state coffers.”

Violaine Carrère, a lawyer at Gisti, an immigrant information and support group, agrees. “When you are on a payroll, you pay into social security. And with a real salary, you can spend more.” 

Not only does it benefit the economy, Carrère says, becoming legal enables migrants “to integrate fully and lead a dignified life”.

“Staying stuck, working all the time – it’s not a life that many people would want to live,” says Amadou.

“Everyone wants to be happy, have a good life, a roof and a family. If you’re a sans papier it’s all out of reach.”

Labour shortages

Under French President Emmanuel Macron, unemployment has fallen to 7.4% of the workforce, the lowest level in more than a decade. He has pledged to continue this mission, pushing for full employment (which the country’s labour organisation considers to be 5%).

At the same time, eight out of 10 professions in France saw labour shortages in 2022, according to the Directorate for Research, Studies and Statistics (Direction de l’Animation de la recherche, des Études et des Statistiques). This increased from seven out of 10 in 2021 due to France’s ageing population and a wave of resignations.

Targeting low domestic unemployment rates while seeking a concurrent increase in migrant labour might seem contradictory. But it is simply not possible to make up for France’s worker shortfalls with a supply of domestic labour that is mostly young – some 17% of French youth are unemployed, significantly higher than the EU average. 

Research is focusing on three central reasons for this, says migration policy analyst Anna Piccinni. The first and second are skill disparities and remuneration: much of the increasingly qualified youth are not motivated by low-skilled jobs, especially if the salary level is not what they expect.

Piccinni’s third reason is that labour shortages are often localised and migrants offer a more mobile labour force – filling the gaps that non-migrant workers might be unable or unwilling to fill. “Often, shortages of low-skilled labour are not in urban areas, where the youth move for their studies and then stick around for jobs,” she says. “Migrants have the potential to fill these gaps.”

Indeed, she points out that many municipalities across Europe are now creating incentives to retain migrant populations – such as Altena, a small town in Germany known for its successful integration scheme.

This point has not been lost on France’s business community. Speaking to Radio Classique in the lead-up to Tuesday’s vote, Patrick Martin, who heads the French entrepreneurs’ union, said relying on a foreign labour force is necessary for the country.

“We are already experiencing enormous recruitment pressure,” Martin said. “We have to call a spade a spade and make a choice” to allow a larger immigrant workforce.

For Piccinni, this cannot be achieved without fewer bureaucratic hurdles for issuing work permits to migrants who have already demonstrated a commitment to participating in the economy. “This has to be part of the solution,” she says.

Even the most anti-immigration governments in Europe are doing this, she points out. Georgia Meloni’s government in Italy signed a decree in March allowing 82,000 non-EU migrant workers to work in the country because of seasonal labour shortages.

“Beyond the perception of migration as a threat to social cohesion and security, some governments are aware and willing to recognise the role it has in [fulfilling] employers’ needs,” Piccinni says.

* Not his real name

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Notorious Russian general, master spy duo organise in Africa after Prigozhin’s demise

In recent weeks, Russia’s Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and General Andrei Averyanov from the GRU military intelligence agency have made several trips to Africa. The two are increasingly seen as the main organisers of the post-Prigozhin era of Russian relationships with Africa following the Wagner Group chief’s demise in a fiery plane crash at the end of August. 

Yunus-bek Yevkurov, Russia‘s Deputy Defence Minister, and Andrei Averyanov, a notorious general from the GRU military intelligence agency, touched down in Bamako, Mali, on Saturday, September 16.  They were slated to meet political leaders from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, according to local media and various sources on Telegram.

This was not the first of the duo’s visits to Africa. They have made several visits to the continent since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23, 2023… and even prior to that. Yevkurov, always flanked by Averyanov, was in Libya – one of the main African bases for Wagner’s mercenaries – the day before the plane crash back in Russia which killed the Wagner Group chief, as well as two others from the organisation’s top leadership who could have replaced him. 

Yevkurov, the negotiator

The meeting in Mali was not coincidental: Yevkurov and Averyanov were scheduled to hold talks with representatives of the countries Prigozhin had last visited. Riley Moeder, an Africa specialist studying the role of Wagner’s mercenaries on the continent at the New Lines Institute, an American geopolitical research center, holds that Russia is playing on a sense of continuity: “Prigozhin was filmed in that region before his plane crashed, and this region is looking for support. So Moscow wants to assure them that it remains committed to that region,” she says.

The Russian deputy defence minister had already visited Mali and Burkina Faso in the first week of September to assure local authorities that Moscow would “do everything in its power to help” them, The New York Times reported in an investigation into the future of Wagner’s African “empire” published on September 8.

Yevkurov and Averyanov would therefore appear to African leaders to be the successors to the late Wagner boss. What’s more, as The New York Times reports in the same investigation, they also met with some of the remaining Wagner mercenaries in Mali. Several media outlets have already presented the GRU’s Averyanov as “Prigozhin’s successor” in Africa.

Indeed, the profiles of both men correspond to some of the roles hitherto played by Wagner’s former leader.

For example, Deputy Defence Minister Yevkurov is a decorated general with “quite a good military reputation”, says Ivan Klyszcz, a specialist in Russian foreign policy at the International Centre for Defence and Security in Estonia. That may be enough to inspire respect among the Wagner mercenaries.

Yevkurov also has a solid reputation as a peacemaker and negotiator from his time spent in Ingushetia, an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation located in the Greater Caucasus mountain range. He led this Russian republic from 2008 to 2019, at a time when the region “was more violent than Chechnya“, says Klyszcz, who has focussed on this part of Russia. “The region was almost as safe as everywhere else in Russia when he left.”

For the Kremlin, Yevkurov has a certain diplomatic finesse that is perfectly suited for being “the new face of relations between the Russian government when dealing with these African regimes”, says Andreas Heinemann-Gruder, a Russia specialist who studies private paramilitary groups at the University of Bonn.

Averyanov and the GRU assassins

Diplomatic finesse is arguably not Averyanov’s strong suit. General Averyanov is best known for having led the GRU’s infamous 29155 unit, which specialises in covert operations like sabotage and assassination. Spies from this unit are suspected of having blown up an ammunition depot in the Czech Republic in 2014, attempting to stage a pro-Serbian coup in Montenegro in 2016 and the attempted poisoning of former double agent Sergei Skripal in 2018. 

Read moreUnit 29155, the Russian spies specialising in ‘sabotage and assassinations’

In other words, “[Averyanov’s] qualification is preparing special operations abroad. He is the ‘hit and kill guy’ you call when you need this kind of service,” says Heinemann-Gruder.

What’s in it for African regimes? “Averyanov can … take over some elements of regime security, and not only bodyguard services, but also in [his] area of specialisation: repression and targeted assassination,” adds Klyszcz.

But Averyanov is more than a cold-blooded killer. “Averyanov is a decorated veteran from Afghanistan and Chechnya and was also active in Moldova and Crimea. As with all Russian special operatives, he is trained to take the initiative, operate cut off from superiors’ orders, and make links with local allies,” says Jeff Hawn, Russia specialist and an external consultant for the New Lines Institute. This pedigree makes him an ideal candidate to negotiate with local military groups, just as Wagner’s managers would do when arriving in a new country in Africa.  

Yevkurov, the shrewd politician, and Averyanov, the master spy, thus appear to be as different as they are complementary. However, they both have one quality in common setting them apart from the late Yevgeny Prigozhin: “They’re both reliable, loyal soldiers who are not the type of personality which could be expected to ‘go rogue’,” says Hawn. 

“Loyalty is a very powerful advantage in the Putin system right now,” says Klyszcz. This would be especially the case for anyone aspiring to take over for Prigozhin, who, after his abortive rebellion attempt against the Russian defence ministry in June, came to epitomise treachery in the eyes of the Russian leadership.

More openly official support

Is all of this enough for the Kremlin to hand the keys to Wagner’s kingdom in Africa to the duo? According to the experts interviewed by FRANCE 24, they will play a role, but not as sole operators. Yevkurov and Averyanov embody, as representatives of the Russian state, a move from the semi-clandestine operations and relations carried out by Wagner to more open relations with the African regimes in place. “It’s no longer hybrid warfare but official support. They show that communication is continuing with Russia, but now through official channels,” says Heinemann-Gruder. 

But this does not mean that the structures set up by Wagner will simply be absorbed by the Russian ministry of defence. Wagner’s very decentralised model is still useful to Moscow, because “it’s easier to adapt to local situations. What is happening in Mali is not what is happening in the Central African Republic,” says Moeder. The situation in Mali, with its imperative to fight terrorism, has little in common with the nature of operations in the Central African Republic, where Wagner’s main aim is to secure lucrative mining activities. Wagner also runs propaganda operations in several countries and even manages a brewery and vodka distillery in the Central African Republic.

Such diverse activities and hybrid warfare, wherein conventional tactics are blended with subversive actions,  “require greater dexterity than the Russian security bureaucracy is likely capable of”, writes Joseph Siegle, Director of the Center for African Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, in an article published on The Conversation.

Finally, it will still be useful to let the mercenaries carry out certain actions to be able to continue denying official involvement on the part of Moscow in the event of exactions or reprisals in a country.

Yevkurov and Averyanov are thus an important part of the first stage of the reorganisation of Russian operations in Africa. “The Russians are beginning to learn some lessons from past experience with Wagner and other PMCs (private military companies). We can expect less autonomy and clear political leadership,” says Heinemann-Gruder.

And if Moscow’s progress in taking control of operations is rather slow, it’s also because the Wagner Group also has well-entrenched financial interests in Africa. “There is a web of [Russian] oligarchs and businessmen who benefitted from Prigozhin’s businesses and shell companies, and who have everything to gain from the system remaining,” says Moeder. Moscow’s interests therefore also lie in making sure that everyone involved in Wagner’s African operations continues to benefit. 

This article was translated from the original in French. 

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Explained | Does the coup in Niger point to a wider pattern in the Sahel?

The story so far: Amping up pressure on Niger’s mutinous military junta on Saturday, July 29, the African Union demanded the country’s military “return to their barracks and restore constitutional authority” within 15 days. The European Union also announced the suspension of security and funding cooperation with Niger, declaring that the 27-country bloc would not recognise the putschists who have confined the democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum to his official residence since Wednesday.

On Friday, leader of the coup General Abdourahamane Tchiani, the Presidential Guard since 2011, appeared on state television to declare himself the new leader of the troubled West African country. This is the seventh coup in western and central Africa since 2020, including two each witnessed by Niger’s neighbours Burkina Faso and Mali.

A snapshot of Niger’s political history

Niger is a vast, arid country in West Africa, twice the size of France. Having a population of about 25 million, the largely-agrarian country is one of the poorest in the world and has ranked low on the Human Development Index over the decades, vulnerable to the extreme weather effects of climate change which threatens food security. Niger, however, also has gold mining reserves and 5-7% of the global production of uranium.


Also read: Explained: The coups in West Africa and the regional response

It was a French colony until 1960, like many of its neighbours. It faced a long period of instability post-independence and was rocked by four military coups between 1974 and 2010. Like other countries in the wider Sahel region, the African region separating the Sahara Desert in the north from the tropics to the south, Niger has also faced the rise of Islamist extremist groups, armed local militias supported by stretched state security forces to counter the jihadist threat, and the resulting violence and displacement.

Mahamadou Issoufou came to power in 2011, winning legislative elections. Under his two-term presidental rule, Niger saw a semblance of political stability. In 2021, when Mr. Issoufou agreed to step down after completing his second term, the maximum number of successive terms allowed to a leader, his Cabinet Minister Mr. Bazoum was elected President, in the first democratic transfer of power since the country’s independence.

What is happening now?

On Wednesday, July 26, the President, Mr. Bazoum, and his family were detained by elite troops in Niger, who declared that they now held power. While the President, who has not resigned, has since been confined to his official residence by the military, a group of soldiers appeared on national TV on Thursday, declaring that they had overthrown Niger’s government. Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane said “all institutions” in the country would be suspended, borders closed and a curfew imposed.

He explained the rationale behind the military takeover, citing a “continued deterioration of the security situation” and “poor economic and social governance.” Armed forces chief General Abdou Sidikou Issa threw his weight behind the putschists saying it was “to avoid a deadly confrontation.”

Putting prevailing confusion to rest, General Tchiani said in a television address on Friday that the nation would now be run by a newly formed military body, the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP). “The President of the CNSP is the head of state,” an officer said, reading out a statement. General Tchiani presented the coup as a response to “the degradation of the security situation” linked to jihadist bloodshed.


Also Read: Coup in Niger: On the ouster of President Mohamed Bazoum

Meanwhile, Mr. Bazaoum has not made a statement since Thursday morning, when he vowed to protect “hard-won” democratic gains in a post on social media. Western allies and international organisations have stood by Mr. Bazoum, saying that they did not recognise the coup-plotters as the leaders of Niger.

Does the coup bid follow a pattern in the wider Sahel region?

The Sahel region is made up of six Francophone countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal,— collectively home to more than one hundred million people. After independence from the French, these countries have faced long periods of political instability, economic and ethnic strife, violence over control of natural resources and the adverse impacts of climate change.

The multifold issues of weak governments, often composed of elites of certain ethnic communities, engaging frequently in corruption and unable to register economic and social progress, led to military takeovers of elected regimes under the pretext of restoring stability. Ethnic clashes and rebellions led stretched militaries to support local civilian militias to counter conflict, which in turn led to widespread violence and human rights violations.

A report in the BBC quoted research by Central Florida and Kentucky Universities to state that coup attempts in Africa “remained remarkably consistent at an average of around four a year between 1960 and 2000.” While the number of coup d’états in the larger African continent and the Sahel were high till the turn of the millennium, a decline was witnessed in the 2000s, followed by an upswing since 2020.


Also read: Terror in the Sahel: On growing Islamist violence in Africa

A renewed chapter of instability began in in 2012 when the then fairly dormant rebellion of the Tuareg people, which had taken place in the 1960s, 1990, and 2006 in northern Mali, resurfaced and spilled beyond the country’s borders. The crisis was compounded by the collapse of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in bordering Libya, which caused an influx of extremists and arms into the Sahel.The rebel groups, who demand a separate state for the Tuaregs— a mere 10% of the Malian population—organised and aligned themselves with multiple Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This led to violent Islamist groups gaining ground in the tri-border region between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, controlling territory and conducting attacks.

Former colonial actor France stepped in with military support for local armed forces in the Sahel to prevent the resurgence of non-state armed groups across the region. Around 4,500 French personnel were deployed with the local joint counter-terrorism force. First, a French-led Operation, titled Operation Serval, started in 2013, targeting Islamic extremists linked to al-Qaeda who took control of northern Mali. However, in 2014, the mission was scaled up, renamed Operation Barkhane, and aimed at countering terrorism in the wider region.

While Operation Serval was seen as fairly successful, as France regained Mali’s northern regions from the extremists in 2014, Barkhane saw the growth of new groups affiliated to terrorist organisations, including the Islamic State.The period also saw widespread human rights violations by security forces and increased recruiting to fight the crisis.

The situation also resulted in several military takeovers, justified by the militaryciting the inability of civilian governments to ensure economic stability and national security against extremists. The coup plotters also capitalised on the anti-French sentiment in sections of the populace, and gained some popular support for ousting leaders seen as pro-Western.

Have military takeovers lessened the violence in the Sahel?

There’s no concrete evidence that military takeovers restore stability and bring down violence. The crisis monitoring group, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), points out that successive military coups in the recent past have caused regional instability and the weakening of state institutions. It recorded that in 2022, the number of reported deaths from political violence increased by 77% in Burkina Faso and 150% in Mali from 2021.

The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) points out that some coups have become a means of grabbing power by politicised security elites on the pretext of restoring security and order. “Many of these recent military coups have been led by colonels commanding presidential guards or special forces units rather than military leaders at the top of the chain of command,” it notes. “These elite units are often provided specialised training, equipment, and salaries to enhance their capacity. Over time, some of these units have become politicised and accustomed to their privileged space near the centre of power.”

This trend is evident in the fact that even though Niger was seen as managing insurgencies and extremism better than its neighbours Mali and Burkina Faso, the Nigerien putschists also cited the worsening security situation as a reason for their uprising.

In fact, the ACSS states that under the last decade of democratically elected regimes in Niger, the country saw economic progress and an increase in public accountability. The United Kingdom think tank Chatham House also points out that Niger became a better example in the region when it came to improving ethnic inclusivity in governance and dealing with insurgents. 

Why is the West concerned about NIger’s coup affecting security in the Sahel?

Niger, owing to its relative stability, had become a democratic outlier in the Sahel following military takeovers in neighbouring Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad since 2020. After military coups and anti-French sentiment, France’s relations with the military rulers grew hostile in Mali and Burkina Faso. Mali last year expelled the French ambassador when he disagreed with the junta’s decision to remain in power until 2025, and Burkina Faso’s military government also announced its decision to end its military agreement with France and called on Paris to withdraw its troops within a month. France shifted more than 1,000 personnel to Niger after withdrawing from Mali last year. In such a situation, the landlocked Niger was viewed by analysts as the West’s “only hope” in the region to fight the militants.

The country also played an outsized role in America’s Africa strategy and became a key partner for Washington’s fight against Islamist insurgents, who have killed thousands of people and displaced millions more. U.S. military personnel have been training local forces to fight militant groups.

Western countries poured resources into Niger to bolster its security forces in the face of a growing insurgency linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State. The U.S. says it has invested about $500 million since 2012 to help Niger boost its security. There are some 1,100 U.S. troops in Niger, where the U.S. military operates out of two bases. In 2017, the government of Niger approved the use of armed American drones to target militants.

Between 1,000 and 1,500 French troops are based in the country, with support from drones and warplanes. Their role is solely to support the Nigerien army when it identifies insurgent activity in the border regions connecting Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. The European Union also decided last year to set up a three-year military training mission in Niger, to which Germany contributes troops. Italy also has about 300 soldiers in the country.

Now, with Niger also falling into the hands of a military-led leadership, it is unclear whether the U.S and European countries would be able to impact security in the Sahel region through Niger. The U.S. has supported the ousted leader Mr. Bazoum, and said that a military takeover may cause it to “cease security and other cooperation with the government of Niger, jeopardizing existing security and non-security partnerships.”

How does Russia figure in the crisis?

Multiple pro-coup protestors in Niger this week were seen waving Russian flags in the protests outside the National Assembly, the country’s legislature. Notably, the anti-French sentiment in the Sahel has been seen as a reason for Russia making inroads into the region. Mercenaries from Russia’s private military Group Wagner are already active in Mali, from where the French have withdrawn troops after a decade. The country also asked the United Nations to withdraw its MINUSMA peacekeeping mission.

Burkina Faso is reportedly involved with the Wagner group to deal with surging jihadist violence. After officially announcing the end of the French operation in November 2022, Burkina Faso turned towards Moscow taking steps similar to Mali.

Incidentally, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin expressed his support for the putschist takeover of Niger. “What happened in Niger is the fight of its people against the colonizers. … It effectively means winning independence. The rest will depend on the people of Niger,” he said in a statement on Thursday.

Observers now fear that Niger will also open its doors to Russian influence through Wagner. Besides, Russia has also been accused by the West, particularly France, of spreading disinformation in Africa; France said last month that it found Russian-linked disinformation campaigns in the region targeting the French government.

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UN votes to end its peacekeeping mission in Mali after junta demands

The UN Security Council voted unanimously Friday to immediately end its peacekeeping mission in Mali as demanded by the country’s military junta, which has brought in mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group to help fight an Islamic insurgency.

Mali, a landlocked country in West Africa, has grappled with the insurgency for over a decade. It has seen its relations with the international community become strained in part because the ruling junta brought in the Wagner mercenaries. 

The mercenaries have also been engaged in Moscow’s war in Ukraine and were part of a short-lived mutiny against Russia’s military last week led by the Wagner group’s founder Yevgeny Prigozhin.

The French-drafted resolution, adopted by a 15-0 vote, terminates the mandate of the peacekeeping mission known as MINUSMA as of Friday. It orders the mission to start the withdrawal Saturday of more than 15,000 personnel, to be completed by the end of the year.

US deputy ambassador Jeffrey DeLaurentis expressed regret at the military government’s decision to abandon the UN mission. He also said that “some domestic actors” in Mali are calling for harassment of peacekeepers and urged the mission to ensure the safe and orderly transfer of UN facilities and equipment to UN-designated places.

“The UN has a responsibility to minimise the risk that its assets fall into the hands of those looking to destabilise Mali, or bring harm to its people, including violent extremist organizations and the Wagner Group,” he said.

British Ambassador Barbara Woodward expressed regret that Mali wanted the peacekeepers to leave at a time when the region is “facing increasing instability and humanitarian needs.”

“And we do not believe the partnership with the Wagner Group will deliver long-term stability or security for the Malian people,” she said.

Meanwhile, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby expressed deep concern at Wagner’s destabilising activities in Africa, especially Mali and Central African Republic.

He told reporters in Washington that US information indicates “the Malian transition government has paid over $200 million to Wagner since late 2021.” Despite the payments, he said, security hasn’t improved and terror attacks and violent crime have increased in central Mali.

Kirby also claimed that “Prighozin helped engineer” the speedy departure of UN peacekeepers “to further Wagner’s interests.”

“We know that senior Malian officials worked directly with Prighozin employees to inform the UN secretary-general that Mali had revoked consent for the MINUSMA mission,” he said.

Mali has struggled to contain an Islamic extremist insurgency since 2012. Extremist rebels were forced from power in the West African nation’s northern cities the following year, with the help of a French-led military operation. But they regrouped in the desert and began launching attacks on the Malian army and its allies.

The UN peacekeepers came in a few months later in what has become one of the most dangerous UN missions in the world. U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres paid tribute to the 309 MINUSMA personnel who lost their lives “in the service of peace during 10 years the mission was deployed in Mali,” his spokesman said.

Mali has been ruled by a military junta following two coups, starting in 2020, led by Col. Assimi Goita, who now runs the country.

The resolution welcomes Goita’s commitment to organising free and fair presidential elections in February 2024 and ensuring the return to constitutional order in the following months – commitments that DeLaurentis and other council members said the transitional government must keep.

The council’s decision to end the U.N. mission followed a demand by Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop to the Security Council on June 16 that the peacekeepers leave the country, claiming they failed in their mission to restore security. There is “a crisis of confidence between Malian authorities and MINUSMA,” he said.

Following Friday’s vote, Diop told national broadcaster ORTM that “”many Malians” had requested the withdrawal and called the peacekeeping mission “a threat to our country.”

He said it wasn’t a hasty decision but the result of the government’s desire to take charge of its own affairs and the strengthening of its military and security forces.

The United Nations needs the support of governments for its peacekeeping missions to operate.

Russia’s deputy UN ambassador Anna Evstigneeva told the council Moscow supports the transitional government’s “aspiration to take full responsibility and play the leading role in stabilizing the Malian state.” She said Russia will continue providing comprehensive bilateral support to Mali to normalize the situation in the country.

Mali’s UN ambassador, Issa Konfourou, told the council after the vote that while MINUSMA didn’t achieve its fundamental goal of supporting the government’s efforts to secure the country, the people and the government in Mali would “like to applaud its contribution in other areas,” especially humanitarian and social assistance.

Rida Lyammouri, the senior fellow at the Morocco-based Policy Center for the New South, said that while MINUSMA was not authorised to fight militants, it did provide protection to civilians from the jihadis.

Attacks are most likely to increase now in the areas where UN peacekeepers provided regular patrols since the Malian army remains underequipped to provide adequate protection,” Lyammouri said.

The UN mission also played a critical role in mediating between the Malian government and separatist Tuareg rebels. Ely Dicko, a sociologist at the University of Bamako, said that one of the consequences of the vacuum the peacekeepers will leave may be the resumption of hostilities between the government and the Tuareg rebels.

Daniel Forti, senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, said the withdrawal “is going to be a massive undertaking for the whole UN and for Mali” and both have a lot to lose if it isn’t done “in a consensual and united way.”

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African, international news outlets appeal for press freedom in Mali and Burkina Faso

FRANCE 24 and its sister radio RFI have joined a group of 30 African and international news organisations and monitors in an appeal for press freedom in Mali and Burkina Faso. The news outlets and rights groups call on the authorities of these two countries and the international community to put an end to the pressure and threats against national and foreign journalists. They urge the transitional governments in Mali and Burkina Faso to respect their countries’ international commitments to uphold freedom of expression, in particular the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The open letter, whose signatories include Jeune Afrique, Mali’s Joliba TV News and Burkina Faso’s L’Observateur Paalga, coincides with World Press Freedom Day on May 3. It is addressed to the Malian and Burkinabe authorities, as well as the wider international community.

The signatories voice their concern about threats to freedom of expression and the press amid increasing pressure and death threats targeting national and foreign journalists in both countries. “Measures taken by the authorities in Burkina Faso, especially in recent months, are liable to undermine the public’s fundamental right to be informed,” they write in the collective text. “Freedom begins where ignorance ends,” they add, recalling the recent arrests and imprisonment of journalists and opinion leaders in Mali.

>> Read more: Armed groups, juntas create dangers for journalists in Sahel

“In both Burkina Faso and Mali, these attacks are increasingly amplified on social media by ‘influencers’ who support the military regimes in these two countries, who play the role of dispensers of justice and issue death threats against journalists and opinion leaders they regard as overly independent,” reads the letter, signed by several press freedom watchdogs – such as the International Francophone Press Union (UPF) and the Union of West African Journalists (UJAO) – and rights advocacy groups including Human Rights Watch.

The “establishment of a regime of terror”, to quote L’Observateur Paalga, “is accompanied by a wave of fake news flooding social media with falsehoods”, the signatories add, noting that “the victims of these ‘influencers’ are the people of Mali and Burkina Faso, who are deprived of a democratic debate.”


 

Acknowledging the “complexity of the political, geopolitical and military context” in both counties, as well as their “crucial duty to inform the public”, the 30 signatories add: “The fight against terrorism must not in any way serve as a pretext for imposing a new reporting standard and restricting the fundamental rights of the Malian and Burkinabe public to seek and access news and information through professional and independent media.”

The open letter was drafted under the coordination of the Sub-Saharan Africa bureau of Reporters Without Borders (RSF).


Open letter on protecting journalists and defending freedom of expression and press freedom in Mali and Burkina Faso

For the attention of:

● The President of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union

● The President of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS

● The President of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of WAEMU

● The Chair of the African Union Commission

● The President of the ECOWAS Commission

● The President of the WAEMU Commission

● The President of the Pan-African Parliament

● The UN Secretary-General

● The President of the UN Human Rights Council

● The Director-General of UNESCO

● The Secretary-General of the OIF

● The heads of the media regulatory bodies of the 15 ECOWAS countries

● The President of the Francophone Network of Media Regulators

● The President of the Platform of Broadcasting Regulators of WAEMU member countries and Guinea

● The Ministers of Communication of the 15 ECOWAS member countries

● The Chair of the African Broadcasting Union

What with calls for journalists and opinion leaders to be murdered, threats and intimidation against the national press, grotesquely fabricated accusations against journalists, the suspension of local broadcasting by French international news outlets RFI and FRANCE 24, and the expulsion of reporters with the French newspapers Libération and Le Monde – the threats to freedom of expression and press freedom are very worrying in Burkina Faso. Measures taken by this country’s authorities, especially in recent months, are liable to undermine the public’s fundamental right to be informed. Freedom begins where ignorance ends.

Journalists and opinion leaders are increasingly subjected to harassment and intimidation in Mali as well. In November-December 2022, television network Joliba TV was suspended by the High Authority for Communication (HAC) after it broadcast an editorial deemed critical of the authorities. This year, the Maison de la Presse in Bamako was ransacked on February 20, while Mohamed Youssouf Bathily, a radio columnist better known by the pseudonym Ras Bath, was charged and imprisoned on March 13 for denouncing former Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga’s “assassination”. Rokia Doumbia, the influencer also known as “Rose vie chère”, was arrested on March 15 for referring to inflation and the transitional government’s “failure”. The journalist Aliou Touré was abducted by masked gunmen on April 6 and was not found until four days later.

Here too, the international press is far from being spared. In February 2022, a Jeune Afrique reporter was deported from Bamako. A month later, RFI and FRANCE 24 were silenced throughout Mali.

In both Burkina Faso and Mali, these attacks are increasingly amplified on social media by “influencers” who support the military regimes in these two countries, who play the role of dispensers of justice and issue death threats against journalists and opinion leaders they regard as overly independent. Lies are now being added to the violence. The “establishment of a regime of terror”, as Burkinabe daily L’Observateur Paalga wrote, is accompanied by a wave of fake news flooding social media with falsehoods. The victims of these “influencers” are the people of Mali and Burkina Faso, who are deprived of a democratic debate.

Amid what is a serious security crisis in both countries, journalists are all aware of their crucial duty to inform the public. They also understand the complexity of the political, geopolitical and military context. They also live and suffer the serious consequences of this security crisis. Like all citizens, they want a quick return to peace. However, the fight against terrorism must not in any way serve as a pretext for imposing a new reporting standard and restricting the fundamental rights of the Malian and Burkinabe public to seek and access news and information through professional and independent media.

In Burkina Faso, the situation of journalists has become so critical that even the entity in charge of regulation is alarmed. In a press release published on March 29, the Superior Council for Communication (CSC) said it “notes with regret the recurrence of threats against media outlets and media actors” and asked the authorities to “take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of the media and journalists in the course of their work.”

On April 6, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said he was “deeply troubled” by the restrictions on the media in Burkina Faso. “In this period of transition, protection of independent voices is more necessary than ever,” he added.

On February 20, Alioune Tine, the UN independent expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, said he was “extremely concerned about the restriction of civic space and freedom of expression and association” in Mali.

In the light of all these facts, we, the signatories of this open letter,

● Urge the authorities of Mali and Burkina Faso to put an end to all measures that undermine press freedom.

● Note a lack of protection by the security forces and silence from the judiciary in response to the intimidation campaigns and death threats against journalists in these two countries. While respecting the independence of justice, we call on prosecutors and police officers to respond more to such acts, which are punishable under criminal law.

● Call on the authorities of these two countries to guarantee the protection and safety of all media professionals who are the victims of threats, intimidation, harassment and physical attacks.

● Call on the authorities to carry out impartial, effective and independent investigations to shed light on abuses committed against journalists, and to identify and prosecute those responsible.

● Call on both governments to respect the international obligations signed and ratified by their countries regarding freedom of expression and press freedom, in particular the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

● Call on the national authorities and pan-African and international bodies to whom this open letter is addressed to support this initiative at the highest level. Access to news and information is a fundamental right of peoples. On World Press Freedom Day, it is essential to defend and protect it.

 

SIGNATORIES

1. AfrikaJom Center

2. Burkina Faso Journalists Association (AJB)

3. Association of Online Press Publishers and Professionals (APPEL Senegal)

4. Norbert Zongo Cell for Investigative Journalism (CENOZO)

5. Norbert Zongo National Press Centre (CNP-NZ Burkina Faso)

6. Courrier confidentiel (Burkina Faso)

7. Federation of African Journalists (FAJ)

8. International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)

9. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)

10. France 24 (France)

11. Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA)

12. Human Rights Watch (HRW)

13. International Press Institute (IPI)

14. Jeune Afrique (France)

15. Joliba TV News (Mali)

16. Le Pays (Burkina Faso)

17. Le Monde (Burkina Faso)

18. Lefaso.net (Burkina Faso)

19. Le Reporter (Burkina Faso)

20. L’Événement (Burkina Faso)

21. Libération (France)

22. L’Observateur Paalga (Burkina Faso)

23. Radio France Internationale (RFI)

24. Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

25. Burkina Faso Society of Privately-owned Press Publishers (SEP)

26. Omega Médias (Burkina Faso)

27. International Francophone Press Union (UPF)

28. Union of West African Journalists (UJAO)

29. 24heures.bf (Burkina Faso)

30. Wakat Sera (Burkina Faso)

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Xenophobia grows amidst raids and repeated attacks on sub-Saharan Africans in Tunisia

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Tunisian law enforcement has launched a wave of repression against the country’s sub-Saharan African population, carrying out random identity checks and sometimes violently arresting them, leaving their children abandoned and offering no access to any kind of legal support. Xenophobic and racist sentiments have also been circulating widely on Tunisian social media, a toxic climate that recent statements by the Tunisian president only exacerbated.

Tunisian police in a number of cities carried out a campaign against the migrant community, arresting and detaining around 300 people from sub-Saharan Africa, including women and children, between February 14 and 16. 

Police in a western suburb of Tunis arrested the staff working at a daycare run by an Ivorian couple… as well as a number of parents who had come to pick up their children on February 16. The adults were brought to the police station, apparently so that authorities could check their papers, according to the Tunis-based media outlet Radio Libre Francophone.

Some of the parents who were arrested managed to get their small children to friends or family. Other children were taken into the care of staff with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. However, many of the children were taken from their parents and placed into a foster centre in a Tunis suburb.





Fuel was added to the fire when Tunisian president Kaïs Saïed said that sub-Saharan migrants were “a source of crime and delinquency” during a meeting with the National Security Council on February 21. 

‘It’s really, really difficult to get a residency permit for Tunisia’

Melvin (not his real name) works with an association in Tunis. He says that it is difficult and costly to get a residency permit in Tunisia. 

No one wants to stay in the country illegally but it is very, very hard to get a residency permit in Tunisia [Editor’s note: because of complex administrative procedures, about 60% of interns and students from sub-Saharan Africa don’t have a valid residency permit].

I know a lot of students who don’t have residency permits, even if they go to expensive private universities that cost more than 3,000 euros a year.

When you arrive in Tunisia, you are allowed to stay in the country for three months. After that, you have to pay 80 dinars [about 24 euros] for each month that you stay beyond that. So many sub-Saharan migrants live in poverty. So how can they pay these fees, not to mention other expenses?

Most of the community expected [the president to make] calming statements but what was said was shocking. We were expecting him to announce mass regularisation for the migrant community, so they could go home [Editor’s note: undocumented migrants who want to leave Tunisia cannot do so without paying fines for overstaying their visas].

And so many migrants accumulate these penalties because they can’t get their residency permit. And so they prefer to try their luck crossing the Mediterranean. 

@birdmansacko ♬ son original – Birdman Sacko

This is a video of a Guinean migrant filmed at the port in Sfax, a city in Eastern Tunisia. The person filming says that he and his friend hope to arrive safe and sound in Italy or in France.

Police arrested about thirty people from sub-Saharan Africa in the northeastern peninsula of Cap Bon on February 20 as part of what the government has claimed is a national security campaign to verify the papers of people from this migrant community, according to radio Mosaïque FM. This wave of repression continued when, on the morning of February 22, 35 people suspected of irregular immigration status were arrested and detained in Kasserine.

Even though Tunisia is often considered as just a transitory stop on the migration route from Africa to Europe, about 21,466 people from sub-Saharan live there, according to the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics. However, many other groups, including NGOs who work with migrants, believe the number is actually much higher. 

‘We don’t have any news about the mothers. Did they go before a judge? Why were they arrested?’

Daoud (not his real name) is originally from sub-Saharan Africa, though we are keeping his name and his country of origin anonymous to protect his identity. He has been living in Sfax, the economic capital of Tunisia, for several years but has friends living in Tunis.

He was terrified when he heard that two of his female friends, who are related and both have small children, went out to get groceries on February 14 and never came back. Afraid, Daoud called another friend living in the same Tunis neighbourhood, only to get no response. 

Considering the sickening situation in Tunis and especially in the neighborhood where they were living, I wanted to make sure they were safe. I contacted dozens of people who might know where [my three friends] were. Finally, I talked to someone on the morning of February 15 who said that they had all been detained. The two women were taken to Raoued and detained there. Same for my friend, who was arrested in a café. 

The two women are both mothers with tiny children. When the mothers were arrested, their daughters, aged just one and two years old, were left at home alone, locked in the apartment where they were all living. It is inhumane to leave children like that.

A family from the Ivory Coast, including two mothers (wearing red), were arrested on February 14 and detained in Raoued, a Tunis suburb. Photo sent by our Observer, “Daoud”

When Daoud realized that the babies were home alone, locked in the flat, he did everything he could to save them, even though he was miles away. Along with assistance from the landlord, a friend managed to break a window and get into the flat.  

We went to the police station to plead for the mothers to be released but the Ariana tribunal said that the two women needed to pay their debts because both of them had irregular status. Finally, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees took over care of the baby girls. 

Right now, we still have no news of the mothers. Did they go before a judge? Why were they arrested?

There have been other cases where parents have had to get a lawyer in order to regain custody of children placed in detention. We’ve also heard of other children being placed in a foster centre without access to their parents. 

A number of Tunisian organisations published a joint statement, denouncing the campaign of abusive arrests as well as comments made by officials that they considered “dangerous and inciting hate towards migrants from sub-Saharan Africa”, as well as the random identity checks and lack of access to legal support. The associations also called on the authorities to release all of the people who had been arrested and put an end to these “systematic arbitrary arrests”. 

In this toxic climate perpetuated by the authorities, many members of the Tunisian public have felt emboldened to intimidate or even assault people from sub-Saharan Africa.  

This woman from sub-Saharan Africa was attacked and left with a bleeding injury to the head on February 14 in a neighbourhood in the town of Sfax. Associations of Ivorians in Tunisia said that she was attacked by the young men you see in this video.
This woman from sub-Saharan Africa was attacked and left with a bleeding injury to the head on February 14 in a neighbourhood in the town of Sfax. Associations of Ivorians in Tunisia said that she was attacked by the young men you see in this video. Screengrab/ Maghreb Ivoire TV

‘When police see someone is from sub-Saharan Africa, then that is enough for them to be arrested in the street or on public transport or even at work’

Daoud continued:

In the neighborhoods where people from sub-Saharan Africa live, there are often groups of young Tunisians who gather outside of the buildings where migrants live. I advised a young woman I know to move for her safety. 

When police see someone is from sub-Saharan Africa, then that is enough for them to be arrested in the street or on public transport or even at work.

In fact, it is almost impossible for people to even leave Tunis without having their papers checked. 

‘I’ve noticed a palpable fear of Black people in Tunisia’

Moreover, the Tunisian Nationalist Party (Parti nationaliste tunisien), which has been in existence since 2018 has been carrying out a campaign to “raise awareness” about what they call the “sub-Saharan invasion” into certain neighbourhoods in Tunis and Sfax. 

These Facebook posts call on Tunisians to refrain from renting to people from sub-Saharan Africa or hiring them. In the comments section, there are lots of xenophobic and racist comments as well as comments from sympathisers to the cause who say they want to help apply this locally.
These Facebook posts call on Tunisians to refrain from renting to people from sub-Saharan Africa or hiring them. In the comments section, there are lots of xenophobic and racist comments as well as comments from sympathisers to the cause who say they want to help apply this locally. Observers

The party also draws from the “great replacement theory“, championed by the extreme right in both Europe and the United States. 

A petition launched by the Tunisian Nationalist Party has collected nearly a thousand signatures. The petition demands the expulsion of undocumented migrants, the repeal of a law related to the fight against racial discrimination, as well as a requirement for all sub-Saharans to have a visa to enter Tunisia.
A petition launched by the Tunisian Nationalist Party has collected nearly a thousand signatures. The petition demands the expulsion of undocumented migrants, the repeal of a law related to the fight against racial discrimination, as well as a requirement for all sub-Saharans to have a visa to enter Tunisia. Tunisian Nationalist Party

Daoud continued: 

This party’s campaign to “raise awareness” has contributed to the hatred towards people from sub-Saharan Africa. Members of the party go to cafés, metro stations or to “louages” [Editor’s note: shared taxis for inter-urban transport] to “raise awareness”, essentially spreading hate about people from sub-Saharan Africa. I understand the country is experiencing a difficult economic period but it isn’t the presence of sub-Saharans in Tunisia that has caused that. 

They have a racist ideology. This is dangerous because political figures like the president indirectly encourage violence, which could lead to actual acts. I’ve noticed a palpable fear of Black people in Tunisia. Even at work, my colleagues refuse to drink the same water as me.

The FRANCE 24 Observers team attempted to reach the spokesperson for the ministry of the interior for a comment but did not get a response. We will update this page if we do. 

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