It’s time to take a step back from the brink of a divided world

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

We think that our vision of connectivity is essential for Europe’s ability to become strong again — and that cooler heads will soon have a chance to prevail. During our presidency, we intend to show how, Balázs Orbán writes.

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Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Europe this week is his first visit to the continent since the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic disrupted exchanges between Europe and China, making President Xi’s visit crucial in restoring links with European countries.

The first visit of a Chinese president in 20 years to Hungary also marks the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between Hungary and China. 

One might find it curious why Budapest has emerged as the only EU capital President Xi is visiting other than Paris. 

The simple answer is that Hungary has transformed into a pivotal state for all concerned — a promoter of peace and national sovereignty, a leader of new industries, a crucial player in bridging East and West, and a gateway to the European Union. The Chinese president’s choice reflects this fact.

This is what we mean by ‘Hussar Cut’

Hungary’s foreign policy strategy, centred on connectivity, is attracting global attention.

While many nations across the world are closing in on themselves, Hungary stands out by actively cultivating ties with a wide array of countries and market players across various sectors, from trade to infrastructure, as well as cultural and scientific exchange.

We believe that this strategy is essential for escaping the middle-income trap and positioning ourselves to thrive in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.

This bold masterstroke, a “Hussar Cut” as we call it in Hungarian, appears to be paying off. Since 2010, the Hungarian government has transformed the economy into an open, export-oriented model capable of robust growth.

This has resulted in a remarkable 38% increase in GDP per capita over the past 13 years. 

Our efforts have propelled Hungary from the 23rd to the 11th most complex economy according to the Harvard Economic Complexity Index, boasting a highly diversified export portfolio. 

Additionally, we’ve fostered a work-based society with record-low unemployment, complemented by a flat-rate income tax of 15% and a corporate tax rate of just 9%.

It’s all about best technology, globally

Hungary has been focused on bolstering domestic companies such as MOL, Richter, OTP Bank, and 4iG to help them emerge as dominant regional players. 

Our efforts to expand energy connections, repurchase the Budapest Airport, renovate the Budapest-Belgrade railway and establish a port in Trieste capable of handling 2.5 million tonnes of goods a year further our commitment to enhanced connectivity across all fronts. 

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Hungary has nearly doubled since 2010, with a more geographically diverse investor base. Last year, compared to 2010, the share of Asian investors surged from 19% to 34%. Meanwhile, European investments accounted for 56%.

We actively encourage foreign companies to establish headquarters here, as we aim to make Hungary a regional hub and a global meeting point. Alongside this, we invest significantly in culture and sport relative to GDP, outstripping European averages.

On the industrial front, Hungary seeks to strengthen its military, information technology, energy, and banking sectors while also emphasising the development of industries such as food, pharmaceuticals, and automotive — all pivotal for global connectivity.

As part of our strategy, we seek to partner with countries and companies that offer the best technology globally, which is why China is a natural partner for us. Hungary’s strength is growing, particularly in the electric vehicle sector. 

BYD, China’s top electric vehicle manufacturer, has announced plans to build its first European passenger car facility in Hungary, which is a direct result of building strategic partnerships over the years. In doing so, we’re betting against the current trends toward decoupling and de-risking.

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Europe’s place in this increased global competition is under threat. In recent years, European GDP growth has lagged in both the Us and China. Europe’s import dependency is five times higher than that of the North American continent, according to the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, and decoupling would come at a very high cost. 

Keep cool, calm and connected

In this situation, Europe must also recognise that the evolving geopolitical environment requires a strategy of prudent connectivity. When global tensions between China and the US arise, Europe’s open economic framework will pay the price.

The increasing logic of bloc formation we witness today poses a number of clear dangers. 

From our perspective in Budapest, these dangers include the worsening of existing dependences, the loss of our sovereignty, economic decline, consignment to the geopolitical periphery, and exposure to conflicts affecting all bloc members.

Our proposed solution is for Hungary to become a keystone state — a pivotal hub in the interconnected global landscape. By doing so, we can mitigate one-way dependencies, safeguard our sovereignty, ensure economic prosperity, and maintain internal and external security.  

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Doing so is crucial not only for our sovereignty but also for the success of the region and of Europe as a whole.

In the second half of this year, Hungary will exercise the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU. 

We think that our vision of connectivity is essential for Europe’s ability to become strong again — and that cooler heads will soon have a chance to prevail. During our presidency, we intend to show how. 

It’s time to take a step back from the brink of a divided world. In Hungary, we are already reaping the benefits.

Balázs Orbán is a member of the Hungarian parliament and political director for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

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The EU and Taiwan must partner up in the fight against disinformation

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

If the two could join forces in their endeavours, it is possible that they could fuel regional development in Southeast Asia and elsewhere within the Global South where China has developed influence and a rooted footprint via its Belt and Road Initiative, Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy writes.

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In May, G7 leaders, meeting at the 2023 Hiroshima Summit, agreed that a “growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest”. 

Their call, for continuing multilateral engagement with Beijing did, though, request that China not conduct interference activities aimed at undermining the integrity of democratic institutions, and that the country should do more to press Russia on its military aggression in Ukraine.

Conversely, at this month’s Belt and Road Forum of International Cooperation in Beijing, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin celebrated the deepening of their mutual political trust, praising the close strategic coordination of the two countries. 

This followed Xi’s March visit to Moscow when the two leaders reinforced their ambition to remake the liberal international order, with the Chinese leader reassuring his “dear friend” that they are driving changes “that have not happened for one hundred years”.

This deepening of relations captures a new geopolitical reality, which many in Europe are still struggling to comprehend.

Sino-Russian cooperation a growing concern?

Looking eastwards, Europeans now see two former foes, China and Russia, bound together by their shared fear of liberal democracy. 

These regimes want to upend the world order so that it marries with their authoritarian agendas. 

The bilateral meeting between Xi and Putin on the sidelines of the Belt and Road Forum this month left no question about Beijing’s desire to curate and present an alternative worldview to the Global South, while strengthening its strategic alignment with Russia.

The meeting also consolidated Putin’s support towards China’s positioning on international affairs, in line with the Global Security Initiative, which Xi designed to help China achieve global primacy against a perceived backdrop of Western inhibitors.

The scale of Sino-Russian cooperation is vast, multi-faceted, and developing at speed. For, not only are their militaries and economies now in a state of synergy, their diplomats and state-controlled media are also collaborating closely. 

Chinese state-media and official social media channels routinely amplify selected pro-Kremlin narratives and are also platforming Russian media sanctioned by the West.

This growing strategic partnership is forcing the EU to finally get serious about its claims to rethink ties with China – and, by association, with Russia – in what European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the de-risking of trade and political relations. 

China is changing, and “moving into a new era of security and control”; it is time for Europe to change, too.

Brussels needs a defensive toolbox — Taiwan can help

How this can be effected, though, is still at a fragmented stage of development, and was a key point of discussion at this year’s Budapest Forum. The EU High Representative Josep Borrell has urged the bloc and its member states to work with democratic partners around the world to fight information manipulation by authoritarian regimes.

This is an important step, which marries with wider efforts to position the EU as an independent voice and force on the world stage.

By focusing on Russia and China as key foreign actors in information manipulation and interference, the EU continues to invest in strategic communication, vital to defend democracy.

But it is essential that closer coordination at home is supported by a defensive toolbox for economic security and stronger cooperation with like-minded international partners, including Taiwan, if the bloc is to effectively push back at China and Russia’s developing orbit. 

What is needed most to boost the immune system of democracies is a whole-of-society approach and an inclusive global conversation with the developing world.

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The learning pools from Taiwan, and its response to Chinese aggression, are particularly important. For, here, over decades, democracy has withstood a barrage of disinformation and hostility from China. 

And, as a testament to the island nation’s strength, it has developed an approach that reflects the collective will of society and encourages a civic spirit that empowers citizens to feel that they hold the reigns of their democracy. 

This has extended to emerging and digital technologies, which are now seen through the lens of individual citizen interest, rather than benefiting those of the country’s political class.

Can the EU lead into action?

This has established a two-way trust, which, today, not only sees Taiwan hold the status as a pivotal node in the global semiconductor supply chain but also boasts a radically transparent democratic system of government. 

The lessons for Europe are numerous, and it is in the EU’s interest to explore Taiwan’s open and technologically driven governance and its expertise in media literacy. 

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For the past decades, the government has invested in education to empower its citizens to make informed decisions about what they see and read. Together, the EU and Taiwan and other democratically-minded countries could develop a networked system that would undercut the space for authoritarian regimes to corrupt information streams with falsehoods.

The two, and others committed to this cause, should partner up and help anchor developing countries in democracy and limit China’s negative clout, mindful that significant infrastructure investment needs will remain across the Global South. 

Europe’s Global Gateway forum, for one, seeks to boost secure links in digital, energy, transport and education along with democratic values, while Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy has committed to integrating its capacity in digital technology to promote a digital New Southbound initiative. 

If the two could join forces in their endeavours, it is possible that they could fuel regional development in South East Asia and elsewhere within the Global South where China has developed influence and a rooted footprint via its Belt and Road Initiative.

All of this points to the necessity for Europe to be more global-minded in its policy, and to take on the role of upholding not just its own, but other, developing democratic ecosystems. 

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Understanding the long-term consequences of information manipulation by authoritarian regimes to the rules-based order will be key to the future of global democracy. 

The question is: is the EU prepared to fundamentally change its position, and lead in this action?

Dr Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy is Assistant Professor at National Dong Hwa University in Hualien, Taiwan and the author of “Europe, China, and the Limits of Normative Power”.

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Could the COVID pandemic have been avoided if China were a democracy?

By Oliver St. John, Founder and Public Affairs Manager, IAD

Not only could China have potentially prevented the global coronavirus pandemic — its authoritarian regime is now also impeding our ability to learn from it, thereby increasing the risk of future pandemics, Oliver St. John writes.

Several weeks ago, the Director General of the World Health Organisation, Tedros Ghebreyesus, declared “an end to COVID-19 as a public health emergency”. 

It is now more than three and a half years since the first case of COVID-19 was reported in China, and it is still unclear how the pandemic started. 

It is imperative that we now redouble efforts to determine how the pandemic started and how it could have been avoided, so we can prevent future pandemics. 

One important aspect that has not been given consideration is whether the nature of authoritarian regimes fosters public health emergencies such as COVID-19.

China’s authoritarian regime severely curtails many of the fundamental freedoms which citizens in democracies take for granted. 

The suppression of freedom of expression, in particular, hinders independent research, information sharing and freedom of the press. 

If China were a democracy, a political system in which freedom of expression and freedom of the press is indispensable, could it have been possible to contain the COVID-19 outbreak at an early stage, thus potentially avoiding the devastating global pandemic we experienced?

China’s freedom of speech crackdown didn’t help limit the spread

The pandemic has had an unprecedented negative impact on the lives of billions around the world and continues to affect us to this day. 

According to the WHO, there have been almost 7 million deaths due to COVID-19. 

And let us remember, these are only official numbers presented; authoritarian regimes such as China have not been transparent in their reporting. 

And this is not the first time that Beijing’s suppression of freedom of speech has fostered the spread of a coronavirus and sparked an international health crisis, as seen in the case of Dr Jiang Yanyong during the 2003 SARS epidemic.

It is, therefore, vital to understand whether China’s authoritarian system provides optimal conditions for deadly diseases to spread.

Arrests, detentions, and reprimands

The earliest case of COVID-19 is reported to have been detected on 17 November 2019, weeks before Chinese authorities acknowledged the virus. 

On 30 December 2019, a Chinese doctor, Li Wenliang, informed colleagues in a chat group about a novel virus, which resulted in Li being detained by police. 

Li, unfortunately, died of COVID-19 in February 2020. 

His death sparked demands on social media for freedom of speech in China; these demands were unsurprisingly censored by China’s repressive authorities.

Li was not an exception; it is thought that eight people were detained by police for sharing information about the COVID-19 outbreak.

Ai Fen is another doctor in Wuhan who was reprimanded for raising the alarm of a new virus in December 2019. 

Staff at Ai’s hospital were explicitly forbidden from sharing information relating to the virus.

Expert advice was ignored, too

Chinese officials initially ignored advice from experts and refused to acknowledge human-to-human transmission of the virus, allowing the virus to spread quickly. 

It took until 20 January 2020 for Chinese officials to finally acknowledge transmission between humans and until 23 January 2020 for a travel ban and quarantine to be imposed on Wuhan. 

That amounts to over two months between the detection of the virus and the implementation of measures.

The period between 17 November 2019 and 23 January 2020 was crucial. If experts in China had been free to voice their professional opinions and share their data and findings, and if the media had been allowed to report freely on these findings, appropriate action could have been taken earlier to contain the outbreak, which was initially limited to a small area. 

“We watched more and more patients come in as the radius of the spread of infection became larger,” Ai stated. 

In the lead-up to the Chinese Lunar New Year holiday, before the travel ban was finally implemented, around 5 million people are estimated to have travelled from Wuhan, the epicentre of the COVID-19 outbreak, thus allowing the virus to spread across China and ultimately, the globe.

We still don’t know how the pandemic started

The absence of independent research and information sharing under China’s authoritarian regime continues to affect us today. 

In the aftermath of a global pandemic that has claimed the lives of millions and affected billions, it is crucial to understand its origins, so we can prevent it from happening again. 

However, China’s authoritarian regime strikes again. 

More than three years after the outbreak of COVID-19, it is still unclear how the pandemic started. In April this year, a senior WHO official denounced China’s “lack of data disclosure” as “simply inexcusable”. 

Not only could China have potentially prevented the global COVID-19 pandemic — its authoritarian regime is now also impeding our ability to learn from it, thereby increasing the risk of future pandemics.

Things would have been different under a democratic regime

If China were a democracy, medical professionals and scientists would have been free to share information about the outbreak of COVID-19 without fear of repercussions. 

Journalists in China would have been free to report on the outbreak. Experts could have advised the government about how to stop the spread of the deadly virus.

Under these circumstances, the Chinese government would have had no other choice but to take action earlier. 

This could have prevented the virus from spreading outside of Wuhan. 

At least 7 million deaths could have been avoided and immeasurable suffering prevented if only the Chinese government weren’t afraid of the voices of its own citizens.

Oliver St. John is the Founder and Public Affairs Manager at the International Association for Democracy (IAD). At IAD, he leads the work on raising awareness about the challenges facing democracy around the world and on lobbying politicians to do more to promote and defend democracy.

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Can China broker peace between Russia and Ukraine?

China presents itself as neutral in the Ukraine war.

At the same time, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been in Moscow for an extended meeting with Putin – an alleged war criminal.

In an article published in Russian state media to mark the start of Xi’s trip, Xi called his visit “a journey of friendship, cooperation and peace” and promised to “open a new chapter” in bilateral relations.

China has “always maintained an objective and impartial position” on Ukraine and “actively promoted peace talks,” it said.

After China’s successful rapprochement of two arch-rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran, is peace in Ukraine the next victory for Chinese diplomacy?

Both EU and NATO officials are urging Beijing to take a proactive role and put pressure on Moscow. 

What connects China and Russia?

In addition to a long history as neighbouring countries and a nearly 4,200km border, there are numerous connections between Russia and China.

“It makes enormous sense for China to secure through negotiations, through its alliance with Russia right now, with Putin, to at least avoid trouble along that border,” explains Professor Hans van de Ven, historian and professor of Chinese history at the University of Cambridge.

On the world political stage, China and Russia are united by their opposition to the United States, their rejection of NATO and the Western model of democracy.

In addition, they share common economic interests: China imports raw materials, and Russia relies on importing high-tech products and components from China, explained Dr Saskia Hieber, a lecturer in international politics with a focus on Asia-Pacific at the Academy for Political Education in Tutzing Germany, in an interview with Euronews.

But this particularly strong link between Russia and China is based mainly on the close relationship between the two presidents, explains Steven Tsang, a political scientist and director of the SOAS China Institute in London.

“There is a very strong personal bond and mutual respect and admiration between both Putin and Xi Jinping,” said Tsang.

What role has China played in the Ukraine war so far?

China’s role so far can be described as a balancing act. By declaring itself “neutral” to some degree while remaining close to Putin and Russia, China has created a position that “inevitably creates distance between themselves and the United States, but at the same time not completely alienating European countries,” according to Professor van de Ven, who spoke of a “complex manoeuvre.”

Almost a month ago, China presented a 12-point plan for peace in Ukraine which the European Union criticised since it did not “distinguish between aggressor and victim” but put the parties on the same level, said EU foreign affairs representative Josep Borrell on the anniversary of the war.

Saskia Hieber classifies the Chinese points paper as “not very concrete.” It was “perceived with attentive distance in Moscow,” according to the China expert.

The opinions of the experts differ as to what China is actually saying with the first point: respect for the sovereignty of all countries. Hieber sees a clear formulation that Beijing is demanding that Moscow respect Ukrainian territory.

However, “China’s position paper simply says that territorial integrity should be respected, without saying whose territorial integrity that is,” says Professor Tsang.

Where did the initiative for this new role of China as a peace broker come from?

Earlier this month, Saudi Arabia and Iran declared they would reopen diplomatic channels after several years of silence. This rapprochement between the arch-enemies, which is crucial for the Middle East, was negotiated by China – at the initiative of President Xi.

“Xi Jinping is trying to find a new role for China in the world,” van de Ven said. Now, Beijing is presenting itself as a mediator in the Ukraine war – the first time China has interfered in European politics in this way.

Van de Ven considers direct interference in the war – China refers to it as a “crisis” in its 12-point plan – to be unlikely, even if the United States has indications that China could supply Russia with weapons. Beijing’s main concern is to signal a willingness to play a proactive role in peace, Tsang said.

While China has an interest in ensuring that the global economy and international trade relations and supply chains function, it fundamentally wants to stay out of the Ukraine war, says Saskia Hieber.

Can Beijing play a serious mediating role?

As long as neither Ukraine nor Russia is willing to talk about peace and seek a solution on the battlefield, China cannot play a role in the peace process either, according to Professor van de Ven. “I think talks are simply not an option at the moment.”

Saskia Hieber agrees with this opinion. While China was committed to peace and negotiations, she said, it ignored Moscow’s position “that it’s not possible to renounce hostilities and warfare at this point.”

China cannot play a mediating role, she said, “because it does not condemn the war, because it sides with Moscow. Because it does not openly say that it is a war of aggression, an illegal war of aggression.”

An end to the war could be in China’s interests from other points of view, as well: Chinese expertise could play an important role in the reconstruction of Ukraine.

“China could play a positive role if it wants to. It is very well suited to do so, given its ability to execute major projects and deliver them quickly,” van de Ven said.

But, while Beijing could benefit from this situation, a leading role in reconstruction and China’s presence in Ukraine would “create all kinds of new anxieties” in Europe, van de Ven believes.

How much pressure can China put on Moscow?

Neither the EU nor the United States can act as mediators, EU foreign affairs envoy Josep Borrell told the Spanish daily El Mundo. “Diplomacy cannot be only European or American, Chinese diplomacy must also play a role here,” Borrell said.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is also increasing pressure on Beijing: “China must begin to understand the perspective of Kyiv and establish contact with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy if he wants to be serious about peace. Beijing, on the other hand, has not condemned the illegal invasion of Russia.”

How likely is it that Beijing will increase pressure on Moscow to bring about a quick end to the war?

Saskia Hieber speaks of the “huge dilemma” that the war in Ukraine has put China in.

The country is not interested in having a strong, victorious neighbour in Russia that wins the war triumphantly, nor does it want Russia to fail miserably and emerge from the war completely weakened, Hieber said, hence the initiative for peaceful negotiations.

“If the EU expects Xi Jinping to actually play a role to make peace, genuinely, I think the EU is misguided,” Steven Tsang said.

According to him, the fact that Xi Jinping travelled to Russia on a state visit and met Putin over an extended period of time while planning to (possibly) talk virtually with President Zelenskyy shows that Xi is not seeking an impartial solution.

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Msc 2023, the game of the dragon

The security order in Europe, which now needs to be entirely reimagined, has become the event’s origin due to Russia’s war against Ukraine. It will be necessary to do this by creating new regulations, updating institutions, and reevaluating the entire European security apparatus in light of emerging or previously unidentified threats.

More generally, this conflict necessitates a reconsideration of the guiding principles and ideals of the international system, which is currently beset by conflicting “visions” between democracies and autocracies.

Here six things to watch:

One, China

The conference’s main objective will be to define what the European Union’s relationship with China should be, both as a whole and as individual countries. This conversation is more difficult than it used to be because of the connection between economic expansion and national security, whether it be in innovation, trade, energy, or pandemic preparedness.

The Sino-Russian collaboration will continue to be in the spotlight a year after their “no-limits alliance,” and China will continue to help Russia with necessary supplies. Wang Yi, a former foreign minister and new member of the Politburo, is expected to attend, whereas Russia has not gotten an official invitation for the first time in many years (Russia did not send a delegation in 2022).

Mirko Campochiari one of the most succesful military analysts on the web, says: “It is thought that China wants to play a game called escalate to de-escalate. They create a crisis situation and then they offer a compensation or a political reconciliation. China has not yet exposed itself about the war in Ukraine. Partly because China has a very careful, soft-power oriented policy. For them to come out of the closet and play a part in the conflict, to become a major player and try to mediate the Ukrainian crisis, this could bring great gains in visibility, but it could also be a major failure. It could undermine the way China sees itself (as a world power). Therefore I don’t believe China will play any role in this conflict, not to mention the fact that a weak Russia might even be convenient to China in the long run, because Beijing could so acquire cheap hydrocarbons and gas, since Russia wille necessarily have to venting other markets”.

Two, Ukraine

Several days after the Munich Security Conference in 2022, Russian soldiers first occupied Ukraine. The resilience of the two opposing armies will be a hotly debated topic once springtime returns. According to the existing plan, war will likely continue indefinitely. Even though there has been a great deal of loss and damage, it does not seem that this strategy will be opposed in the near future.

Christoph Heusgen, the new MSC’s boss, favors the sale of fighter jets to Ukraine%20%3Ca%20href=%22https://twitter.com/TRTWorldNow/status/1489860089313775616?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw”>February 5, 2022</a></blockquote> <script async src), clearly at odds with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. After deploying 31 Abrams tanks to Ukraine last month, the Pentagon seems to be warming up to the notion.

Three, NATO

It will likely be examined if NATO can maintain its unity over the long term as well as the widening East/West division. Despite the unity brought about by the current situation, many eastern member states that share a border with Russia feel that western states are acting irrationally more often than not. The alliance’s ability to adapt to this division, be agile, and be able to fulfill the needs of the current security environment will determine how successful it is in the future.

Other conversations will center on the issue of Sweden and Finland joining NATO, which is ultimately dependent on Turkey’s approval and is expected to be inactive until Turkey’s presidential elections later this year. There will be discussion of Ukraine’s application to join NATO, but no immediate decision is anticipated. At the NATO summit to be held in July in Vilnius, members are likely to focus on the operational integration of Ukraine, which could take the shape of a Membership Action Plan (MAP).

There will probably be a focus on operational reinforcement for NATO’s European pillar. Those who support European strategic autonomy have been ignored in the context of the war in Ukraine since the priority is for the entire alliance to form a block against Russia.

Four, Defense expenditures

In this new geopolitical environment, Germany and France have each pledged billions of euros in funding to support and modernize their armed forces, raising important questions for business about how these funds will be accessed, how much will go to domestic companies, whether foreign companies can receive funding, etc. Important queries in a situation where businesses are more visible than ever at the conference.

New EU legislation, which requires military corporations interested in the European market to prove their commitment in Europe, is based on the idea of the “Europeanization” of defense. Strong agreement with ESG principles, such as human rights respect and greening militaries, is another factor. The eagerly anticipated first German National Security Strategy, which might be made public at the conference, may hold some of the answers, at least for Germany.

Five, Energy and the environment

As governments’ commitments to using green energy sources continue to be jeopardized by the ongoing energy security problem, energy will emerge as a crucial issue. Europeans will keep talking about how to relax their stringent collective limits on state subsidies and how to respond to the US Inflation Reduction Act. A focus on the urgency of increasing resilience to climate impacts, such as migration, may also be present, especially in areas of the world that have already seen significant consequences from climate change, such as Africa and Southeast Asia.

Six, Cybersecurity and technology

In particular between the EU and the US, there will likely be a focus on expanding collaboration through collaborative standard-setting in the areas of technology and cybersecurity, as well as a continuous dedication to a democratic and reliable information environment. The Digital Services and Digital Markets Act, which aims to create a safer online environment, safeguard fundamental user rights, identify and eliminate gatekeepers, and level the playing field for businesses, will be highlighted together with other European tech regulations.



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US-China balloon brawl shows the EU needs to boost its clout in Asia


The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent in any way the editorial position of Euronews.

With the fourth “unmanned aerial object” being shot down over US airspace in as many as eight days, tensions across the Pacific are reaching levels we had not seen since the depths of the Cold War.

While the war in Ukraine has kept the global focus on Europe, the balloon incidents could be the decisive moment that history books later remember as the spark that caused the US and Europe’s foreign policy to finally pivot towards Asia.

While the rhetoric coming out of Beijing and Washington has been steadily escalating, the US has gradually prepared its entrance into the Pacific arena, forging new alliances and strategic partnerships. 

Brussels has been quick to react and catch up.

Both powers have realised the importance of positioning themselves in Asia not to become relics of the past, as the region promises to be the main driver of global economic growth.

However, the US and the EU will need to employ different strategies based on their respective strengths to successfully forge a significant presence in Asia.

Washington’s intentions in Asia are clear

The US already possesses a strong foothold in the Asia Pacific, being the second most important trading partner to most nations and over 120 military bases in the region. 

As Beijing’s hostility in Southeast Asia grows, it has pushed the nations in the region to seek US deterrence to guarantee their sovereignty. 

Countries like Indonesia and the Philippines have started to express repeated concerns over Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s coercive tactics, including several voices at this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos.

There is an opportunity for the US to provide a balancing of powers to nations being increasingly dwarfed into Beijing’s sphere of influence. 

The recent launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework agreement (IPEF), which includes 12 regional nations and excludes China, is evidence of this appetite. 

The Biden administration should use the IPEF as a springboard to accelerate and strengthen economic and military ties with any Southeast Asian nation seeking to balance China’s influence and ensure their sovereignty as much as their economic security. 

The recent announcement of the acceleration of the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement between the US and the Philippines, providing access to four new military bases in the Philippines for the US military, is proof of that.

Energy-producing allies are key in offsetting China’s influence

The US possesses a second key advantage — its status as an energy-producing nation. This endows it with the potential to safeguard global energy security and affordability as the energy supply crunch threatens political and economic stability across the world. This, however, requires energy-producing allies.

Saudi Arabia used to hold that special position. However, its growing rapprochement with Russia and, recently, China, has strained its relationship with Washington. 

The United Arab Emirates has stepped up to fill the void. 

It helped protect US interests in the region by attempting to dissuade Saudi Arabia from enacting an oil production cut in OPEC+ last year when prices were already above pre-pandemic levels. 

The ties between Washington and Abu Dhabi are only likely to get stronger as the Emirates also has the ability to exert influence in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and can assist the US in shifting its focus within the region.

Brussels is playing a different game

On the other hand, Europe’s strategy has been vastly different. 

Slightly more opportunistic, Brussels has concentrated on pooling its collective resources to offer significant investments to assume a stronger global leadership role in the future.

The European lighthouse projects within the Global Gateway Initiative offer developing countries an alternative to China’s strategic largesse under the Belt and Road Initiative, through which Beijing demonstrates its power along strategic trade routes by developing ports, energy projects and telecommunications networks. 

The EU has several projects planned in China’s backyard, such as an energy transition partnership with Indonesia and a digital connectivity project in the Philippines. 

The same goes for plans in Russia’s backyard, such as a hydrogen project in Kazakhstan, which is becoming an increasingly important partner for Europe in questions of future energy and raw materials supply.

Furthermore, Brussels is planning a transport link in Central Asia, two projects in Mongolia and a hydropower plant in Tajikistan.

Hearts and minds are best won through economic might

In the era of strategic competition, deal-making and an ambitious approach to partnerships with ASEAN economies are precisely what is still needed for the EU. 

In turn, bilateral engagement with Southeast Asia’s giants, Indonesia and the Philippines, will strengthen the case for the holy grail of its Indo-Pacific trade diplomacy: an EU-ASEAN trade deal could and should lead to a free trade agreement to boost growth and strength on both sides one day.

There are good approaches in this that both Washington and Brussels can learn from and, better yet, work on collectively. 

As the pivot unfolds, the US and EU must not forget that the strongest weapon in their arsenal is their economic might. You can, indeed, fight balloons with dollars and euros.

The two should also make this message clear when their representatives meet China’s top foreign policy official Wang Yi at the Munich Security Conference, which takes place this weekend.

Oliver Rolofs is a strategic security and communication expert. He was previously Head of Communications at the Munich Security Conference, where he established the Cybersecurity and Energy Security Programme.

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