Activist investor ValueAct has been building a stake in Disney

Disney CEO Bob Iger speaking with CNBC’s David Faber at the Allen&Co. Annual Conference in Sun Valley, Idaho.

David A. Grogan | CNBC

ValueAct Capital has taken a significant stake in Disney (DIS) and has been in dialogue with Disney’s management, the Activist Spotlight has learned. This is a new stake not previously disclosed in filings or media reports.

Here’s a breakdown of the situation:

Company: Walt Disney Co.

Business: Disney is one of the most iconic entertainment companies globally. It operates through two segments, Disney Media and Entertainment Distribution; and Disney Parks, Experiences and Products. Disney engages in film and TV content production and distribution activities, as well as operates television broadcast networks and studios.

Stock Market Value: $167 Billion ($91.07 a share)

Activist: ValueAct Capital

Percentage Ownership: n/a

Average Cost: low $80s per share

Activist Commentary: ValueAct has been a premier corporate governance investor for over 20 years. ValueAct principals are generally on the boards of half of ValueAct’s core portfolio positions and have had 56 public company board seats over 23 years. ValueAct has filed 89 13D’s in their history and has had an average return of 57.57% versus 17.52% for the S&P 500 over the same period.

Behind the scenes:

ValueAct knows technology very well as seen by their active investments at Salesforce, Microsoft, and Adobe where they had board seats. They also know media well as active investors at the New York Times, Spotify and 21st Century Fox.

ValueAct began buying Disney this summer during the WGA and SAG strikes and it is one of the firm’s largest positions. The activist investor has been in dialogue with Disney’s management and are still growing their position today.

ValueAct believes that Disney’s theme parks and consumer products businesses and their $10 billion in EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) are alone worth low $80s per share, ValueAct’s approximate cost basis in the stock.

The theme parks unit has a high return on capital, allowing Disney to further monetize its intellectual property. Amongst its peers like Warner Bros, Paramount and Netflix, Disney is the only one who has this advantage. Moreover, this is a business that is not threatened by technology, but enhanced by it.

For example, Disney’s Genie app, which allows park visitors to be guided through the parks in a way that minimizes their wait time, greatly enhances the visitor experience. Moreover, Disney has recently announced that it will be investing $60 billion into theme parks, which will be money well spent.

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Disney YTD

This theme park valuation implies an almost zero valuation for the rest of Disney’s business that includes ESPN, theatrical movie releases, Disney+, Hulu and its television networks. Like digital news and music, video streaming was greatly disrupted by the internet and the low cost of capital from 2016 to 2021 afforded streaming companies, almost unlimited capital to acquire customers at any cost. Then with rising interest rates and inflation, that bubble burst in 2022 and there was a massive re-rating of assets globally.

Many of the high-growth companies that had easy access to capital now find themselves the most capital constrained they had been in a long time. This gives a huge advantage to companies like Disney, which has a market leading brand and an incumbent business model with strong customer relations.

Now, these streaming wars are in the process of resolving and companies are focused more on profitability than acquiring customers at any cost. This means cutting costs and creating growing and sustainable revenue.

ValueAct has experience in both of these areas. At Salesforce, where ValueAct CIO Mason Morfit is on the board, margins have gone from 18% to 32% while the stock has gone from $130 to $220 in 10 months. Disney has already announced an aggressive cost cutting plan, but it is the revenue opportunity that is more interesting here.

At portfolio companies like Adobe, Microsoft, Salesforce, Spotify and the New York Times, ValueAct has advocated for and assisted in creating bundles, pricing tiers and advertising stacks that have led to less churn, more pricing power, higher average revenue per user and even better advertising technology.

Both the New York Times and Spotify increased their bundles (NYT with Wordle, the Athletic, etc.; Spotify with podcasting and audiobooks) and both increased subscription pricing. The New York Times’ stock went from $30 per share to $45 per share and Spotify went from approximately $80 per share to $175 per share. Disney has numerous opportunities for bundling, price tiers, etc. and there are many ways this can work out through its present assets, M&A, alliances and licensing, but intelligently bundling its products will lead to more stable and valuable revenue. Based on similar situations that ValueAct has been involved in, this could lead to up to $15 billion of EBIT for the media assets and a Disney stock price as high as $190 per share.

ValueAct has a history of creating value through board seats, including at Salesforce and Microsoft, but has also added value as active shareholders in situations like Spotify and the New York Times.

I would expect that they would want a board seat here and as someone who has a reputation of working amicably and constructively with boards, the Disney board should welcome them with open arms. Aside from their extensive experience at technology companies and media companies and their innovative and relevant history of growing sustainable revenue at similar companies, there is one other reason shareholders should welcome them to the board.

Bob Iger returned to Disney in 2022 with an initial two-year contract with the explicit goal of righting the ship. The board formed a succession planning committee at that time. Iger subsequently extended his employment agreement through 2026 but longer-term succession remains one of the board’s most important priorities. Having a shareholder representative on the board is very helpful in that area particularly one like ValueAct, whose CIO participated in one of the most audacious and successful CEO successions ever when Satya Nadella replaced Steve Ballmer as CEO of Microsoft. Someone with that experience and perspective would be invaluable in navigating CEO succession at Disney.

Finally, we cannot ignore the fact that Disney is presently the target of a proxy fight by Nelson Peltz and Trian Partners that is turning somewhat confrontational. This certainly gives the Disney board an alternative they were not expecting.

Ken Squire is the founder and president of 13D Monitor, an institutional research service on shareholder activism, and the founder and portfolio manager of the 13D Activist Fund, a mutual fund that invests in a portfolio of activist 13D investments.

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Activist Legion Partners spots two possible paths to create value at Clear Channel Outdoor

Company: Clear Channel Outdoor (CCO)

Business: Clear Channel Outdoor is an out-of-home advertising company that offers a variety of advertising services, including through billboards, street furniture displays, transit displays and airport displays. It also sells street furniture equipment, provides cleaning and maintenance services and operates public bike programs. Clear Channel is broken into the following segments, which account for the following percentage of revenue: America (45%); Airports (10%, in the U.S. and Caribbean); Europe-North (23%); Europe-South (19%); and Other (3%, includes Latin America).

Stock Market Value: $661M ($1.37 per share)

Activist: Legion Partners

Percentage Ownership: 5.08%

Average Cost: $1.98

Activist Commentary: Legion is an activist investor whose managing directors are Chris Kiper, previously of Shamrock Activist Value Fund, and Ted White, previously of European activist fund Knight Vinke. Legion prefers to do its activist work behind the scenes, resorting to a proxy fight if amicable discussions do not go well. The firm has significant experience with consumer retail companies.

What’s happening?

Legion sent a letter to Clear Channel’s board, expressing concern with the scope and pace of the company’s current strategic review process. The firm also argued that the board needed to consider a broader strategic review process, including potential divestitures of other non-core assets and select U.S. assets, or a sale of the entire company.

Behind the scenes

CCO is one of the largest and highest quality out-of-home (“OOH”) advertising companies. The OOH business has long-term growth prospects and a strong business moat, especially among billboard assets. Clear Channel effectively has two business lines – Americas and Europe, each with very different business models and valuations. The European business works on fixed limited-term contracts with municipalities, which are rebid at maturity. Because of this, the European business trades at around a multiple of 8 times earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Most of the U.S. business is billboards, which the company owns, and accordingly trades closer to 13 times to 15 times EBITDA. Moreover, these billboards are in the process of being converted to digital, which will allow each billboard to generate approximately four times more revenue and six to 10 times more EBITDA. However, this conversion requires the approval of each municipality and will not be a quick process.

Despite its market leading position, Clear Channel’s shares have seriously underperformed since its separation from iHeartMedia in May 2019. CCO is currently trading 79% below the pre-deal share price and 65% below its peers since the separation. CCO’s underperformance has been linked to several factors, but is largely driven by the company’s high leverage, which amplifies volatility, and the sub-optimized conglomerate structure, which increases complexity. This has led to a misunderstanding by the market of the intrinsic value of the underlying assets, which should be significantly higher than what is implied by the current stock price. Legion Partners conducted a sum-of-the-parts analysis based on 2024 adjusted EBITDA estimates which implies an upside of 230% (implied valuation of $3.57 compared to $1.08 as of May 12). The firm thinks this could be unlocked as the company transitions to a U.S. pure play and reduces its leverage. Legion highlighted that while multiples for publicly traded OOH peers have compressed recently given potential macroeconomic slowdown concerns, it has seen that private market multiples for OOH assets are robust. Legion thinks that given quick synergies, industry consolidation is an accretive pursuit for any OOH player.

Legion has been actively engaged with the company for the past two years and most recently, had a meeting with management on May 12, where Legion expressed its concerns with the pace and scope of the company’s strategic review process. Specifically, Clear Channel has been prioritizing the sale of assets within Europe-South, even though the significantly larger part of the business is Europe-North. Moreover, since this strategic review of Europe began in December 2021, Clear Channel has announced the sales of businesses in Italy, Spain and Switzerland. This is concerning since as a fixed-contract business, the value goes down the closer the contracts get to maturity. Accordingly, Legion is pushing for an accelerated pursuit of a sale of the Europe business.

Legion sees two potential paths to value creation here. First, the company could sell off its European and Latin American businesses and become a U.S. pure play. While there is little value to Europe-South and Latin America, Legion believes that the Europe-North business could fetch $500 million to $600 million in a sale, which could be used to de-lever the company. Additionally, while selling Europe-South and Latin America would not yield significant proceeds, it would get rid of a distraction and allow management to focus on its crown jewel U.S. asset. As a sale of the European business would not be enough to optimally de-lever the balance sheet, Clear Channel could also consider selling select U.S. assets. Legion would like to see management pursue this plan while also exploring a potential sale of the entire company. Such a sale would be more complex and possibly less lucrative than the other plan, but it would have the benefit of certainty.

CCO first announced its strategic review of the European business in December 2021 and very little has come to fruition. It is unclear why this is and what the logjam is, but if it continues, Legion will want to be inside the boardroom to get a better look. Legion has shown in the past that it has no hesitancy in soliciting proxies if it feels that is necessary. We have no doubt that if the firm is met with reluctance by the board to commence one of the two outlined paths, Legion will seek board seats. But the firm has plenty of time to make that decision as the nomination window does not open until Jan. 4, 2024.

Ken Squire is the founder and president of 13D Monitor, an institutional research service on shareholder activism, and the founder and portfolio manager of the 13D Activist Fund, a mutual fund that invests in a portfolio of activist 13D investments.

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Op-ed: In battle with activist Jana Partners, Freshpet unleashes the dogs of war

In September 2022, Jana Partners made an investment in Freshpet after the company’s stock had dropped by approximately 74%.The firm liked the company and its business a lot, but thought that it was mismanaged and needed a reconstituted board to institute more focus and management accountability. Because Freshpet had a staggered board – one in which a portion of directors are up for election each year – Jana could only nominate four directors to the board last month to replace the four whose terms were expiring in 2023.

Jana made many good operational and capital allocation points in its case for change that alone justified adding one or two Jana representatives to the board. However, it is a big step from adding two new directors to four new directors. Replacing nearly 40% of the board is not something shareholders should do lightly, but it is necessary in situations where the bad performance is not just the problem but a symptom of poor governance, and that could not be clearer at Freshpet.

Forget about corporate governance infractions like a staggered board, which itself is a red flag. Freshpet had unique and somewhat unprecedented examples of at the very least, the board not holding management accountable, and at the worst, serious conflicts.

In 2020, Freshpet’s president and chief operating officer Scott Morris co-founded Hive Brands, a grocery and retail delivery service that focuses on the sustainability and environmental impact of the goods offered. Those goods include high-quality pet food and treats in direct competition with Freshpet. I almost hesitate to mention the “direct competition” point because it implies that this would be OK if Hive weren’t a competitor of Freshpet. Clearly, it wouldn’t be OK. Morris’s employment agreement states: “During the Employment Period, the Executive will devote the Executive’s full time and efforts to the business of the Company.” While it does also state that “The Executive may engage in non-competitive business or charitable activities for reasonable periods of time each month so long as such activities do not interfere with the Executive’s responsibilities under this Employment Agreement,” I do not think “activities” include participating in Hive’s launch, capital raises and management. Moreover, Hive is a competitor of the company by Freshpet’s own definition. The same employment agreement defines a competitor in part as “(i) engag[ing] in the manufacture, sale or distribution of either (A) fresh, refrigerated, frozen or raw pet food; or (B) dry pet food with more than 30% meat content.” But you do not need to be famed legal scholar Laurence Tribe to figure this out: It is highly inappropriate for a senior executive of a public company to work for another firm at the same time.

Additionally, many standard employment agreements include an inventions assignment provision in which the employee agrees to assign to the company any ownership or other rights he acquires through his work or services. Morris’s employment agreement does not have such a provision. But this does not appear to be an oversight as much as an omission through negotiation. Section 7 of his employment agreement governs non-competition and non-solicitation. Section 8 governs confidentiality, and section 9 is where you would normally see rights to inventions covered. However, there is no such section 9. Instead, that section is a standard publicity provision. Additionally, that is not how it seemed to be in the original draft of the agreement. Section 5(e) of the Morris employment agreement states: “The confidentiality and rights to inventions obligations established in Sections 8 and 9 of this Agreement will survive the termination of this Agreement pursuant to this section.” It seems that someone may have missed removing a cross reference in the document.

Ultimately, Morris acquired a valuable interest by founding Hive at a time when he was working as president and chief operating officer of Freshpet and being paid by Freshpet to be “involved in all aspects of Company development and day-to-day operations.” Between 2019 and 2021, Morris received $13.4 million in compensation from Freshpet while he was founding Hive. If the rights to inventions clause remained in the agreement, the company would have a very credible claim to his interest in Hive.

To exacerbate matters, Freshpet’s current vice chairman and former CFO Richard Kassar simultaneously served as Freshpet’s vice chairman and Hive’s CFO until August 2022. He later assumed the role of Freshpet’s interim CFO in September 2022, a post he held until December of that year. Additionally, directors J. David Basto and Olu Beck have served as a director and a formal advisor, respectively, at Hive, according to Jana. Basto resigned from Freshpet’s board, effective May 31, according to a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

This situation seems to go against the company’s general ethics policy, which provides: “Team members are not to engage in outside work or conflicting outside activities that have, or could have, a material effect on the team member’s duties to the Company; imply sponsorship or support by the Company; adversely affect the reputation of the Company; or otherwise compete with the Company.”

Jana attempted to address this by talking to Freshpet about improving corporate governance and adding new directors identified by Jana to the board. The company could have walked away with Jana’s offer of (i) replacing two directors of Freshpet’s choosing with Jana directors, (ii) addressing ongoing conflict and governance issues (including the overlap of certain officers and directors with competitor Hive); and (iii) permitting Jana to provide input and feedback on any potential future board chair. Jana even agreed to defer (ii) above until after the Jana-appointed directors joined the board.

The Freshpet board should have looked at this as a gift from heaven. Instead, the board went in the opposite direction and seemingly attempted to set up obstacles to a fair election, including expediting the annual meeting by moving it to July from that fall. This could be interpreted as an attempt to partially disenfranchise Jana and entrench incumbent directors. Jana was forced to spend the time and money to file a lawsuit in the Delaware Chancery Court, a move it made on June 1. Less than a week later, Freshpet reverted the governance changes back to the way they were prior to Jana’s involvement, including postponing the annual meeting to a date in October.

These types of tactics by Freshpet accomplish three things: (i) it causes both Jana and the company to spend needless time and money; (ii) it creates self-inflicted distractions for management – the kind companies generally complain about any time an activist starts a proxy fight – and (iii) it harms the board’s credibility with other shareholders and Institutional Shareholder Services. Shakespeare referred to unleashing “the dogs of war” as creating a force that – once let loose – is very difficult to control. By making those ill-advised entrenchment governance changes, Freshpet has done just that, even though it has attempted to undo it. The damage has already been done.

If this were not a staggered board, I think Jana would have a good shot at getting a majority of board seats given the company’s behavior and performance. It is only because of Freshpet’s entrenchment device that Jana is restricted to four nominees. If the company can settle for less than that, it should count its lucky stars, take the best settlement it can get and start focusing on running Freshpet – and only Freshpet.

Ken Squire is the founder and president of 13D Monitor, an institutional research service on shareholder activism, and he is the founder and portfolio manager of the 13D Activist Fund, a mutual fund that invests in a portfolio of activist 13D investments. Freshpet is a holding in the fund. Squire is also the creator of the AESG™ investment category, an activist investment style focused on improving ESG practices of portfolio companies.

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Activist investor Elliott is back at NRG Energy. Here’s how the firm plans to build value

Company: NRG Energy (NRG)

Business: NRG Energy is an integrated power company involved in producing and selling electricity and related products and services to residential, commercial, industrial and wholesale customers. It generates electricity using natural gas, coal, oil, solar, nuclear and battery storage.

Stock Market Value: $7.6B ($33.30 per share)

Activist: Elliott Management

Percentage Ownership:  > 13.0%

Average Cost: n/a

Activist Commentary: Elliott is a very successful and astute activist investor, particularly in the technology sector. Its team includes analysts from leading tech private equity firms, engineers and operating partners – former technology CEO and COOs. When evaluating an investment, the firm also hires specialty and general management consultants, expert cost analysts and industry specialists. The firm often watches companies for many years before investing and has an extensive stable of impressive board candidates.

What’s happening?

On May 15, Elliott sent a letter to NRG. The firm called on the company to implement a plan that includes appointing five new independent board members it has identified and making operational and strategic improvements, including a review of Vivint Smart Home.

This is not Elliott’s first foray with NRG. In January 2017, the firm filed a 13D on NRG with a plan centered around operational improvements and portfolio actions. Elliott saw a company with an attractive collection of generation and retail assets that had lost its focus as it expanded beyond its core merchant power and retail electricity businesses, which led to an uncompetitive cost structure, an overleveraged balance sheet and a complex asset portfolio. As part of its plan, Elliott suggested that NRG focus on its core businesses by reducing costs, monetizing non-core assets to simplify its portfolio and paying down debt. NRG conducted a four-month business review that targeted initiatives, including $1.065 billion of total cost and margin improvement, $2.5 billion to $4.0 billion of asset divestitures and $13 billion of debt reduction. In February 2017, Elliott settled with the company for the replacement of two directors, including the chairman, with a longtime director (since 2003) taking over the chairman role. Elliott exited their 13D six months later with a 103.5% return versus 7.5% for the S&P 500. One year later, one of their directors resigned from the board. Two years after Elliott wrapped up the engagement, the other director resigned.

Since the end of the firm’s engagement, NRG has reversed much of its progress and has underperformed the S&P Utilities Index by 44% and integrated power peers by 53%, which can largely be attributed to various operational failures and a loss of strategic direction. NRG missed two years of financial guidance in 2021 and 2022 after struggling with repeated plant outages and demonstrating an inability to manage through extreme weather events. Perhaps more impactive to its dismal performance was the company’s acquisition of Vivint (a home security business), completed on March 10. This acquisition prompted a 20% decline in NRG’s market cap over the first week and begs the question of why the company would make such a large bet on a strategy that many other firms have already failed to execute successfully.

Missteps aside, Elliott thinks that the company’s retail franchise is a crown jewel that has been a market leader in Texas for over 20 years and there remain several opportunities to get back on track. Now Elliott is back with a plan that is remarkably similar to its 2017 plan: improve operations, refresh the board, and fix strategy and capital allocation. Elliott calls on the company to adopt an operationally focused strategy of improving reliability, reducing costs and meeting financial commitments. The firm thinks that this could lead to at least $500 million of recurring, EBITDA-accretive cost reductions by 2025. Additionally, Elliott believes that NRG should conduct a strategic review of its home services strategy, including Vivint, and focus on the core integrated power business. The company should also establish a new capital allocation framework to return at least 80% of free cash flow to shareholders, with any growth investments focused on the generation and retail businesses. Elliott states that this plan would allow the company to return $6.5 billion of excess capital (~85% of the current market cap) to shareholders over the next three years. Elliott believes that this plan could create over $5 billion of value, driving the stock price to upward of $55 per share.

To effectively oversee this plan, Elliott believes that the board needs new independent directors with expertise in the power and energy industry. Elliott has identified five candidates that it believes will help implement the foregoing operational and strategic changes. The board and management currently consist of the same chairman Elliott agreed to in 2017, five (out of 10) of the same directors from before Elliott’s 2017 engagement and the same CEO as from before the firm’s engagement. Elliott does not come out and say that the company needs a new CEO, but the firm certainly dances around it in the May 15 letter: It notes that the company “must restore the credibility of the management team.” “The Board should also evaluate the management team’s ability to drive high-performance operations on a sustained basis.” “Strong management will be key to the success of the Repower NRG Plan,” and “significant changes are needed.”

One of the biggest, but under-recognized benefits of shareholder activism is that activists often not only create value during their engagement, but they also put the company on the right trajectory to sustain shareholder value over the long term. The latter did not happen here, and now Elliott is realizing the difference between giving someone a fish and teaching them to fish. Or, to use a more business-like analogy, the difference between “clock building” and “time telling” as explained by author Jim Collins in the book “Built to Last.” “Searching for a single great idea on which to build success is time telling; building an organization that can generate many great ideas over a long period of time is clock building. Enduring greatness requires clock building,” Collins wrote. In 2017, Elliott’s campaign was about time telling. To achieve the kind of long-term value the firm appears to be aiming for this time around, it is going to have to build a clock.

They will have time to make this happen. Elliott has only recommended directors instead of nominating them, which signals amicable engagement, but it cannot formally nominate directors until Dec. 29 and has until Jan. 28, 2024 to make nominations. The amount of change that is needed to sustain long-term value as Elliott alludes to in its letter will take more than just replacing two directors this time, so an early settlement might not be in the cards.

It should be noted that activists have historically not been that successful the second time around when they go back to the well. A 2019 study conducted by 13D Monitor concluded that when activists file a second campaign at the same company, they have an average return of 16.78% versus 28.56% for the S&P 500 the second time around. That’s compared to an average return of 46.54% versus 6.25% the first time they engaged.

Ken Squire is the founder and president of 13D Monitor, an institutional research service on shareholder activism, and the founder and portfolio manager of the 13D Activist Fund, a mutual fund that invests in a portfolio of activist 13D investments.

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